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Introduction
The book presented here belongs to the series documenting different 
topics discussed during the seminary that was held in The Institute of 
Cultural Studies (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan) in 2011–2013. The 
seminary itself was dedicated to the study of the theoretical consequences 
of different methodologies and approaches engaged by historians in the 
particular field of the theory of cultural change. The seminary consisted 
of young scholars belonging to various intellectual traditions, working 
within different specialities and different, sometimes mutually exclusive 
methodologies. Not the common point of view, but a shared interest in 
the problem of change and its possible theoretical solutions united the 
seminary.
Three texts presented here deal with separate but still deeply connected 
issues connected with theoretical problems discussed in previous books 
of the series. A n d r z e j B e ł k o t  concentrates his study on the historical 
dimension of the structures of everyday life, following and modifying 
the solutions indicated both by historians and cultural theoreticians. 
The main frame of his considerations is formed by the theory of cultural 
participation as developed in Poznan University. The article proposed by 
S t a n i s ł aw K a n d u l s k i reaches back to the main topic of the first book 
in the series, once again discussing the relationship between historical 
concept of mentality and the socio-pragmatic theory of culture. Still the 
author approaches the topic differently and achieves new results. The 
third study, proposed by Ma r t a Ko s i ń s k a, introduces a new point of 
view and an intellectual tradition not yet discussed extensively within this 
series. Her effort is to confront the theoretical achievements of cultural 
historians with the paradigm of British cultural studies and contemporary 
poststructuralist humanities.
8 Introduction
The text presented in this volume are diverse and follow different theo-
retical principia and different methodologies, while remaining within our 
main field of interest and researching the problems of cultural change and 
the relationship between culture and time. We did not try to artificially 
unite them as our goal was rather to trace different theoretical possibilities 
than to propose finite solutions.
Krzysztof Moraczewski 
Chapter I
Everyday life history(-ies) in the context  
of the individual’s participation in culture 
You who celebrate bygones!
Who have explored the outward, the surfaces 
of the races – the life that has exhibited itself;
Who have treated of man as the creature of 
politics, aggregates, rulers and priests;
I, habitant of the Alleghanies, treating of him 
as he is in himself, in his own rights, 
Pressing the pulse of the life that has seldom 
exhibited itself (the great pride of man in 
himself);
Chanter of Personality, outlining what is yet 
to be, 
I project the history of the future.
Walt Whitman, To a historian
Two fundamental contexts are involved in the issues related to everyday 
life history(-ies), namely: the theoretical and methodological context, and 
the context of the subject and (sub-)discipline. The former refers to the 
general condition of historiography – as a field of research and description 
(oral and written) of the “past,” the latter is connected with the question 
of dimension (scope) of “everyday life” as such – as the subject of study. 
To begin with, it should be stated that institutionally sanctioned histori-
ography has a social approval (consent and also a privilege) for delivering 
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“true stories”1 about the “historical past.”2 One of the simple and common 
intuitions about history stands behind this view. John H. Arnold was one 
of the researchers who decided to conduct its reconstruction. According 
to this English researcher, there is a common belief that history is “a true 
story about something what happened a long time ago, recalled in the 
present day. The past gets revived one more time, and the imbalanced 
relation between ‘then’ and ‘now’ is re-established.”3
However, the mere understanding of “true stories” has its historic con-
text of origin. Early modern time was characterized by the advantage of 
aesthetic form over the explanatory and descriptive context – the Ciceroni-
an rhetoric style dominated over the imitative verismo. Historiography of 
the Enlightenment frequently recreated events connected with personified 
“great concepts,” such as Mind, Nature, Man, Spirit and even Progress,4 
which frequently exemplified the fortunes of “great men.” History was ap-
proached from different perspectives, such as follows 1) the anthropomor-
phic one, e.g. by using such notions as genesis, progress, maturation or end; 
2) the one concerning outlooks on life, e.g. by considering a supernatural 
1 According to J. H. Arnold “in the true story there is a necessary tension: history is 
‘true’ because it must be compatible with the evidence and facts which it refers to but it 
also has to show that given facts are wrong and they require renewed compilation. At the 
same time it is ‘a story’ because it interprets facts placing them in a wider context or in-
cluding it in the course of narration.” J. H. Arnold, Historia, transl. J. Jaworska, Prószyński 
i S-ka, Warsaw 2001, p. 25. According to Hayden White this term contains contradictio in 
adiecto. He thinks that there is nothing like “true stories.” “Stories are told or written, but 
not found. When it comes to the notion of a ‘true’ story, it is a contradiction in terms. All 
stories are fictional. It means that they can be ‘true’ but only in a metaphorical sense or in 
the same way as a rhetorical figure is true.” H. White, Proza historyczna, ed. E. Domańska, 
Universitas, Cracow 2009, p. 34.
2 One of the definitions of the “historical past” is proposed by H. White, after M. Oake 
shott. He understands it as “a construction and highly selective version of the past ap-
proached as a whole comprising all events and beings, which occurred in the past and 
mostly left the evidence of their existence. Therefore, historians are always forced to specify 
the subject of history (a state, a nation, a class, a place, an institution etc.) which could be 
described by a story based on facts (contrary to an invented one). In other words, the his-
torical past should be distinguished from the past as a constantly changing whole of which 
the former is merely a small section.” H. White, Proza historyczna, p. 15.
3 J. H. Arnold, Historia, p. 15. It involves a mythopoeic element because it reminds 
one of a process of updating of a mythical event described by Mircea Eliade in Sacrum, 
myth, history.
4 The work by Jean Antoine Nicolas de Condorcet Outlines of a historical view of the 
progress of the human mind illustrates this trend. 
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intervention (providentialism) of the historical sprit (historicism); 3) the 
didactic one, e.g. by evaluating persons and events using moral categories; 
4) the commonsense one e.g. by using colloquial categories. “True stories” 
were supposed to provide answers to universal questions connected with 
the human condition and the regularities of its timeless existence.5 
Political history in the parade of “great men” and in the atmosphere of 
“great events” threw a long lasting shadow onto the topics and objectives 
of historiography. Despite the fact that its 19th century direction was guided 
by the truly Aristotelian, concise sentence coined by Leopold von Ranke 
“to tell only how it really was” (wie es eigentlich gewesen),6 the concept that 
a historian should deal only with the events and persons worth attention 
was not rejected. Each time, the verification of authenticity and the qual-
ity of historie rerum gestarum was carried out under the auspices of the 
workshop criteria current in a given moment of dealing with res gestae. 
The task of a historian was to focus on the critical review of evidence 
and a controlled reconstruction of “how it really was.” An important fea-
ture present in all directions of classical historiography was to aim for the 
synthetic and holistic approach to the subject of study, with the emphasis 
on the case connection between the presented actors and phenomena. The 
“Divine Eye” perspective made history a phenomenon which was easy to 
capture and evaluate. Michel Foucault in his considerations points out that 
“traditional methods of historical research are based on describing reasons 
and consequences of great political or social events, or creating some lines 
of continuation and development which connect particular historical facts 
in a logical and understandable whole, and also on looking for common 
sources, beginnings, omnipresent motifs and the ultimate meaning, at the 
same time trying to provide an ‘objective’ description of history.”7
5 This view was proclaimed by an outstanding representative of the Enlightenment – 
David Hume. “People are the same to such an extent, regardless of time and place, that 
history will not tell us anything unusual in this matter. Its main benefit stems from the fact 
that it discovers constant and common elements of human nature.” D. Hume, Badania 
dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego, transl. J. Łukasiewicz, K. Twardowski, PWN, Warsaw 1977, 
p. 101.
6 According to Jerzy Topolski we are dealing with a transition “from history (as a nar-
rative about the past), whose aim is utilitas (being beneficial and effective) to history ori-
ented for discovering the truth [for it is] the evolution of historical research from utlilitas 
to veritas.” J. Topolski, Historia i życie, Wyd. Lubelskie, Lublin 1988, p. 6.
 7 D. Leszczyński, L. Rasiński, Introduction, in M. Foucault, Filozofia – Historia – Po-
lityka. Wybór pism, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warsaw – Wroclaw 2000, pp. 19–20.
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Abandoning this “Thucydides tower,” as Arnaldo Momigliano puts it,8 
took historiography a lot of time. Departing from the vision of history 
based on events and individuals for the benefit of an extensive research of 
historical processes, which are complex and difficult to verify, took place 
gradually. The beginnings coincided with a precise analysis of the source 
language, which could date back to the first studies by Lorenzo Valla on 
“Constantine’s donation.”9 His studies were coupled with considerations 
about the complex relations between society (structure, relations, kinship), 
the economy (production, trade, consumption), geography (location, 
climate) and culture (in understanding the “entity” or “spirit” of a given 
nation, their language and art). 
Later on, the transformation of the cognitive perspectives and con-
ceptual apparatus related to them facilitated the development of histori-
ographic research awareness. Discovering new ways for the articulation 
of history became as important as the antiquarian search through the 
archives to find new, unknown sources or the archaeological exploration 
of new and old excavations. The classical model of historiographic analysis 
was thoroughly scrutinized. This was explicitly expressed by an exquisite 
researcher of the Annales School – Ferdinand Braudel: 
Hi-story, which is so dear to Ranke, may offer us [...] lights, but without brilliance; facts, 
but dehumanized. It is worth noticing that history-story always puts forward a claim to 
describe “how it really was.” [...] Actually it secretly reveals itself as an interpretation, as 
an authentic philosophy of history. Under this approach, hi-story reflecting on human 
life involves dramatic events, a game of exceptional individuals, who control their own 
fate and even more significantly control ours. But when it tells about “common history,” 
it is a chain of exceptional vicissitudes, as every protagonist must take into account 
another protagonist. We all know what an unreliable illusion that is.10 
As a consequence of the above criticism, simple causality theories 
were contrasted with structuralist determinations, the subject-conscious 
approach with the object-unconscious one, and methodological individu-
alism with anti-individualism. The rational-choice conditioning preferred 
under the traditional approach is extended to comprise alternative or 
complementary functional and functional-genetic conditioning.11 Next to 
 8 J. H. Arnold, Historia, p. 45.
 9 J. Pomian, Przeszłość jako przedmiot wiary. Historia i filozofia w myśli średniowiecz-
nej, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2009, p. 10.
10 F. Braudel, Historia i trwanie, transl. B. Geremek, Czytelnik, Warsaw 1999, p. 29.
11 This terminology is applied by Poznan school of cultural studies. The primacy of 
subjective and rational conditioning within the methodological individualism in earlier 
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the previous actors of history, namely: “great men,” “historical processes,” 
“states,” “civilizations,” “cultures,” and “societies,”12 other aspects appeared, 
such as “anonymous masses,” “ordinary people,” things, cities, villages and 
sometimes even nature.13 
Considering the above, historical studies were enriched by theories 
and research in the following fields: religious, political, anthropological, 
geographical, economic, linguistic, sociological, legal, demographic and 
biological, and many others, even more professional.14 “However, histori-
ans know – as the author of Forms of Life in Europe claims – that nothing 
remains unchangeable, so they must set out to find changes of lifestyles 
in time and space. Anyway the lifestyle is connected not only with the 
economy but also with the state, the law and the religion.”15 This resulted 
in experiments with new methods of studying the “historical past.” And 
so, the analysis of letters and last wills may be as equally important as the 
statistics of marriages and divorces (in a given time period, for a given 
population) to gain knowledge about something seemingly as elusive as 
“mentality.”16 
studies was observed by W. Reinhard. He claims that “here the floor is taken by mar-
ket economy ideology which originates from the rational-choice theory, but it goes too 
far, as it underestimates unconscious and not considered dimensions of cultural behav-
ior. [However] [l]ately culture has not been perceived as a system but as a process of 
continuous negotiation with a high degree of individual choice.” W. Reinhard, Życie po 
europejsku. Od czasów najdawniejszych po współczesność, transl. J. Antkowiak, Wyd. Na-
ukowe PWN, Warsaw 2009, p. 22. “Behind the gestures of those who seemed to direct the 
game of events, now a tough collective reality of every society and every culture emerges 
– M. Bloch the cofounder of the Annales School comments on the above change – we 
moved from the level of an event to the level of hidden but efficient and continuously 
functional infrastructures.” M. Bloch after J. Le Goff, Czy historia polityczna jest nadal 
‘kręgosłupem historii’?, in idem, Świat średniowiecznej wyobraźni, transl. M. Radożyc-
ka-Paoletti, Volumen – Bellona, Warsaw 1997, p. 10.
12 Wojciech Wrzosek lists three traditional idols of history: politics, the individual 
and chronology. W. Wrzosek, Stosunek jednostkowe – społeczne jako dylemat współczesnej 
historiografii, in K. Zamiara (ed.), Humanistyka jako autorefleksja kultury, CIA Books, 
Poznan 1993/95, p. 58.
13 Here it is worth mentioning the work of E. Le Roy Ladurie entitled Montaillou: 
Village occitan 1294–1324, P. Chaunu Seville and Atlantic and a famous work by F. Braudel 
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. 
14 F. Braudel, Historia i trwanie, p. 48. 
15 W. Reinhard, Życie po europejsku..., p. 387.
16 Other, equally mysterious events of historical research are the “incommensurate 
degrees of the rationality of knowledge” (Bachelard), the “framework of thinking” (Koy-
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The aims of the new historiography have become far-reaching. As Woj- 
ciech Wrzosek points out “Contemporary historiography abandons the 
descriptions of the world perceived by an individual, it departs from the 
world of events in which an individual is the agent, the world appealing 
to its ordinary understanding and feeling. Contrary to traditional history, 
new history explores the world beyond human existence, the reality of 
objectively perceived processes and phenomena. It describes the past of so-
ciety as a kind of mechanism in which different kinds of reality coexist, 
including natural surroundings of a human being, economy and social and 
cultural phenomena of various kinds. ‘Nouvelle histoire’ means studying 
the entire historical reality, starting with living conditions, through various 
walks of human life and finally all dimensions of civilization created by 
man.”17 The trend which particularly promotes this kind of “total strategy” 
was the above mentioned famous Annales School.18 
The above mentioned trends to gather and pursue the achievements 
of other scientific disciplines does not support the idea about the scien-
tific progress advancing in historiography. Among its creators one might 
notice a growing “constructive sensitivity” (once described as rhetorical 
sensitivity), constructive or even eristic to some extent, towards “true 
stories.” As J. H. Arnold writes, this is connected with the fact that “if 
historians spin a yarn of stories, they do so in order to convince us (and 
themselves) about something. Their methods of convincing are based on 
the presumption that they are telling the truth, that nothing is conceived 
or twisted – and, at the same time, history is conveyed in an interesting, 
cohesive and educative narrative form. The past as such does not create 
a narration. As a whole it is as chaotic, incohesive and complex as life is. 
The task of history is to order the mess, to find some regularities within it 
or to create certain patterns, meanings and stories.”19 Their construction 
creates only a certain version of “true stories,” as nobody has a monopoly 
on them. There are no criteria of generating them either, as these are rather 
re), the “structural patterns of perceiving the world,” “mental endowment” (Febvre), and 
episteme – “the system of thinking” (Foucault).
17 W. Wrzosek, Stosunek jednostkowe – społeczne..., p. 60.
18 It is directly announced by F. Braudel when he writes about aiming for studying 
“social reality in the ‘total’ dimension.” S. Bednarek, Pojmowanie kultury i jej historii we 
współczesnych syntezach dziejów kultury polskiej, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 
Wroclaw 1995, p. 5.
19 J. H. Arnold, Historia, s. 25.
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their outcome. And all this combined is the subject of a constant revision 
from different perspectives. J. H. Arnold shares this agonistic manner of 
perception. For him:
[...] history is mainly a dispute. The dispute between various researchers, but also, 
perhaps, between the past and the present, between what really happened and what 
is going to happen.20
In the early stages of the development of historiography everyday 
life issues and problems did not constitute a subject worth addressing. 
Dealing with the past posed an intellectual challenge which was supposed 
to establish significant “historical facts.” Everyday existence is a mass of 
similar, or closely related, and constantly repeated human behavioural 
reactions, technical and practical activities and symbolic expressions 
(language and customary ones). This banal provenience and tedious 
repetition made them a matter which was on one hand too light, when it 
comes to their historical importance, and on the other hand, too heavy 
in their factual scope to be analyzed thoroughly and to lead to valuable 
conclusions for a traditional researcher of res gestea. “Historians were not 
interested in everyday life – J. H. Arnold says – at least no more than great 
painters were interested in portraying peasant women.”21 This stemmed 
from a more or less conscious, metaphysical and later positivist, ground 
of historical reflections. Their strong pattern-creating role caused that the 
latter option tried to confer a universal and nomothetic meaning on the 
research. “Generally speaking – as Damian Leszczyński, Lotar Rasiński 
writes – traditional historical research is imbued with metaphysics and its 
desire for objectivity remains an ‘unfulfilled dream’ about the unity of hu-
manity, an individual and history, because the uniform scheme imposed on 
history obliterates its fragmentary, incoherent and accidental character.”22
The objection against giving history a more philosophical character was 
uttered by Lucien Febvre, among others. He expressed this in his famous 
motto “Philosophizing is the capital crime of a historian.” However, this 
concerns its metaphysical shape – as the philosophical reflection over the 
“historical consciousness” constitutes an inspiration for many approaches, 
not only of a historiographic character. Its importance was emphasized 
20 Ibidem, p. 24.
21 Ibidem, p. 38.
22 D. Leszczyński, L. Rasiński, Introduction, in M. Foucault, Filozofia – Historia – Poli-
tyka..., pp. 19–20. 
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by Hans-Georg Gadamer, to name one scholar, who wrote that “the role 
of humanities for Europe’s future relies on [a] historically-effected con-
sciousness.”23 The influences of Nietzsche played a great role here, which 
was developed by M. Foucault, among others, in his genealogy. This view 
“does not object to history as a rarefied and deep insight of a philosopher 
contradicts a down-to-earth perspective of a scholar; but it does object 
to a metahistorical development of ideal meanings and vague theologies. 
It objects to looking for ‘a source.’ ”24 
Abandoning the history of philosophy practised from a metaphysical 
perspective for the benefit of relatively understood historicism (Szacki) 
is characterized by the historic relativity of the truth, departing from the 
invariability of the subject which is beyond history and the vision of the 
continuity of history and the accumulation of human knowledge. The 
important contribution was made here by French philosophy and the 
history of science (Duhem, Meyerson, Milhaud). M. Foucault became its 
faithful student, who replaced the “metaphysical history” with “true his-
tory.” In his opinion the latter “tries to depart from describing only high 
and the most noble moments in history, the most impeccable people or 
the most prevailing ideas”25 to deal with such events as the idiosyncratic 
births, developments and temporary declines of discursive formations 
having a regulatory character. The words of M. Foucault are distinctive 
here: “noticing events, slight deviations or, contrary, complete downturns, 
mistakes, misjudgments, off-the-mark calculations, which underlay what 
exists and what is of some value to us, results in discovering that the nature 
of our existence is based not on the truth and being but on the external 
character of an accident.”26 
In professional historiography (the scientific creation of history – as 
long as we do not question the scientific character of this research disci-
23 H.-G. Gadamer, Dziedzictwo Europy, transl. A. Przyłębski, Spacja, Warsaw 1992, 
p. 13. In another place he wrote directly about historical cognition that it ideally means 
“understanding the same phenomenon in its unrepeatable context.” H.-G. Gadamer, 
Truth and Method, Bloomsbury Academic, Oxford 2004, p. 38.
24 M. Foucault, Filozofia – Historia – Polityka..., p. 113.
25 D. Leszczyński, L. Rasiński, Introduction, in M. Foucault, Filozofia – Historia – Po-
lityka..., p. 29. The above change is also observed by Sven Lindqvist. “During the past 
decades the history of elites is increasingly replaced by the history of societies. Since the 
main protagonists of history are not the rich winners but the defeated poor.” S. Lindqvist, 
Terra nullius, transl. I. Kawadło-Przedmojska, W.A.B., Warsaw 2010, pp. 202–203.
26 M. Foucault, Filozofia – Historia – Polityka..., p. 119.
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pline) special formulas are applied which are built on the narration about 
the “historical past,” e.g. metatextual footnotes, references to the sources 
and explicit workshop declarations (which give an insight into the theo-
retical and methodological consciousness of the researcher). Thus, this is 
a two-level expression in the subjective and theoretical language. Then the 
need occurs to justify oneself for creating “true stories,” and because of 
its literary affiliations, the constant fear of creating fiction patterned on it. 
Hayden White claimed that classical historiography used for this 
purpose the avoidance “of all explicit rhetorical figures and means typical 
for poetic style [and closing oneself] in the idiom of transparently told 
narrations.”27 Classical historiography maintained that “true stories” rec-
reate the reality from the past by recalling it faithfully. The past seemed 
to speak for itself via the mouth (or rather hands) of a historiographer. 
As W. Wrzosek points out “A historian describing events gets involved in 
the reality of the events. Appearing in the role of a viewer and participant, 
a historian yields to a suggestion of traditional historical sources. The 
chronicler’s convention ‘tells him’ to participate in the heat of events.”28 
This metaphysical, realistic and representational opinion came across 
increasingly stronger opposition with time. All methods of the reification 
of the vision of the “historical past” were revised. Relativist, non-metaphys-
ical and non-realistic tendencies came into focus. The opinion expressed 
by H. White is symptomatic for this trend of historiographic reflection: 
“the notion of ‘history’ is not a reference to a material thing but is a sig-
nifier. The signified, of the notion of ‘history’ could be either ‘the past’ 
or ‘a temporal process,’ but they are merely notions not things and none 
of them exists in a material form. They can be recognized only through 
‘traces’ or material forms of the existence which created them, if ‘certain 
things’ happened in a given place or were conducted in a given place. 
However, ‘what happened,’ or ‘what was conducted,’ will remain a mystery 
whose nature is alleged and its discovery, which relies on conclusions and 
intuitions, must remain merely a possibility and thus fiction.”29 
As it can be noticed, the other side of the objective and disinterested 
discovering of “the past in itself ” is constituted by histories written on the 
basis of idiosyncratic interest, selectively collected sources and literary 
27 H. White, Proza historyczna, p. 14.
28 W. Wrzosek, Stosunek jednostkowe – społeczne..., p. 58.
29 H. White, Proza historyczna, p. 11. 
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invention, i.e. “history for oneself and others.”30 This is because history 
is always some kind of choice “of what [has] already finished (and what 
will not happen again),” “of what passed,” “of what is gone (and will nev-
er return, will not be repeated)” but, at the same time, of what is worth 
noticing, preserving and memorizing.
1. Everyday life history(-ies) in historiography
The answer to the basic research issue seems to be problematic, namely, 
what is the category of everyday life? “Everyday life” often constitutes 
a subject of sociological research. And so a French representative of this 
discipline – Henri Lefebvre – claims that everything originates in every-
day life, which in turn is a manifestation of everything.31 This statement, 
indeed tautological, seems to be too general and insufficient, although 
the closest to intuitions connected with understanding everyday life. So 
too is the definition developed by Piotr Sztompka: “Everyday life is the 
most obvious thing, present in direct experience, the most realistic form 
of existence overwhelmingly imposed on our perception.”32
Everyday life is not quite in opposition to non-everyday life because 
the latter may constitute a part of the former; however, the opposite case 
is not possible. For example, calendar holidays, although imbued in an 
uncommon time of the sacred, create, together with the usual profane, 
a continuous cycle of perception of various forms of existence. Similar-
ly the places of worship – temples, the places of epiphany, hierophany 
and theophany, surrounded by ritual care – together with the profane 
30  And again over to J. H. Arnold: “Every historian carries his own load of inter-
ests, moral and philosophical convictions, views on the world and human behaviour [...]. 
However, in a sense, historians are always wrong. It is because there is no such thing as 
complete certainty in every field. There are gaps in every historical account, there are 
problems, contradictions and spheres of doubts. We are wrong also because we do not al-
ways agree with each other so we have to be mistaken, each of us in his own way, [it serves 
the purpose of the dispute] between various researchers but also, perhaps between the 
past and the present, between what really happened and what will happen.” J. H. Arnold, 
Historia, pp. 23–24.
31 P. Sztompka, Życie codzienne – temat najnowszej socjologii, in P. Sztompka, M. Bo-
gunia-Borowska (ed.), Socjologia codzienności, Znak, Cracow 2008, p. 26. This is proba-
bly the simplest explanation of the importance of the research into the phenomenon of 
everyday life.
32 Ibidem, p. 25.
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architecture, create the perception of the cultural countryside. However, 
in the opposite case, the arbitrarily proclaimed holiday connected with 
a single event e.g. a victory over the enemy, becomes a distinctive feature 
of non-everyday life; and so is the case of destroying a very important, 
from a social point of view, building (not only a temple), despite its possi-
ble further existence as a ruin (reminding one of the historical event and 
gaining new meanings).33
Non-everyday life a is figure which is outlined in the background of 
everyday life. This background cannot be reduced to a dimension of the 
private domestic life of the subjects of historical research. Everyday life is 
rather the most widely understood context, both regulated culturally and 
idiosyncratically, which does not transgress the threshold of a historical 
“event.” Classical history tells the story of non-everyday life in whose 
footsteps everyday life faithfully follows. Causative power is attributed 
to “events” which impose the “conditions of necessity” on all possible 
“perceptions of existence.”
Continuing with the next issue – everyday life history – one should 
answer a vital question – what is everyday life? According to the simplest 
characteristics, it would be one more, labelled, product of historiography. 
From the conceptual point of view, everyday life history seems to be con-
tradictio in adiecto (or in a literary sense an oxymoron). “Everyday life” 
should involve all aspects of the “historical past,” from material to symbolic 
ones, whereas history is its selection and synthesis. It is not able to com-
prise “everyday life” as a whole because then it would have to transform 
from a map to its prototype. Addressing the issues related to everyday 
life is connected in the contemporary perspective of historiography with 
the transfer of research interests. Moving from the hi-story based on 
political history, historical account and event-related history towards the 
“functioning of the background” was connected with developing new tools 
(techniques) of interpretation and procedures of presenting results.34 Here 
anthropology comes to one’s aid as it provides topics and research tools 
for studying everyday life, and also ideological support. 
33 As H. White notices: “the trace of the past which survived in the present is some-
thing else. As in its very essence it is not the past, even though it carries traces of the past 
or it indicates past actions or processes.” H. White, Proza historyczna, p. 12.
34 It is also confirmed by J. H. Arnold: “The past requires interpretation, not only pre-
sentation. By placing the story in a wider context we are trying to find out not only what 
happened but also what was the importance of the events.” J. H. Arnold, Historia, p. 19.
20 Chapter I
This is described by Clifford Geertz. “Studying the world in another 
place leads to a very similar result, no matter if this is a place from a dis-
tant past or far away from here.”35 W. Reinhard put forward an interesting 
proposal in this field in his version of historical anthropology which is as 
“a field of research whose issues are inspired by ethnology. It studies the 
behavior of ordinary human beings in the first place trying to discover 
behavioral patterns referring to a given culture in order to establish the 
rules which underlie its everyday life.”36 Thus, everyday life history is 
transformed into the history of everyday life culture which analyses 
behavioural styles, patterns of problem solving or lifestyles (and so does 
Martin Dinges). 
Ethnological methods are also applied by microhistory, which is called 
a “sister of everyday life history” by Hans Medick.37 On the basis of avail-
able sources, e.g. court documents, it thoroughly and multidimensionally 
vivisects a given research issue concerning a small territory in a strictly 
specified frame of time. Thus, one of the main demands of experimental 
anthropology is fulfilled by the research into indigenous societies. The 
analyzed issues concern “ordinary people” in ordinary situations; however, 
they often abound in dramatic conflicts, twists or tragic endings which are 
too insignificant to be recorded in the annals of classical hi-story which 
focuses on events and processes. Such less important issues gain historical 
significance only coupled with other similarly perceived and deprived of 
accidents “non-events,” elevated to the rank of “an event” or “a process” 
by means of generalization, according to the law of large numbers. 
The performances of ordinary people on the stage of everyday life 
are observed not for their acting skills but to distinguish the rules which 
they follow. Thus, microhistory is closer to the history of mentality than 
to the historical version of a dramaturgic approach. As Ewa Domańska 
proposes, it is an “alternative history;”38 microhistory is a certain thematic 
orientation without any common research tools and uniform terminology. 
Being antisystemic, it is attributed the postmodernist predilection – be-
35 C. Geertz, Historia i antropologia, in idem, Zastane światło. Antropologiczne refleks-
je na tematy filozoficzne, transl. Z. Pucek, Universitas, Cracow 2003, pp. 153–154.
36 W. Reinhard, Życie po europejsku..., p. 22.
37 H. Medick, Mikrohistoria, in W. Schulze (ed.), Historia społeczna, historia codzien-
ności, mikrohistoria, transl. A. Kopacki, Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, Warsaw 1996, p. 67.
38 E. Domańska, Mikrohistorie. Spotkania w międzyświatach, Wyd. Poznańskie, Poznan 
1999, p. 20.
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cause it does not create a specific microhistorical cognitive perspective, but 
only a conglomerate of studies of a given character and certain common 
features. Everyday life history in this version would become a collective 
name for varied effects of this type of practicing historiography, and not 
an alternative for an official trend, or a counter proposal. 
Everyday life history fits into the issues related to the balancing or 
focusing of two perspectives: a synchronic and a diachronic one. The 
former provides a cross-sectional explanation of the interrelations (func-
tional connections) between the specified or possible to generate elements 
which fill in a structure which is limited in space and time.39 The latter 
transgresses one structural categorization indicating the vertical character 
of changeability, transformations, decline and relations (functional and 
genetic connections) between the phenomena chosen for the research 
(their aspects). Two possible research approaches seem feasible here. One 
is represented by L. Febvre, among others, in a comparative approach to 
holistically perceived, closed structures; the other is represented by Marc 
Bloch in analyses of not horizontally stabilized, “semi-flowing” struc-
tures. This alternative contains different cognitive accents. The difference 
between a “structural-synchronic” approach and a “process-related and 
diachronic” one reflects, on one hand, a pursuit for a synthetic stability, 
whereas on the other, a realization of the potential modality of structures. 
Besides the research practice, there is also a question of the social role 
played by history as a “teacher of life.” As W. J. Burszta points out “A human 
being is a unique creature, the only one that exists for himself as he gets 
to know himself.”40 He gets to know himself always through the history 
of himself. The sentence historia magistra vitae in everyday life, which is 
the closest to the omnipresent matter of life, paradoxically does not have 
to refer to it at all. Since there is a conviction that if “history is supposed 
to teach anything,” then this lesson must be based on “historical facts” 
of great significance. In the discursive dimension, it should take a form 
of a skillful narration preferably uttered as slogans or instructions. It is 
also inherently spectacular and unusual. Contrary to this, everyday life 
history aims for close relations to and immersion in the vernacular and 
mundane praxeological life experience of “ordinary people.” Can the or-
39  The examples are both a monumental work by Jakub Burckhardt The culture of the 
Renaissance in Italy and a microhistorical study by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie Montaillou. 
Village occitan 1294–1324.
40 W. J. Burszta, Introduction, in W. Reinhard, Życie po europejsku..., p. 12.
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dinary tedious life of average people teach anyone anything? Can it decide 
about the history of “a human who constantly gets to know himself ” in 
the process of important changes?
Only “life” as a universal phenomenon conditio humana transgresses 
the borders of temporal and spatial existence. There are certain objective 
conditions of humankind’s existence, such as the necessity to find food or 
to reproduce, which unite human beings into one timeless community. This 
transcendence is confronted with the discontinuity of social practice and 
symbolic formations41 because both historical and ethnological research 
shows that they always take some substantial forms, whose internalization 
is conducted in a symbolic and communicative dimension through encul-
turation (ideological regulations) and in a corporal dimension through 
socialization (psycho-social coercion apparatus). 
A moderate version is proposed by the social and regulatory concept 
of culture. Under this approach “historical cuts” involve changes in social 
practice which entail transformations in the regulatory layer of the social 
consciousness i.e. culture. The latter is a set of forms of social consciousness 
which regulate the types of social practice belonging to it. These forms 
consist of normative convictions which define the aims of human activity 
and directive convictions which define the methods of implementing 
them. They are reconstructed in a subjective and rational mode. How-
ever, the aims of these activities and methods of implementing them are 
conditioned functionally by the entire social practice which creates the 
structural context for these convictions. In the technical and utilitarian 
culture there are relations of an objective character which refer to direct 
and practical activities and the objects which result from these activities. 
This involves those features which “render these objects consumable 
41  Contemporary history shares this awareness with anthropology. According to 
one of the representatives of the latter – Wojciech J. Burszta – “the whole tradition and 
the present day of anthropological reflection, [...], is expressed by the following paradox: 
the unity of human symbolic thought and the multitude and variety of cultural ideas 
concerning life.” W. J. Burszta, Introduction, in W. Reinhard, Życie po europejsku..., p. 12. 
Discontinuity appears in the moments of the so called historical cuts. Their analysis was 
conducted by M. Foucault, among others. His studies on the “history of madness” or 
the “history of sexuality” are widely known. The idiosyncratic nature of transformations 
within “discursive formations,” the “bio-power” apparatus, is reflected by the epistemic 
ways of their perception. Although the author of the History of Madness rejects all at-
tempts to categorize by using “isms,” in terms of philosophical consideration, it would be 
an extreme constructivism.
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in the way which does not require respecting convictions concerning 
norms and directives applied when producing them.”42 In the case of 
other fields, these dependencies are of a social and subjective character 
(conscious-orientated). Their convictions concerning norms and directives 
are characterized by the fact that the effects of activities regulated by them 
are ‘non-consumable;’ in fact, they are not realized if their consumption is 
not accompanied by respecting these convictions as the ones motivating 
relevant activities.43 The symbolic character of these senses is constituted 
on the basis of the common respect towards semantic rules, or in other 
words, their conventionalization.
Each type of social practice has two kinds of functional determinants: 
1) the direct one (regulated in the social and subjective mode) and 2) the 
indirect one (providing the response to objective needs functionally de-
termining a relevant type of practice). The primary role is attributed to the 
latter. As the author of the “Social and regulatory concept of culture” writes: 
“by indicating the functional conditioning of proper human activities we 
always refer to [...] a certain global state (tendency) of their structural con-
text. But such a state is not permanent. It must be every time hypothetically 
assumed in order to show that in a given case only this particular action 
must have occurred to cause the assumed continuation of a given state.”44 
Social practice is directed to the constant reconstruction and transformation 
(simple or extended reproduction) of its own objective conditions. Hence, 
individual types of practice satisfy the demand of a given global state by 
generating relevant components (convictions) in the social consciousness. 
However, they are not directly “materially” required. This is confirmed 
by the words of Jerzy Kmita. 
Anyway, functional determination is ambiguous; the predictable response to a given 
demand is a framework. Thus, we may only predict what kind of a specific set of con-
victions will be commonly respected, i.e. it will receive a social acceptance sooner or 
later (this term means common respect, functional conditioning, but not conscious in-
dividual acceptance), because of the occurrence and intensification of a given demand; 
each of the distinguished (by belonging to this type) sets of convictions presents the 
so called historical possibility, whereas the social necessity is only when one of them 
gets socially accepted [...]. There is never a demand on only one specific set of convic-
42 J. Kmita, Kultura i poznanie, PWN, Warsaw 1985, p. 29.
43 Ibidem, p. 31.
44 G. Banaszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, Instytut Kultury, 
Warsaw 1991, pp. 35–36.
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tions, rather this demand refers to a random set of convictions of a given type. Each 
of these sets is functional, each of them would satisfy a given demand equally well.45
Transformations in time are explained on the basis of the functional-
ly-genetic determination. This means that in response to the change in 
the objective order, also the social and subjective regulator, i.e. culture, 
will be changed. 
We will determine the intellectual connection between a given state of a certain form 
of social consciousness and its historically former state as a genetic relation, [...] the 
fact of social acceptance of a given set of convictions creating a particular form of 
social consciousness is determined in two ways: 1) this set of convictions is more 
functional in relation to needs than the set of convictions which has constituted this 
form so far, i.e. it ‘serves’ a wider scope of these needs; 2) there is a genetic relation 
between the former and the latter set of convictions. This statement can be shortly 
expressed in other words: each next state of a given form of social consciousness is 
determined in a functionally-genetic way.46
It is indicated how a modification of normative and/or directive convic-
tions contributes to a better continuation of a constant tendency in a given 
macrostructural context so that functional reasons of replacing some 
convictions by others are defined. Actually two versions of changes come 
into play: 1) “partial change” – the macrostructural context generates the 
same global state, whereas the activities upholding it, regulated by earlier 
convictions of a normative and/or directive character, as less effective, 
are being replaced by subsequent ones having a greater functionality; 
2) “fundamental change” (dramatic) – a change of macrostructural context 
occurs which entails accepting a different hypothesis as far as the global 
state is concerned, and its continuation leads to constituting a new set of 
convictions concerning norms and directives different from the previous 
ones.47 However, even in the case of a dramatic transformation of the 
structural organization of the context and its global state, the connections 
of the new systems (their elements) with the earlier ones may be indicated 
(often thanks to detailed historical research). This means that in response 
to the change in the objective order, these new altered components will 
still remain in a specific relation with the previous convictions.48
45 J. Kmita, O kulturze symbolicznej, COM UK Ministerstwa Kultury i Sztuki, Warsaw 
1982, pp. 69–97.
46 Ibidem, p. 70.
47 G. Banaszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, pp. 37–41.
48 J. Kmita, Kultura i poznanie, p. 10.
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When studying a phenomenon in the objective manner, both within 
the functional determination as in the functionally-genetic one, various 
alternative explanations are acceptable. According to J. Kmita “indicating 
one functional determinant does not explain a particular phenomenon, 
but only one of its features.”49 The ambiguous character of this condition-
ing allows a simultaneous and various ways of understanding the role 
of the phenomenon (at least because a different aspect is chosen for the 
subject of research). It should be remembered that these functions may 
be understood in various ways, both in the macrosocial context present-
ed above or in another context, and (that) in (their) global states (they 
are) conceived differently (in both cases). This is included in the scope 
of the radical functionally-genetic explanation because the change of the 
macrostructural context occurs here, together with the adopting of a new 
assumption in reference to the global state generated by it. 
Discontinuity of the contents in the cultural heritage in the course of 
cultural transmission (radical change) is a characteristic feature for the 
highly revisionist tradition-related process of post-traditional societies. In 
the discussed context, the emphasis should be placed on a differentiation 
between a-historical and historical societies (“cold” and “hot” according 
to Claude Lévi-Strauss). According to common knowledge, the past his-
torical state of the cultural heritage, or rather its social consciousness, is 
the main issue for historiographic studies. Hence, it is noticeable that only 
the interest in the past, also by applying institutional professionalization, 
constitutes a distinctive dimension differentiating the types of societies. For 
the “cold” type, everyday life is always present and never passes, whereas 
non-everyday life is neutralized by special rituals. These were described in 
detail by Victor Turner in his concept of a ritual process which constitutes 
part of the “social drama” theory.50 
2. Individual participation in culture
The historiographic perspective varied from that tending to view an indi-
vidual as making history, to the rejection of different forms of anthropo-
morphism characteristic of the ideological and descriptive historiography 
49 J. Kmita, O kulturze symbolicznej, p. 96.
50 V. Turner, Czy istnieją uniwersalia widowiskowe w micie, rytuale i teatrze, transl. 
G. Janikowski, “Polska Sztuka Ludowa – Konteksty” 3–4/2002, Instytut Sztuki PAN, Fun-
dacja Kultury, Warsaw.
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for the sake of a rediscovery of the importance of the individual (no longer, 
however, in terms of the individual’s greatness). Aron Gurevich identifies 
two aspects of the question of the individual in a historical perspective: 
On the one hand, it involves the investigation regarding the emergence of the human 
ego, the individual who is moulded within the group but, who at the same time, is aware 
of what sets him or her apart, that is, the independence of the individual in relation to 
the group, and who can become engrossed in his or her own individual existence. On 
the other hand, attempts made by historians to investigate the self-determination of the 
individual and the type of the individual’s self-awareness characteristic of a particular 
society, constitute for all intents and purposes a search for what makes a given culture 
unique, for what lends the culture [...] its historic “individuality.” 51 
As for the former, this is an ontogenetic process of the development 
of the individual’s awareness of their very participation in culture; as for 
the latter, this is a process of the development of specific forms of the in-
dividual’s participation with reference to the distributive culture variants. 
From the perspective of culture studies, it is worthwhile to note the po-
sition treating the history of everyday life as a history of everyday culture. 
It is then studied from the point of view of either the culture norms of 
a given social context, or an individual’s participation in culture. Histor-
ical analyses of the regulations of the culture of everyday life, i.e. within 
the scope of the studies of “mentality” or “discursive forms,” are widely 
known. It is important to grasp to what extent the history of everyday cul-
ture should also be the history of the individual’s participation in culture. 
The key issue here is the answer to the question of what “participation” 
in culture involves. Within the Poznan school of culture studies, this an-
swer has been provided by Krystyna Zamiara, who identified two types 
of concepts of participation in culture: “cultural studies-related” and “psy-
chological.”52 Rejecting ideas of extreme psychologism that assume that 
participation in culture is in principle psychological, she describes three 
anti-psychological positions: moderate, relatively radical, and extreme. 
51 A. Gurevich, The Origins of European Individualism, transl. K. Judelson, Wiley- 
Blackwell, Oxford – Cambridge 1995, p. 3.
52 According to the author, the former refers to the “concept of participation in cul-
ture as advanced in different culture sciences,” the latter to “equivalents of these concepts 
put forth by psychology.” K. Zamiara, Kulturoznawcze a psychologiczne badania nad ucze-
stnictwem w kulturze, in J. Kmita, K. Łastowski (ed.), Biologiczne i społeczne uwarunkow-
ania kultury, Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Warsaw – Poznan 1992, p. 39.
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The first of these assumes that “only some extra-biological phenomena 
related to the individual have their partial ultimate determinants in social 
phenomena.” The second approach assumes that “all extra-biological phe-
nomena related to the individual have their partial ultimate determinants 
in social phenomena,” while according to the third one “all extra-biological 
phenomena related to the individual have their full ultimate determinants 
in social phenomena.”53 
The first two approaches allow the combination of the humanistic and 
psychological perspectives. Both psychologism combined with method-
ological individualism and anti-psychologism combined with method-
ological anti-individualism rule out the above possibility. According to 
K.  Zamiara, both approaches are inadequate since a correct approach 
to the question of the individual’s participation in culture should address 
the aspects of the individual and the object. This allows to simultaneously 
take into account the features of individuals participating in culture and 
the “determinants of the features, which define the adequate properties 
of the very process of participation in culture” as well as the features of 
culture in general (its fields) and the “determinants of the features, which 
define (other than the above) properties of the participation process.”54
The “optimal” approach in the study of participation in culture should, 
therefore, be based on anti-psychologism combined with a moderate or 
relatively radical version of methodological individualism. This allows 
the separation of the objective zone of culture from the individual’s par-
ticipation in it.55 The process of the analysis of individual participation in 
53 Ibidem, pp. 40–41. As the Poznań scholar observes on another occasion, “They 
stress the differences between culture and natural phenomena or, conversely, obliterate 
the differences between the natural and the cultural, at the very level of culture, of the 
process of participation in culture or else at the level of the properties of individuals par-
ticipating in culture. Some take into account only one direction of determination (from 
culture to individuals, or the other way around), others allow a certain kind of interaction 
between culture and individuals participating in it. In the former case are generated ideas 
that subordinate individuals to the culture that is the object of their participation and that 
see those individuals as ‘culture constructs,’ or, conversely – excessively stress the sub-
jective properties of individuals seen naturalistically, treating culture as an ‘extension’ of 
biological organs, or tools allowing adaptation to the environment. In the latter case gen-
erated are ideas that allow the construction of an entire system composed of culture and 
the individual participating in it, in a way that disregards neither.” K. Zamiara, Introduc-
tion, in K. Zamiara (ed.), Skrytość kultury, Wyd. Fundacji Humaniora, Poznan 2001, p. 9.
54 K. Zamiara, Kulturoznawcze a psychologiczne badania..., p. 41.
55 Ibidem, pp. 41–42.
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culture is made difficult by the identification of its determinants, i.e. the 
mental characteristics of individuals and the cultural context. The former 
component seems especially cumbersome in the field of historical analyses. 
While the contemporary social sciences, in particular psychology, have 
at their disposal a whole array of tools for the diagnosis and description 
of all kinds of “mental profiles” of the actors of social and private life, in 
the case of “temporal regress” we can speak at best only about approxi-
mate “psycho-cultural profiles.” The difficulty is compounded when we 
turn back the clock and have limited sources, since then there are not 
sufficient criteria for describing the mental condition of individuals in 
a situation of insufficient data concerning his or her hypothetical state. 
A psycho-cultural reconstruction of the features of participation in culture 
can be carried out on the basis of reconstructable patterns of behaviour; 
a possible mental structure is deduced from them. This was carried out 
by Johan Huizinga in The Autumn of the Middle Ages56 in an attempt to 
reconstruct the emotional structure of the representatives of individual 
social groups of the historical period under his scrutiny.
Individual participation in culture may, moreover, be considered in the 
context of the concept of culture seen through social regulations. However, 
it cannot be limited to a reduction of psychologically determined phe-
nomena of the individual’s participation in culture to the field of norms 
and directives. According to K. Zamiara, the psychological understanding 
of the cultural-studies approach to participation must be “in terms of re-
specting and conscious acceptance of cultural norms and directives and 
psychological patterns that determine such participation in culture of any 
individual: the process taking place under normal circumstances and the 
process of learning to participate.”57 Such a study must factor in both the 
uniqueness of mental determinants and the unique impact of individual 
fields of culture on the human psyche. It differentiates the manner and 
experience of participation. It must, moreover, focus on indicating the 
differences between passive respect and active acceptance of culture norms. 
It demonstrates development, stability and the potential possibility of their 
change precisely due to the individual, voluntary factor. 
As K. Zamiara observes, an analysis of the psychological component 
facilitates a determination of “the psychological factors which impact an 
56 J. Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1967.
57 K. Zamiara, Kulturoznawcze a psychologiczne badania..., p. 49.
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intra-individual variability of forms of participation in culture, i.e. among 
others a transition from respecting to deliberately accepting a particular 
type of cultural convictions.”58 It also offers a chance to examine the 
conditions of the “depth” of individual participation in a specific area of 
culture, from superficial respect to a “complete” acceptance of the culture 
norms. What is debatable is the question whether the individual is capable 
of interfering in the transformation of norms and directives and the scope 
of the subjective and rational conditions of the individual’s actual activ-
ity, as we can also in a psychoanalytic sense deal with a “rationalisation” 
taking place. The above and other psychological factors may determine 
the alignment between an individual’s actions and the cultural scenarios 
of actions to be taken in a particular situation. According to the Poznań 
scholar, another important analysed element is that the “question of com-
patibility with the culture norm also applies to the content of particular 
culture fields and in the content aspect of an individual’s consciousness 
under scrutiny – what kind of psychological factors determine the de-
gree of alignment of an individual’s convictions and cultural norms and 
directives as well as with other judgements in the field of social awareness 
(e.g. with those that constitute common social experience or those being 
a product of social scientific practice).”59
From the perspective of the methodological anti-individualism of the 
theory of culture, the individual seen through the prism of culture studies 
is treated as a conveyor of convictions about the norms and directives of 
many fields of culture. “In other words it is the factor that makes a given 
type of social practice occur in a manner regulated by convictions about 
norms and directives that belong with a culture field that is functionally 
linked with this practice.”60 The individual is incapable of grasping the 
entire culture. It remains in large measure unconscious (“covert”).61 How-
ever, it must be emphasised at this point that this “unconsciousness” is not 
seen, as in psychoanalysis or depth psychology, as a separate biological 
(ontological) structure, with its own structural properties, but as a psy-
cho-cultural category. According to K. Zamiara: “Certain covert cultural 
patterns may thanks to a creative reflection of an individual acquire the 
58 Ibidem, p. 50.
59 Ibidem.
60 K. Zamiara, Konstrukcja podmiotu w społeczno-regulacyjnej koncepcji kultury, in 
K. Zamiara (ed.), Humanistyka jako autorefleksja..., p. 67.
61 K. Zamiara, Introduction, in K. Zamiara (ed.), Skrytość kultury, p. 19.
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(hypothetical) value of overtness.”62 This means that they are potentially 
ready for (re)updating. The advancement of the process depends on the 
intensity of the individual’s (deep) participation in the culture. 
Therefore, similarly to the degree of acceptability of judgements related 
to norms and directives, we can speak about a degree of participation (in 
culture), or the acquisition of a greater or lesser cultural competence.63 
At this moment we discover a marked superiority of the social and regu-
latory concept of culture over its behavioural versions. Within the latter, 
we cannot logically explain the appearance of a particular type of conduct 
(culturally-significant activity) without its earlier acquisition. Decisively 
opposing this naturalistic approach to culture, we must stress – invoking 
the theoretical assumptions adopted here – that the convictions about 
norms and directives operative in the social consciousness allow the indi-
vidual to generate new types of conduct (activities of socially recognisable 
communication significance) without the behavioural correlative. 
An analysis of the individual’s participation in a culture requires the 
consideration of Florian Znaniecki’s humanistic coefficient, or a feature 
of “cultural phenomena, objects of the study of the humanities, their 
principal property, that as objects of theoretical reflection they are already 
objects, given to others in experience, or someone’s conscious activities.”64 
The meanings of ideas invariably operate within some historical form of 
social experience. Taking the above into account, a study of the individ-
ual must always factor in the theoretical reconstructions of the part of 
social consciousness where given socio-cultural phenomena are located. 
Only this defines (explains) their particular structure of meanings. The 
interpretation of the humanistic coefficient in the perspective of com-
munication culture “socialises” it, treating it as a “set of assumptions of 
semantics correlating this phenomenon with a particular communicative 
unit as its objective referent; what is at stake are certain judgements that 
62 Ibidem, p. 22.
63 J. Kmita, Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk, PWN, Warsaw 1976, p. 31.
64 F. Znaniecki, Wstęp do socjologii, PWN, Warsaw 1988, p. 25. As the Polish sociolo-
gist observes on another occasion, “If the humanistic coefficient were left out and a schol-
ar attempted to study a culture system the way one does a natural one, i.e. as existing 
independently of human experience and activity, the system would disappear and the 
scholar would deal instead with a host of unrelated natural objects and processes, of no 
resemblance to the reality which he or she started to study.” F. Znaniecki, Humanistyczny 
współczynnik faktów kulturowych, in J. Szacki, Znaniecki, Wiedza Powszechna, Warsaw 
1986, p. 239.
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operate in a particular mode in the practice of cultural communication 
in individual communities.”65
The cultural status of participation on the one hand consists in re-
specting such regulations, and on the other in becoming aware of them. 
It is crucial at this point to stress the difference between respecting and 
accepting convictions about norms and directives. The former occurs “only 
in connection with someone’s systematically recurring action or conduct. 
We say that a given individual respects a particular conviction if he or she 
systematically (at an appropriate time) undertakes a particular activity, 
invariably as if he or she has accepted this conviction as a subjective and 
rational reason for this activity.”66 The above observation does not mean 
that the individual will not accept a given conviction (judgement) leading 
to a particular action. Respect is tied in with taking particular actions 
which allow making inferences about the existence of this respect, while 
acceptance can only be mental, through the approval of a given conviction 
(judgement). When the individual takes “a given activity fully aware of 
the objective determined by a normative judgement p, which objective is, 
according to the individual’s fully conscious conviction q, to be achieved 
by this activity, we can say that the individual accepts judgement p and 
accepts judgement q, or – accepts convictions p and q. It may happen, 
however, that the individual accepts only conviction p or only conviction q, 
exclusively respecting the relevant other conviction. Finally, the individual 
may exclusively respect both convictions.”67 Furthermore, acceptance can 
vary, i.e. be “less or more conscious.”68
In the perspective of social regulations, the reconstruction of con-
victions concerning norms and directives should logically precede the 
attempts at recreating the subjective and rational conditions of the indi-
vidual’s participation in culture. This participation consists of descriptive 
knowledge and value judgements.69 When subjective and rational expli-
cation is used, it is necessary to make an assumption about the actor’s 
65 J. Kmita, Kultura i poznanie, pp. 44–45.
66 G. Banaszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, p. 46.
67 Ibidem, p. 45.
68 Ibidem, p. 46.
69 This is borne out by an observation of a historian related to the Poznań school, 
W. Wrzosek. “The presentation of a human being’s objectives is irreplaceable from con-
stant references to his or her value system, which has an impact on his or her choices.” 
W. Wrzosek, Stosunek jednostkowe – społeczne..., p. 58.
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consistence as to his respected convictions, i.e. an assumption of rationality. 
According to J. Kmita: 
Only when we (idealistically!) assume that each human being invariably takes action 
that is at any given moment based on 1) the fact that at this moment he is focused on 
the implementation of a relevant value identified with the state of affairs adequately 
articulated by him, 2) the fact that at this moment he respects the knowledge that 
‘prompts’ him that in order to implement this value one only needs to take this and 
that action (and thus it is necessary to take these and those components of this action) 
will we deal with explication.70
The greatest role in the consciousness of the individual is played by 
the “ultimate” values, or normative convictions (norms) that make up 
a worldview system (a worldview). According to Kmita this is a “set of 
convictions which, while reflecting a particular vision of the ‘entire’ reality, 
in each case: 1) determine a set of positive superior values, i.e. actual states 
that play the role of the ‘ultimate’ objectives of human activity (rather than 
serving the purpose of attaining such objectives); 2) determine all kinds 
of correlations between superior values and practically tangible values, i.e. 
‘life’ values adhered to by particular individuals participating in different 
fields of social practice. The above correlations may be of different types, 
as it were. They may consist in that the implementation of particular 
practical, direct values leads unconditionally to the implementation of 
relevant superior values; they may only facilitate this implementation (to 
a lesser or greater extent); they may not be conducive to it, may prevent it, 
or be impartial in this respect.”71 When an individual makes an evaluation 
of activities or their effects, the worldview is a kind of set of axiomatic 
judgements which make their evaluation possible in the first place. 
On the basis of available sources, study tools and the ways of build-
ing historical narratives, it is possible to research: 1) to what extent the 
kind and quality of content in the first area impact the unique choice 
of particular values in the other (a question about the entire condition of 
culture); 2) what external factors impact the development of knowledge 
and valuations in particular social groups (this concerns stratifying and 
differentiating factors); 3) who uses particular kinds of knowledge and 
values (the problem here is posed by both the social distribution of various 
70 J. Kmita, O kulturze symbolicznej, p. 27.
71 J. Kmita, Światopogląd nauki – światopogląd naukowy, in J. Lipiec (ed.), Nauka 
i światopogląd, KAW, Cracow 1979, p. 299.
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components of social consciousness – worldviews and common social 
experience); 4) who uses them, how and to what ends (at stake here is the 
question of respecting or accepting convictions concerning norms and 
directives, or the “depth” of participation in culture); 5) how they impact 
historical psycho-cultural profiles on the basis of the required individual 
features of the participation in culture.
3. Individual participation in culture  
and its historical aspect
All the above aspects of participation in culture are at the same time the 
object of interest of the history of the culture of everyday life. This applies 
both to the reflection aiming at reconstructing mental features via the 
psycho-cultural dimension inferred from behaviour patterns and to that 
related to “deep” participation in the zone of the cultural regulations of 
different culture disciplines and social awareness and common social ex-
perience. In the first instance, the identification of the determining context 
requires a thorough analysis of source material to find proof of certain 
patterns of behaviour, then their extrapolation to the mental and then 
psychic levels. At this last level they are made comprehensible thanks to 
tools and psychological descriptions. However, this is tied in with a highly 
speculative way of constructing a “mental profile” because of the relevant 
a-historical allegations which arise from the logic of making inferences 
from today’s cognitive perspective of particular scholarly disciplines and 
of the entire contemporary background of social consciousness and com-
mon social experience. 
This dilemma is not alien to Aron Gurevich, who needs to be quoted 
in extenso:
The crux of the matter is that all attempts by the individual to describe himself or 
herself are inevitably profoundly subjective. Attempts to define the essence of a giv-
en individual on the basis of his or her direct utterances about him or herself pose 
a great risk since to believe and to disbelieve such utterances unquestioningly would 
be equally risky. Much more can be learned from what was not said directly but 
remains ‘at bottom’ of utterances and deeds, deciphering meanings that one has in 
mind when speaking or that subconsciously surface in an utterance. During direct 
personal interaction the observer can reach a definite judgement about an individual. 
This, too, will be subjective, but it will be based, not merely on the words uttered but 
also on many other signs – behaviour, expressions, the person’s whole appearance. 
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Our knowledge of any other person depends to an enormous degree upon outward 
factors. Our knowledge is, of course, shaped by our ideas and feelings, as it is also by 
judgements that have been made by other people about the person. Do we not, in the 
final analysis, project our own selves, complete with our criteria, tastes and prejudices, 
onto the “screen” of the other individual?
The historian, however, is in a more complicated situation: he or she has no chance 
to observe at first hand the personality of an individual who lived centuries earlier. 
Dialogue, that is always presumed to be part of any human interaction, is severely 
limited within the framework of historical investigation. The only possible dialogue is 
through texts, and the immediacy of direct contact between two persons is missing. 
All that the historian can, at best, hope to have at his or her disposal are the individ-
ual’s own utterances or information provided by other people. The unravelling of the 
utterances and information is made even more difficult by the fact that historians first 
need to immerse themselves in the language of the source material and to make the 
transition from an unfamiliar system of concepts to another (their own).
In historical studies on the individual, the scope of manoeuvre is limited by an 
entire system of clichés, all kinds of loci communes and patterns that texts abound 
in. Frankly, reaching out to an authentic personality is uneasy, if not impossible [...] 
Consequently, the language through which the individual expresses himself or herself 
constitutes the essence of this individual. It is futile to search for anything beyond the 
text; there is nothing left to be concealed behind it.72
A. Gurevich’s and W. Wrzosek’s observations confirm an increasing 
interest of historiography in the individual’s participation in culture. The 
former writes as follows: 
The question of the individual is a key issue in modern historical writing with its 
anthropological slant, i.e. with its emphasis on humanity in all its diverse manifesta-
tions, as historically concrete human beings subject to change in the course of history. 
Historians have devoted a great deal of time and effort to fruitful study of society from 
the economic, social and political angles. Yet the human being, the ‘atom’ of the social 
structure, is something about which we know little [...]. Extensive materials have been 
amassed concerning revelations of men and women through their actions and everyday 
behaviour: we have at our disposal statements and ideas expressed by many different 
people in the past. Historians of ideas have uncovered diverse aspects of the picture of 
the world on which people based their thinking in a particular society and, in this way, 
they put together hypothetical reconstructions of the sets of values within which that 
thinking operated. Yet what they were dealing with was mainly collective psychology, 
the extra-personal aspect of individual consciousness, the general attitudes that are 
shared by members of large and small social groups, while the unique constellation 
made up of elements of a world picture in the mind of a given, specific individual 
escapes our attention in the vast majority of cases.73
72 A. Gurevich, The Origins of European Individualism, p. 244.
73 Ibidem, p. 2.
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The Polish historian, in turn, observes: 
A historian, leaving aside the individual as non-scientific, deals with a reality above 
the level of the individual. He thus rejects the field of motivation and intention (i.e. the 
individual’s consciousness) and excludes it from the zone of scientific investigation. The 
unique and exceptional individual remains, therefore, beyond history. The mysterious 
game taking place between the individual and the world, between the unique contri-
bution of the individual and the power of culture, community and process eludes the 
modern historian. A historian leaves to a philosopher the problems that occur at the 
intersection of the individual and the universal and concerns himself with a science 
that “recalculates” a particular empirical reality.74
As is evident in the observations of the Russian scholar, in large measure 
they have an anthropocentric focus.75 After a period of creating a hi/story 
of a great importance of processes and events, the time has come to create 
a history of “atoms.” However, it is created on the basis of the “material 
concerning accomplishments and activities” and the “acts of everyday 
life” of a community. This is in line with the requirements of collective 
psychology, which focuses on what is shared and recurrent. Only because 
of this is it able to meet the scientific criteria of an inter-subjective com-
municativeness and verification of statements. The author of The Origins of 
European Individualism bemoans the impossibility of capturing “a unique 
constellation of consciousness of a particular individual.” However, for 
a historian trying to reconstruct “semantic fields,” invariably created by 
social interactions and cultural regulations, it is extremely difficult to leave 
out the social and subjective “humanistic coefficient,” or the collective 
symbolic and cultural meanings of human actions. 
According to Stefan Bednarek, the categories that “reach out beneath 
the surface of phenomena, to the level of invariables that govern events 
and behaviour” are those that are the strongest rooted in the culture of 
everyday life.76 They can be related to “deep structures” (Duby), “culture 
categories” (Gurevich), “inner reality” (Suchodolski), “unconscious culture 
currents” (Sapir), “archetypes” (Jung), “symbolic paradigms” (Eliade), 
“metaphors” (Ricoeur), or “deep structures” (Lévi-Strauss). Their principal 
74 W. Wrzosek, Stosunek jednostkowe – społeczne..., p. 61.
75 Historical anthropocentrism corresponds with the anthropological one. This is 
addressed e.g. by W. J. Burszta: “The human person is a unique being, the only which 
exists for itself as it gets to know itself.” W. J. Burszta, Antropologia kultury. Tematy, teorie, 
interpretacje, Zysk i S-ka, Poznan 1998, p. 12.
76 S. Bednarek, Pojmowanie kultury i jej historii..., p. 63.
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objective is to develop the most fundamental thinking about the world 
and human beings. Within the approach of culture theory, the common 
aspect of the world of individuals is reflected on at a meta-level, where 
their cultural status is revealed. Making use of cultural regulations, com-
mon experience and diverse kinds of social consciousness, individuals 
live in a complex environment of symbols, worldviews and values which 
are directly, practically, available. Each of them has a semantic, axiological 
and praxeological context. All generate certain mental features arising 
from the participation in a given culture field. For instance, participation 
in a play, which belongs to the ludic custom, generates psychophysical 
states of relaxation, pleasure and joyfulness. In turn, participation in rites 
such as a Mass should trigger reflection, contemplation and a moderate 
number of gestures.
It seems that the descriptions most useful from the point of view of 
historical studies on the forms of participation in culture are contained in 
analyses of a subjective and rational criteria. An adequate reconstruction 
of the context of knowledge and valuation may lead to a description of 
individuals’ rational actions. Naturally, the rational is historically relative 
and it is seen as such at a given moment of social timespace. The above 
observations demonstrate that while the kinds and scale of respect for 
convictions concerning norms and directives are inter-subjectively com-
municable and verifiable,77 attempts at reconstructing the scale and “depth” 
of participation, i.e. awareness or acceptance of them, poses problems. 
How can we infer the actual status of particular regulated social actions? 
Are reconstructions of “psycho-cultural profiles” helpful in this respect? 
Analysis of the interconnections between the “tangible substrates” of 
cultural activity and the resultant mental states helps infer an authentic 
commitment to the acceptance of regulations governing certain culture 
fields. For example, the “festivals of fools” and “carnivals” studied by 
Jacques Heers78 in a given temporal and spatial framework are composed 
of numerous descriptions of all kinds of ludic activities, accompanied by 
77 An articulated normative conviction becomes a normative judgement, or a norm; 
a conviction concerning a directive becomes a directive judgement, or a directive. Both 
the norm and the directive are logically derivative with respect to the prime convictions. 
A culture historian tries to reconstruct judgements which are assumed to constitute inter-
pretations of the convictions about the norms and directives of a given time.
78 J. Heers, Święta głupców i karnawały, transl. G. Majcher, Oficyna Wydawnicza Vo-
lumen, Warsaw 1995.
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psycho-cultural features of participation in those humanistic structures.79 
It can be, then, assumed that they faithfully reflect the “depth” of partici-
pation under the regulations in force in the then existing societies. These 
relations may be fallacious, though. The patently evident “Dionysian” 
forms such as laughter, joy, playfulness, and emotional arousal seem to 
be “convincing,” “authentic” or “frank,” so much so that they are seen as 
a token of the acceptance of superior regulations. How about the “Apollo-
nian” forms, then? The through sources identifiable “tangible substrates” of 
the participation in rituals interpreted as pious attention, contemplation, 
humility, etc. could be equally well understood as respect or acceptance – 
especially if one takes into account the power of social conformism that 
makes individuals perform a ritual action in customary communication as 
messages sent and received rather than as strictly related to the worldview. 
Each and every time the individual’s world of an anonymous participant 
in culture is a universe whose reconstruction is the subject of historical 
speculations and also a wistful longing in the field of personal aspirations, 
as A. Gurevich observes.
Tapping into the above legacy of the Poznań school of methodology, 
one may seek all kinds of proposals of historical studies of the kind and 
scale of participation in the culture of everyday life in terms of subjective 
quality and objective quantity. The former is subjectively rational and the 
latter functional and genetically-functional. The social and regulation 
concept of culture is the binding element. As a result, it does not indicate 
the value of either of the study processes, the subjective nor the objective 
one. They are regarded as complementary. 
The subjective approach stresses the importance of the conscious per-
formance of cultural activities. Within the technical and usable culture, 
79 It arises as a set of complex subjective and rational actions focused on the imple-
mentation of a value as the ultimate objective. As J. Kmita observes, “There is a relation 
of i n s t r u m e nt a l s u b o r d i n at i o n between a given complex subjective and rational 
action, or a humanistic structure, and its direct components, i.e. particular actions. This 
relation consists in that to the best of the individual’s knowledge the particular actions as 
[the] component of a relevant complex action combine to make up this action. Therefore 
the performance of all of these actions suffices to constitute a complex action that furthers 
a relevant objective. Besides, each of the component actions is relatively (i.e. contingent 
on the performance of the other component actions) necessary for the furtherance of the 
objective by this action.” J. Kmita, O kulturze symbolicznej, p. 44. The humanistic struc-
ture may be also a product of the above actions, i.e. a work of art, and have a high level 
of hierarchy.
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the relations between actions and their meanings are objective. In the case 
of symbolic culture, they are typical activities focused on interpretation, 
i.e. they have particular communicative meanings. They vary with the 
particular society and the period of time. This is borne out by Jan Grad’s 
observation: “The relation between relevant behaviours and their mean-
ings is not a natural (objective) relation but a socially subjective one, or 
more precisely symbolically cultural.”80 Historical studies of the culture 
of everyday life in the aspect of an individual’s participation, apart from 
the above analysis of the general and attributive manner of respecting/
accepting cultural regulations in a given society, should also indicate the 
individualising and distributive ways and circumstances of taking part 
in cultural activities. 
It seems that the reconstruction of the subjective and social aspects 
of participation in the technical and usable field, due to its “objectivism,” 
can be better explored. The efficiency of such activities does not depend 
on respect or acceptance. The evaluation of this field and its results is 
a different worldview issue. It relates, however, to societies after Weber’s 
“first disenchantment of the world,” and even more so after the “second 
disenchantment of the world.” During the first stage we deal with the so-
called transition from magic to religion resulting in a separation of the 
practical from the symbolic and the necessary valorisation of the world-
view concerning cultural activities. At the second stage we deal with the 
so-called transition from religion to science, or the dominance in culture 
of purpose-related and rational activities, previously characteristic of the 
technical and usable field. In turn, taking into account the objectives of 
symbolic cultural activities one may try and recreate individualised, unique 
receptions of the “semantic fields” of convictions concerning norms and 
directives in different historical contexts.
Such a development of culture brings about a system of disciplines 
whose formation leads to what A. Gurevich termed a development of an 
individual’s consciousness, uniqueness and self-reflection in the process 
of participation in culture. Relevant research helps identify how the type 
and “depth” of participation impacts the uniqueness of a culture of a giv-
en historical period. While the socio-pragmatic image of culture stresses 
a temporary stabilisation of cultural regulations beyond the level of the 
80 J. Grad, Obyczaj a moralność. Próba metodologiczna uporządkowania badań do-
tychczasowych, Wyd. Naukowe UAM, Poznan 1993, p. 15.
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individual, it is the historical study of participation that can demonstrate 
its fluctuations and a dynamic of change. The subjective factor comes into 
play again during the analysis of e.g. the semantics of custom, which is 
a frequent object of interest of the history of everyday life.
Available sources and study tools help identify the scale of conscious-
ness (acceptance) or respect of worldview beliefs (myths) and those 
arising from common social experience. Both sources of developing the 
semantics of custom precede it genetically, but a historical interpretation 
of custom-related activities each time calls for invoking particular myths 
or common knowledge. Incidentally, one may examine to what extent we 
deal with non-conventionalised and with conventionalised semantics.81 
A reconstruction of an individual’s participation in custom calls for an 
adequate interpretation of: 1) the knowledge providing information about 
the circumstance and ways of performing custom-related activities; 2) the 
knowledge of worldview images or convictions from common social 
experience constituting the assumptions of the semantics of custom. In 
turn, an analysis of “tangible substrates” of custom-related actions helps 
infer the psycho-cultural states generated.
A historical reconstruction of an individual’s participation in customs 
is a complex process of departing from the ideological through the mental 
to the practical, without losing, blowing out of proportion or, as K. Zam-
iara pointed out, disregarding any of the aspects. The assumed optics 
may intensify selected components to the detriment of others. Equally 
hard to assess are the psycho-cultural states of participation in a custom, 
especially if it composes a complex humanistic structure such as a ritual. 
Such idealisations are, however, valuable from the cognitive point of view 
since they are based on an enhanced methodological awareness, which is 
conscious of its tools and of the “resistance of matter.”
A study of participation in the culture of everyday life may also be 
conducted in an objective manner. As W. Wrzosek indicated, it would 
take the form of “empirical recalculating.” It is often applied in statistical 
computations of particular aspects of tangible, material culture. Within the 
functional and genetic mode it is possible to indicate the role of a lot of 
activities from the area of everyday culture, whether technical and usable 
 
81 In the practice of customary communication, unconventionalised semantics means 
that a customary activity (its set) has a number of meanings, while under conventionalised 
semantics it has only one meaning. 
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or symbolic to sustain a given global state of a certain structural context. 
Naturally, this context does not look like a humanistic, but a functional 
structure. In principle, then, the subjective and rational activities under-
taken within it unconsciously generate a certain desired tendency.82 
This approach and the above functional and genetic mode is in no way 
innovative and it has many prior variants in historiography. The benefits 
here arise rather from the fact that, as the Poznań culture scholar observes, 
“making use of a new set of terms, we may formulate new issues which 
may elude even our intuition.”83 This idea should be the priority of the 
study of participation in the history of the culture of everyday life, allowing 
the identification and exploration of ever new subjects. The above con-
cepts and proposals in the field of the theory of methodology against the 
background of the history of historiography are to be a kind of building 
material, incentive and inspiration. 
82 As J. Kmita maintains, “a functional factor is selected via a relevant state continu-
ously retained via its attendant structural context. The individual who performs an action 
need not know about the context. He or she need not know about its retained state, in 
particular the tendency (dynamic state), or about the reasons that help maintain this state, 
or about which of its possible causes (in the form of relevant actions) come into play 
exclusively in a particular case.” G. Banaszak, J. Kmita, Społeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja 
kultury, p. 32.
83 J. Kmita, Wykłady z logiki i metodologii nauk, p. 152.
Chapter II
Defining history of mentalities
Introduction 
L’histoire des mentalités is widely known as the history of mentalities and 
also as the history of representations (histoire des représentations). Its origin 
dates back to the publishing of Lucien’s Febvre book about Martin Luther in 
1929 and also his book about François Rabelais in 1937. In both books the 
author astounds the reader with his innovative approach, asking about the 
mental inclinations of the behaviour of various historical characters. This 
proposition of the French historian was a huge step forward in opening 
up new ways of writing about history.
Before Febvre historians were usually interested in an extremely nar-
row understanding of their subject that was mostly based on “the cult 
of the source” and fact-stating descriptions. This kind of way of looking 
at history was burdened by its nationalistic traditions dating back to the 
19th century, together with other limitations (essentialist theories of cul-
ture, ethnocentrism, colonialism, etc.), although it is also important to 
state the fact that there were historians who had tried to overcome these 
tendencies. The first signs of trying to break through these barriers can be 
found in the books of Jacob Burckhardt, Edward Gibbon and Leopold von 
Ranke, who tried to introduce a cultural approach to the way of viewing 
history. Although each of them had their own methodological, they are 
treated as those who first dealt with the problem/they may be considered 
as the forerunners in dealing with the problem of how to look at history, 
helping the approach to history to bloom with new forms.
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The first movement, or school, that is usually connected with the topic 
of the history of mentalities is the so called Annales School, which started 
the conception of a “new history,” whose new fragments and descriptions 
occurred on the pages of the magazine “Annales d’Hisotire Economique 
et Sociale,” starting from the 15th of January 1929. The committee respon-
sible for editing the journal consisted of Albert Damangeon, Maurice 
Halbwachs, André Siegfried, Carles Rist, André Piganiol, Georges Espinaz, 
Henri Hauser, and Henri Pirenne. Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch were 
chosen as the chief-editors, and after fighting through many difficulties 
they were also approved as lecturers in the College de France, in the 4th 
section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes.1
The concept of this “new history” defined history as a “science about 
constant change” and repeated human accustoming to synchronically 
connected conditions of social existence (like politics, the economy, reli-
gion, or intellectuals/or the intelligentsia). One of the important inspira-
tions was the writings of Henri Berr, who treated history as a multi-layer 
structure influenced by rhythms of change. Other big/significant names 
constituting the new perspective were Ernest Labrousse (whose input is 
usually mentioned when discussing the economical and geographical 
determinations, including the longue durée), François Simiand (who ar-
gued for nomological statements regarding social change supported with 
economical explanations) and Paul Valéry (who spoke of the necessity of 
creating history founded on a neutral axiological approach).
Although no one doubts that this genre of history has gained popularity 
all over the world, it is extremely difficult to explain what does this term 
really refer to. Some believe that it is one of the most popular definitions 
concerning the history of non-intellectuals or call it the “history written 
from below.” Others tend to think that in some way this sub-discipline is 
connected with the history of ideas, the history of representations, the his-
tory of collective representations or intellectual history. The terminological 
chaos seems to be a result of the fact that many investigators, when dealing 
with the details of the problem, try to find a solution to their dilemmas 
without first concentrating on the necessity of establishing any theoretical 
order within the whole genre. This situation seems to be an outcome of two 
perspectives presented by these investigators. The first group usually tries 
1 A. F. Grabski, Dzieje historiografii, Wyd. Poznańskie, Poznan 2008; M. Harsgor, To-
tal History: The Annales School, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/260089?uid=3738
840&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21104389386973 [10.01.2014].
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to produce case (or practice) studies. They seem to struggle with historical 
sources and try to come up with solutions (that are actually) dictated by 
their own investigations. One may have an impression that they are like 
sailors rebuilding a ship on the open sea. In this group one can especially 
find works like those of Philippe Ariès. The other investigators usually try 
to define the subject first, but they seek theoretical solutions lacking the 
backing of empirical work. This group could be compared to those who 
create tools, yet never use them. Amongst their representatives one can 
find the works of Ewa Domańska or Tomasz Wiślicz. Of course, it would 
be unjust not to mention those who try to combine both these tendencies, 
mixing their theoretical reflections with proper historical investigation, 
like Jacques Le Goff, Pierre Nora, or Natalie Zemon Davis. 
The main issues discussed in this article are the source-based dilemmas 
of historians, who try to come to terms with the history of mentalities. 
The subject itself poses numerous scientific problems. First and foremost 
is the question of whether there are any possibility for historians to trust-
worthily present the way people used to think in the past (and even if it 
is possible, then would their statement be anything more than a lucky 
guess or mere assumption?). The second is how to deal with the historical 
sources and what are the strategies of approaching them? The third, when 
talking about mentalities, are we speaking about collectives, or individuals, 
the popular, or the elite, etc.? Furthermore, what ontological status does 
the “mentality” have? Have we got any artefacts thanks to which we can 
confirm its presence?
I intend to shed some light on these difficulties by achieving three 
aims. The first is to present the history of mentalities in order to show the 
origins of different solutions presented in the history of mentalities (in 
this way the reader may get to know the definitions and the somewhat 
problematic field of the topic). The second is to acquaint the reader with 
the socio-pragmatic definition of culture. The third one is to propose 
a new definition of the history of mentalities (which includes some of 
the achievements mentioned in the two first goals and is an outcome of 
combining the socio-pragmatic definition with the concept of mentalité).
All these problems, as difficult as are, were often the main reason for 
many researchers, finding the topic full of unsolvable problems, losing their 
interest in the topic altogether. The most interesting fact, however, is that 
even though the mentalité was often shunned by the theoretical approach 
of any particular faction, everybody seemed to end up practicing it. Hence 
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comes a paradox: it is easy to find a history of mentality (i.e. the history 
of death, sex, violence, family, childhood, gossip), yet it is difficult to find 
someone who might want to reflect on the methodological issues regard-
ing it – and this is exactly the area which I intend this article to relate to.
1. Material and methods 
For a proper apprehension of the problem I have chosen the following 
theoretical approaches: relativism, constructivism and historical anthro-
pology.
The tradition which is the most important for me in this article is 
historical anthropology. My main interest in this discipline regards the 
cultural perspective concentrated on the social practices of the historical 
everyman. Hence, in my opinion, the mentality can be understood in 
a Gurevich manner as:
The conceptions and feeling of people in a given society about life, their beliefs, ways of 
thinking, social and aesthetic values, attitude to nature, experience of time and space, 
ideas about death and the other world, their interpretation of ages in human life, etc., 
which in every epoch are interconnected, form a kind of a whole. This “model of the 
world” or “world picture,” is conditioned into the objective relations of production and 
of society. “Subjective reality,” how people think of themselves and their world, is an 
integral part of their lives as is its material substance. The ‘world picture’ determines 
the behavior, individual and collective, of people.2
Mentality, or as Gurevich likes to put it the “world picture,” is noth-
ing more than the total amount of perspectives presented (by numerous 
individuals) towards the (many) different dimensions of life. In this way 
the notion is not mixed up in any (specific) psychological or psychoana-
lytical inclinations and in its totality is placed on the cultural level of the 
consciousness, accessible through anthropological investigations. When 
trying to discover it, one must concentrate on the social strata of the sub-
jects reality and try to recreate their ways of perceiving the world, related 
to the norms and values of historical individuals.
Every cultural subject possesses a total amount of perspectives which 
helps him to understand and interpret stimuli coming into his mind, al-
lowing him to form his experience in a collectively understandable way. 
2 A. Gurevich, Historical Anthropology of the Middle Ages, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 1992, p. 48.
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What is it, then, that makes this theoretical approach so characteristic and 
important in treating the concept of culture?
One answer is that it changes the optics from classifying the political 
and object-centered relations towards the ways of reading and perceiv-
ing the world. If one would like to look for the predecessor of such an 
approach, it would probably take one back to Immanuel Kant’s theory of 
a priori categories, which, as pre-experience frames of reference, divide 
reality into the unrecognizable objective of noumena and phenomena un-
affected by the human senses. When speaking about these categories Kant 
places them in our mind as if they were a filter helping us to distinguish 
different categories of the world (like time, space, quantity, placement, 
etc.), accordingly to the Aristotelian inspiration. In such a situation one 
can say that the historical anthropologist, like Gurevich, takes the Kantian 
concept to the extreme, claiming that not only does the category shape 
the reflection, but also that the culture shapes the categories.
In this way the key assumption placed in this article is that of historical 
and cultural relativism, which besides the standard assumption of the con-
textualization of the analysed situation in the social-historical background, 
also demands a constructivist approach. These conceptions are connected 
with the presupposition that knowledge about the world, together with 
cognitive forms, has its firm foundations not in the objective conditions 
related to the human organism, but rather within the social rationalization 
of one’s experience and within the ways of its being formulated.
Is this the proper approach? – It is hard to say, yet such a perspective 
allows to explain a lot of phenomena, and at least start a discussion on the 
themes of mental diversity, logic, or analysing of the causes, effects and 
their justification. Furthermore, the connection of these two disciplines 
may establish a good passage between the social sciences and the philo-
sophical founding of the basis of knowledge about the world.
Another advantage comes with specifying the historical field of inter-
est of the history of mentality, thanks to which the notion acquires the 
status of a theory and not only of a declaration. Different conceptions of 
mentality are usually enclosed in definitions that, as catchy as they seem 
to be, usually are not followed by theoretical reflection. The construction 
of the term in its anthropological sounding way, makes it very similar 
to semiotic definitions of culture, comparable to the Geertzian “thick 
description,” to Goodenoughs definition of culture as knowledge or the 
already mentioned socio-pragmatic theory of culture.
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How and on what assumptions may the term of culture enhance our 
understanding of mentality and its empirical application in historical and 
cultural investigations, is what I will discuss in forthcoming parts of the 
text. In the final words of this chapter, meantime, I would like to empha-
size that the concept of mentality may be classified and used as a theory 
when turned into theory thanks to the concept of culture. But it is also 
important to remember that as worthy as anthropological achievements 
may be, it is still the history of mentality itself that produces and specializes 
in bringing up the strangeness and oddness of differences, which later on 
are subject to thorough examination.
2. Mentality and culture
One of the most popular references regarding the concept of mentalité, 
which one can find in historical literature, is an explanation provided by 
members of the Annales School, as they:
[...] made the first attempt to historicize the relationships between an author, his works, 
and his times. By introducing the concept of mental equipment (utillage mental), 
Lucien Febvre sought for a specific way to reconstruct the tools, mentalities and rep-
resentations of a given civilization. He conceived of mental equipment as a collective 
entity that created the framework for individual thought and practices exemplified in 
his biographies of Martin Luter and François Rabelais.3
The first histories of mentalities, created by Lucien Febvre and Marc 
Bloch, were strongly inspired by historical psychology (in the way favoured 
by Charles Blondel) and ethnology (in a way exemplified by the works 
of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl).4 Today’s investigators often put those people into 
the same current, backing their convictions with Bloch’s statement – who 
spoke of his work in the following words: 
In particular, my colleagues Lucien Febvre and Charles Blondel, will recognize so 
much of themselves in certain of the following pages that the only way to thank them 
is to indicate to them those borrowings taken, in all friendship, from their thought.5
3 D. Cahan, From Natural Philosophy to the Sciences: Writing the History of Nine-
teenth-Century Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2003, p. 79.
4 Needless to say, usually Marc Bloch is indicated as the follower of Lévy-Bruhl, while 
Febvre is often connected with Blondel. The broader perspective shows us that this situa-
tion is much easier to handle when treating them as a team in general.
5 S. W. Friedman, Marc Bloch, Sociology and Geography: Encountering Changing Dis-
ciplines, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 116.
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From today’s perspective, it is hard to tell if he was telling the truth. When 
trying to compare the books and the notions of mentality used in them, one 
could find oneself in a strange situation. Blondel and Lévy-Bruhl treated 
about something totally different than defining the problem of mentality. 
The first used the term to refer to collective factors incorporated inside the 
individual. In other words the history-related question would sound: how 
does the socially created order reflect itself in the individual? On the other 
hand, Lévy-Bruhl would be the one to ask the question about how does 
a primitive mind find itself in the lower stadium of development? How does 
that mind connect facts and explain the world, with all its reality, without 
science, inventions, writings and – the most important – logic.6 From the 
historical perspective, the posed question asks for progress. No doubt ei-
ther of these attitudes influenced the two historians, who, on their behalf, 
reciprocated with an inquiry about the historicized ways of rationalizing the 
actions and deeds of everyday life.7 It was their contribution to the problem 
which later on was undertaken by Marcel Mauss and Émile Durkheim. The 
history of science remembers these men gathered in the name of the French 
school of sociology, which strongly investigated the issues of the collective 
consciousness and the rules of its participation, leading them usually to the 
claim that all of our reactions are shaped by the society’s “spirit,” known 
otherwise as the collective consciousness.
On the basis of this sociological and psychological background, the 
two historians started investigating the past in order to present it in new 
terms, based on the social perspective – describing the probable world of 
the historical past depicted from the scope of the individual and not the po-
litical scope. This breakthrough was soon recognized by other investigators 
following the same path. The first one to mention it is the famous Philippe 
Ariès, who in his books tried to describe the history of childhood, family 
and death.8 He redefined the term mentality, treating it as the collective 
unconsciousness, which was available for historical research through the 
artefacts of social rituals and institutions reflecting the social needs.
6 This seems to have in his writings a very distinct and noble place.
7 D. B. Baker, The Oxford Handbook of the History of Psychology: Global Perspectives, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, p. 242.
8 For example: P. Ariès, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, Vin-
tage Books, New York 1965; idem, The Hour of Our Death: The Classic History of Western 
Attitudes Toward Death over the Last One Thousand Years, Vintage Books, New York 1982; 
P. Ariès, A. Bejin, Western Sexuality: Practice and Precept in Past and Present Times, Black-
well, Oxford, New York 1986.
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But as easy as it is to trace the problem of definition in its beginning, it 
becomes much more difficult to follow its lead in later stages, since most 
of the investigators use the term in a somewhat different way, emphasizing 
different accents and nuances, writing about mentality in a way where 
the details of their specification actually change the meaning as i.e. as in 
Robert Darnton’s case, who wrote about the genre in the following words:
It is a sort of intellectual history of nonintellectuals, an attempt to reconstruct the cos-
mology of a common man or, more modestly, to understand the attitudes, assumptions, 
and implicit ideologies of specific social groups (their utillage mental, according to 
Lucian Febvre, the great prophet and practitioner of this kind of history). Mentality 
is more a subject than a discipline.9
These differences are very well encapsulated and described by Michel 
Vovelle, who treats of an almost indistinguishable passage from the level 
of mentality to the level of practices (when a subject executes his or her 
actions respecting the social motivations by choice or unconsciously): 
[...] we have progressed from a history of mentalities, which, in its beginnings, es-
sentially stuck to the level of culture, or of clear thought [...], to a history of attitudes, 
forms of behavior and unconscious collective representations. This is precisely what 
is registered in the trends of new research – childhood, the mother, the family, love, 
sexuality and death.
It is hard not to agree with the French writer, who, when noticing 
the differences, speaks of them loudly and distinctly – the history of 
mentality, indeed, is a discipline without proper definition, not grasped 
by any form of theoretical reflection, and being undertaken by various 
investigators it is dispersed, becoming intellectual history, the history 
of the non-intellectual, social history, history of the idea, the history of 
representations, etc. Amongst the different definitions of mentality and 
the ways of understanding it, the one presented by Michel Vovelle is the 
closest to my own theoretical convictions:
The history of mentalities can be defined as the study of the mediations and of the 
dialectical relationship between the objective conditions of human life and the ways in 
which people narrate it, and even live it. [...] The exploration of mentalities, far from 
being a mystifying process, can ultimately lead to an essential widening of the fields 
of research, not as a venture into foreign, exotic territory, but as the natural extension 
and the cutting edge of all social history.10
 9 R. Darnton, The history of mentalities, in The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in Cul-
tural History, W.W. Norton & Company, New York 1991, p. 261.
10 M. Vovelle, Ideologies and mentalities, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1990, 
p. 12.
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In the negated element of the above last sentence, the historian seems 
to opt against the psychological and psychoanalytical interpretation of 
mentalities, especially in the way Ariès used to express it. Although the 
author of Human and death never showed his fondness for psychoanalysis, 
his tendency towards essentialist analysis was actually proved by many. 
Furthermore, Vovelle points to a dialectical connection between man and 
reality, which is understood as the social and collective vision of the per-
ceived objective conditions. One can never tell what objective reality really 
is, but he surely can provide testimonies about his impressions regarding it.
Vovelle’s transgression is very important because it takes us directly to 
the field of social practices, to which the perspective of sociology becomes 
an analytical point of entry. It is the field of social practices and rituals that 
is the very residuum of individuality. The most interesting for us would be 
the psychological approach, but since we have neither the proper cognitive 
apparatus, nor the necessary data, we cannot even trustworthily presume 
about the motivations of (private) individuals. We also have to remember 
that, all in all, human behaviour comprises of different attitudes, which in 
their broad meaning do not have to be communicable. 
Following its definition, the theoretical elements filling Vovelle’s ap-
proach are the contributions taken from the French school of sociology, 
whose close cooperation with historians was one of the elements estab-
lishing the theoretical background of the first generation of the Annales 
School. The collaboration of Febvre and Bloch with Durkheim, Mauss and 
Blondel, resulted in the conviction that the diversity of cultural approaches 
to reality may be treated as rational regardless of their accordance with 
the investigators own logic. In this way an anthropologist examining 
certain tribes noticed that the vision of the world presented by various 
inhabitants may be treated by the scientist as naive or even “primitive” (as 
Lévy-Bruhl often puts it), but, nevertheless, in its own terms and in that 
particular social order, it may be not only functional but also effective and 
efficient. As relative as this statement may seem, one must remember that 
the first thoughts on the topic presented in the works of Lévy-Bruhl often 
stated that the mind of a “primitive” may evaluate the world in different 
way; it may even suffice for him, but still both the logic and the science 
of the west are much more advanced and stand on a higher level of social 
development. As strong as Lévy-Bruhl was in his scientific issues, he still 
lacked the capability of escaping ethnocentrism.
This reflection was particularly taken up by Durkheim, who placed 
the bonding of a society in its morality. By the term morality Durkheim 
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understood the number of values (norms) derived from the society’s reli-
gion, which is defined by him in a very specific way. First, it is understood 
as synonymous to the hierarchy, governed by its “highest idea,” “god” or 
other providential force within an established ontological status. With time 
(and also societies development), the divinity was reduced to those ideas or 
common convictions shared by the community. In this way the group was 
treated as the highest ideal and it presented the pattern of the social order 
of principles which it was necessary to obey. Durkheim likes to express this 
quite directly when saying that particular deeds are treated as desirable or as 
punishable, not by their implicit (objective) value, but because of the social 
judgement behind their acceptance or decline. As Durkheim puts it: “The 
individual is the source of particular actions and particular impressions 
while performing the general and shared techniques of habitus.”11
What is important, not only did religion influence the morality but 
also the division of labour. In the beginning, societies were united under 
the banner of religion, having their social stratification horizontal; and 
hence, remaining under the influence of religious authority, the group was 
undifferentiated and homogenous. Every unit participating in a society’s 
actions and everyday life usually fulfilled the same duties and obligations 
to the group. It was not until the society’s development caused new spe-
cialties that professions occurred and changed the communities specifics 
from the mechanical to the organic. As the process of this change started, 
similarity was replaced with diversity, helping to meet the new expectations 
and requirements by creating specialized institutions. 
Additionally, the sociological typology proposed by the French scientist 
concentrated on another important aspect. Besides presenting the term of 
collective representation and proposing its regulations, the typology also 
emphasized two dimensions of human existence, the conception of which 
was introduced as homo duplex, which served to underline the mental and 
biological levels of human practices.
Collective representations were to be localized on the social level, but 
the consequences of their functioning – in the somatic. This is the point in 
which the conception shuns from the Blondelian theory of synesthesia and 
directs itself towards the theory of autosuggestion. It was thanks to Mauss 
and his works regarding magic and the phenomena of thanatomania that 
we owe the discovery of the connection between the power of subjects con-
11 C. Noland, Agency and Embodiment: Performing Gestures/Producing Culture, Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2010, p. 50.
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victions and their role in the effectiveness of “miracles.” The best modern 
situation parallel to those taken from the tribal traditions is perhaps that 
of the medical method of treating a patient by means of a placebo. The 
method is based on doctors lying to or presenting their patient with a false 
diagnosis, making that patient believe in his fast recovery. Such a treatment 
is sometimes combined with false medication treatment (i.e. with sugar 
pills) which, combined with the doctors authority and the patient’s trust, 
may result in the patient’s healthy progression and recovery. Hence, truth 
is created by the human mind (especially when speaking of mind-body 
related situations), causing negative (death as a result of a spell that is cast) 
or positive (a good charm of the doctor’s opinion) effects. The results of 
scientific investigations provide us with one outcome. Our psychic level 
(mentality) is the final instance of a human’s appeal when regulating his 
habitus and behaviour. There is no objective reality or conditions to which 
one can relate in a way other than the constructivist way. An evil deed is 
not evil because of its objective relations, but because a society has regu-
lated it in a final way. A charmed person dies not because of magic, but 
because of his own beliefs:
The universality and the a priori nature of magical judgments appear to us to be the 
sign of their collective origin. It follows, therefore, that it is only those collective needs, 
experienced by a whole community, which can persuade all the individuals of this 
group to operate the same synthesis at the same time. A group’s beliefs and faith are the 
result of everyone’s needs and unanimous desires. Magical judgments are the subject 
of a social consensus, the translation of a social need under the pressure of which an 
entire series of collective psychological phenomena are let loose. This universal need 
suggests the objective to the whole group. Between these two terms, we have an in-
finity of possible middle terms (that is why we have found such an extreme variety of 
rites employed for the same purpose). Between the two terms we are allowed a degree 
of choice and we choose what is permitted by tradition or what a famous magician 
suggests, or we are swept along by the unanimous and sudden decision of the whole 
community. It is because the result desired by everyone is expressed by everyone, 
that the means are considered apt to produce the effect. It is because they desired the 
healing of feverish patients that cold water douches and a general theory of magic.12
The influence of such theories on scientific opinions are obvious and 
observable in the manner of constructing descriptions. The positivistic or 
scientific way of describing social reality was created as the behavioural 
depiction of an observed agent and “their” conducted actions. Later, new 
proposition presented by American anthropologists, is called theoretical, 
12 M. Mauss, Theory of magic, Routledge, London 2001, p. 154.
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as it no longer spoke of resembling the reality, but transferring reflection 
to the level of the depicting of the agent executing the actions. Mauss, 
Durkheim and the Annales historians came to the conclusion that there is 
no such thing as “particular or individual human being” in the biological 
meaning of the term. If we are able to self-mutilate or disturb our instinct 
for self-preservation, then surely the social strata of the individual is much 
stronger than the biological one.13
Such a point of view, combined with its cognitive dilemmas, can be 
found presented in Marc Bloch’s work regarding miracle working, attrib-
uted by the society of the Middle Ages to the institution of kings. In his 
work, Bloch creates a synchronic analysis of the kings’ institution and its 
alleged power of healing:
There are two traditional ways of explaining each religious phenomenon. The first one 
[...] sees in the examined phenomenon the conscious work of the individual, aware of 
themselves. The other one is looking for deep and fairly known social forces. [...] So 
that some institution – which serves aims established by the individual will – could 
work amongst a broader circle of people, it must find itself reflected in the underneath 
streams of the collective unconsciousness. Although it maybe also the opposite: so that 
some fairly specified faith could transform itself in to a concrete, regular ritual, help 
from a few wise people would have been required. If we take the hypothesis presented 
by me for granted, the history of the beginnings of the kings ritual of touching, deserve 
to be placed amongst such prominent historical phenomena which are influenced by 
both these mentioned elements.14 
This phenomena appearing in the society was connected with the 
identification of the king, and his power with miracle-working and the 
conviction that the ruler was directly representing the divine influence, 
which anointed him with such wonderful power. This belief, when trans-
lated into practice, displayed itself in the form of the king’s audiences, 
13 “Thus, to the primitive mind, the omen is primarily a cause, but at the same time it 
is a sign because it is a cause. As the characteristics peculiar to his mentality grow propor-
tionately weaker, the mystic type of causality ceases to dominate it almost entirely, time 
and space come to be felt less as qualities, and realized more as ideas, and finally, the at-
tention fastens more and more closely upon the objective series of cause and effect. By an 
inevitable consequence the omen tends to conform to these changes of idea. It becomes 
more and more of a sign and less and less of a cause, until at length the primitive no longer 
understands how it could ever be a cause.” In L. Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive mentality, George 
Allen and Unwin, The Macmillan Company, London – New York 1923, p. 88.
14 M. Bloch, Królowie cudotwórcy: studium na temat nadprzyrodzonego charakteru 
przypisywanego władzy królewskiej zwłaszcza we Francji i w Anglii, Volumen – Bellona, 
Warsaw 1998, p. 102 (my own translation).
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during which the ruler touched with his healing hands people infected 
with scrofula, for instance. However, sceptics would object – claiming 
that this was nothing more than a mischief and pure example of charlatry, 
though this does not explain the fact that those who met the king quickly 
rejuvenated. Sometimes it took one visit, sometimes two or five, yet – as 
the chronicles report – they tended to work. 
The historical explanation provided by Bloch brings the information 
that those who treated themselves for “scrofula” were not actually always 
carrying its virus. They often could have been suffering from illnesses with 
very similar symptoms, which were diagnosed with regards to the mirac-
ulous power of the king. This situation, combined with the fact of numer-
ous plagues and peoples eagerness to jump to conclusions (on the other 
hand – who when standing in the face of death would not?), evolved into 
the shape of such a recognition and autosuggestion. Possibly the patients 
restoration was just a coincidence, because driving the disease away would 
succeed even without a “miraculous intervention.” However, if the king 
was lucky enough, his time of reign would converge with a large number 
of recoveries (i.e. when the alleged scrofula was in fact a malignant flu), 
and then the situation resulted in a rapturous increase of the king’s pop-
ularity, as he was identified with the wave of miraculous recoveries. Such 
a spreading of his fame has a few important aspects. The first was recog-
nition of the king as a true and god sent ruler. Accordingly to the popular 
demands of the epoch, a real king should possess the power of healing, 
by definition. An interesting aspect of this situation is the fact that we do 
not have any confirmed statements claiming that the subjects inquired 
into or investigated the conviction that the power of healing was predes-
tined only for the Capetian dynasty (meaning not-British dynasty which 
used the power with the same commitment as the British one). Probably 
rivalry between two houses was the origin of the wonderful development 
of the healing power of Henry II with his great skill of creating enchanted 
cramp-rings (or special necklaces called the Angeles created from a coin 
with the emblem of an angel) that protected its owner from epileptic fits. 
Needless to say that amongst those people quickly exposed, there were 
also those who very cynically abused the naivety of their neighbours in 
need. In this time it was easy to find a “fencer” who after a few standings 
in long lines at the kings court came into possession of a number of coins 
and rings, which later on he resold to the highest (or maybe the most 
desperate) bidder. The blessed coin was gaining value quickly and could 
have been sold even a few times in its second circulation. Of course, in 
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the broad perspective such an understanding of the king’s healing touch 
helped found the church’s own instances of miraculous cures, as those of 
highest regards, which not only enthrone, but also constitute the king.
Notwithstanding the fact that no matter how many convictions 
were connected with this phenomena, or what mightbe the best way of 
describing it, still the perspective treating the institution of the king as 
both divine and manipulative, as well as a source of hope, would remain 
cognitively “actual” and productive. The scientific movement of historical 
anthropology started by Bloch would develop for a long time and would 
remain prosperous, resulting in adaptations for the next generations in the 
Annales School. Among the next generation, one who would contribute 
to the research and development of the history of mentalities would be 
Philippe Ariès. Not only did he dedicate his works towards investigating 
the problems of childhood, family and death in its historical development 
through the ages, but also it is his insight that remains connected with the 
term mentalité, to which he referred as the collective unconsciousness: 
Presumably it should better be called the collective nonconscious. Collective because it 
is common to an entire society at a specific point in time. Nonconscious, since contem-
poraries take little or no notice of it. It is self-evident and part of the unalterable givens 
of nature. It encompasses ideas handed down over generations or that lie suspended 
in the air. Commonplaces, rules of behavior and moral codes, conformities or prohi-
bitions, permitted, forced or forbidden expressions and feelings and phantasms. [And 
also it – S. K.] forms the elementary psychological tendencies such as self-assurance 
or the desire for power – or, conversely, the feeling of community and solidarity.15
Whilst recalling Ariès in this article, I would like to emphasize that for 
me the importance of his works is combined with his biggest critic and 
colleague Michel Vovelle, whose politics of investigating the historical prob-
lems of mentality is quite often defined by him with a negative reference 
towards the writings of Ariès. Already in the above mentioned citation, one 
can easily notice a psychological (or even psychoanalytical) trap, of which 
Ariès is unjustly charged. It is unjustly so because with all the problems 
of his works and accusations of essayism and doubtful methodology, one 
cannot blame him for referring to Sigmund Freud or Carl Gustav Jung.16
15 A. Lüdtke (ed.), The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences 
and Ways of Life, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1995, p. 78.
16 S. Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/f/
freud/sigmund/general-introduction-to-psychoanalysis/ [29.06.2014]; C. G. Jung, On the 
nature of the psyche, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1973.
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In his works Ariès describes the transformations of the western civiliza-
tions worldview through the centuries, but also constantly attracts readers 
attention with two elements. The first one, so well distinguished by him, is 
the adaptations of social rituals, or rather such readings and investigating 
of them, which leads us towards recognizing the actual agent’s motivation. 
The second is that most of the analysed social practices are practiced 
behaviourally (automatically), and not respectfully (with an awareness 
of the social rules). This explains that not always does an individual have 
to understand and bear in mind all the rules he must respect in order to 
execute an action. Sometimes one does it automatically, i.e. when speaking, 
where no one usually wonders about all the grammatical obligations related 
to their spoken statements. The difference between actions governed by 
behaviour and respect shows us the necessity of realizing the values and 
justifications of an agent undertaking their action.
Vovell’s critical reference towards Ariès relies on Ariès failing to meet 
the very methodological obligations which the author of Human and death 
declares in his works. One of the basic accusations is focused on longue 
durée, which refers to the perspective of the centuries which need to pass, 
and which have to be taken as a cognitive perspective, if one wants to deal 
with the topic of historical change. When examining the history of death, 
Ariès depicts a number of cultural changes that came to happen in the times 
close to the 15th century period. The author of Human and death presents 
us with a large variety of examples, claiming that each change in exercising 
death customs was founded on cultural or civilizational change. Vovelle 
undermines this approach, claiming that during the aforementioned period 
only one change occurred in history, and it was just after the enlightenment, 
which presents a borderline to the religious interpretations of the world. It 
was just then, at that time, when people shunned Christianity and cut the 
thread connecting each social practice (including celebrating death) with 
the divinity. In the practices surrounding death, it is a graspable moment, 
in which peoples started to treat death as the end of their existence, and 
not as the rite of a passage towards another part of their existence. This 
situation is best described in the following citation:
It is clear, if we pass from the history of cultures or of clear thought to the new field 
of history of mentalities, which deals with the domain of attitudes, behavior and what 
some scholars call “the collective unconscious,” that the longest time frame is undeni-
ably necessary. The are no struggles nor even, strictly speaking, sudden changes ore 
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events in the history of the family, of attitudes to childhood, collective sociability or 
death, to list almost haphazardly the new fields which have been opened.17
Such cognitive dilemmas were also presented in Cheese and worms by 
Carlo Ginsburg. The author, after reading the documents of the Inqui-
sition, tried to recreate the perspective of everyday life (of the religion, 
god, world) in the middle ages based on the testimony of the miller who 
tried to defend himself before the Inquisition. The curious thing about 
this examination is the fact that everything he did or spoke of was quite 
shocking not only because it varied so much from the investigators point 
of view, but also because it seemed quite odd in relation to each of his 
neighbours. In general terms, his personality was much closer to being 
eccentric than to that of the “typical” peasant, which led Ginsburg’s thesis 
to reconstruct middle age popular culture on the basis of the trials doc-
uments...well...quite... impossible.
What is important is the fact that not everyone is lucky enough to base 
their investigations on a complex source material, as it was in the case of 
Ginsburg, Vovelle or Ladurie, whose in their researches had the possibility 
of creating a historical analysis of a whole village, founding his research 
on a complete source material. This question gains importance especially 
when one tries to merge the history of mentalities with the serial history.
Emmanuel le Roy Ladurie, François Furet, Pierre Chaunu – all associat-
ed themselves with researches devoted to big serial events, treated as a total 
amount of quantified factors. Although they analyzed historical issues 
through the lens of large numbers (prices, statistics, conjunctures, etc.), they 
tended to avoid deriving conclusions that would inform the reader about 
something more than the “amount of burned wax” (as Darnton likes to 
ironically express it). I think that his questions, similarly to the definitions 
of serial history (treating examination as computer processed data), defeats 
their own purpose. Big series of historical sources are essential material 
for noticing the cultural change and rendering social practices. History’s 
biggest enterprise, to meet and explain the social dilemmas of that which 
is alien and foreign, to define and translate, to contextualize, must always 
undergo the process of falsifying its own thesis (maybe its own perspective 
is erroneous at its very basis). In the context of Ginsburg’s investigations 
regarding the social status of the miller, after careful consideration – was 
his case adequate for deducting the content of popular culture? Would 
17 M. Vovelle, Ideologies..., p. 5.
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not he bring us to the conclusion that his Etruria village was full of the 
apostles of private cosmogonies? Is not the source material too narrow? 
In this case a serial approach would help us analyse the trends and precise 
the currents and the events defining a particular historical period, and for 
sure, his justification – which should be settled in a wider scope.
Not every change is a matter of cultural change, and not in every social 
movement does one find a transformation of civilization. Vovelle draws 
this conclusion whilst interpreting a collection of over one thousand 
testaments, which helps him to write a map of convictions and ways of 
thinking of their authors. The place of cultural change is marked by him 
in at a point when the document left by the deceased is no longer his last 
will and farewell to the world, becoming a formal document sharing the 
inventory without any eschatological, moral or ethical connotations.
In this moment it would be very useful to remind the reader of Vovelle’s 
definition of mentalities:
The history of mentalities can be defined as the study of the mediations and of the 
dialectical relationship between the objective conditions of human life and the ways in 
which people narrate it, and even live it. [...] The exploration of mentalities, far from 
being mystifying process, can ultimately lead to a essential widening of the fields of 
research, not as a venture into foreign, exotic territory, but as the natural extension 
and the cutting edge of all social history.18
In Vovelle’s approach, the significance of the definition is placed on the 
leading role of source material understood not only as the epoch evidence 
of historical actions and activities, but also as a collection of documents, 
whose large number contributes about tendencies connected with mental 
currents of the era. The quantity is also a testimony to commonness that 
informs us about the state of things and their social range, whose time 
range allows to deduct potential changes, conjunctures and other factors.
This is how we come about to another important moment in investi-
gating the topic of mentalities named culturally oriented historical anthro-
pology and the most convenient theory of “world views” created by Aron 
Gurevich. The investigation not only broadens the way of understanding 
the mentalities, but also adapts and connects them with his own concep-
tion. This is what he writes in his definition of the “vision of the world”:
The conceptions and feelings of people in a given society about life, their beliefs, ways 
of thinking, social and aesthetic values, attitude to nature, experience of time and 
18 Ibidem, p. 12.
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space, ideas about death and the other world, their interpretation of ages in human 
life, etc., which in every epoch are interconnected, form a kind of a whole. This “model 
of the world” or “world picture,” which is conditioned into the objective relations of 
production and of society. “Subjective reality,” how people think of themselves and 
their world, is as integral part of their lives as is its material substance. The “world 
picture” determines the behavior, individual and collective, of people.19
And of mentality:
Mentalité implies the presence of a common and specific intellectual equipment, a psy-
chological framework shared by people of a given society united by a single culture 
enabling them to perceive and become aware of their natural and social environment 
and themselves. A chaotic and heterogeneous stream of perceptions and impressions 
is converted by consciousness into a more or less ordered picture of the world which 
sets its seal on all human behavior. The subjective side of the historical process, the 
manner of thinking and feeling particular to people of a given social and cultural 
community, thus becomes part of the objective process of history.20
Mentality in Gurevich’s understanding is similar to the total amount of 
categories, which taken all together constitute the complementary vision 
of the world. In this case, historians enterprise (especially when one takes 
into consideration Vovelle’s critical remarks regarding interpretation and 
processing historical sources) the most visible aspect is his theoretical 
approach derived from culture concentrated anthropology, which under 
the additional consideration of the achievements of various researchers, 
can provide an entry point for recreating mentalité into a theoretical tool. 
The Kantian definition spoke of the impossibility of mastering knowl-
edge of the objective world. This thesis redirected investigators to the 
necessity of concentrating on a priori categories of human forms of 
cognition of observed phenomena. In the case of Gurevich’s scope, those 
categories originate not from the metaphysical constitution of the world, 
but are determined socially and culturally. We learn the world by means 
of socially communicative ways of capturing the experience and ways of 
interpreting it. These ways remain communicative and reproduced in 
a creative way. This means that agents who participate in social receipt 
of the world not only repeatedly recreate their actual order of the world, 
passing it from generation to generation, but also they transform it. This 
perspective allows us to treat the cultural agent or unit as a free entity, an 
active moderator, who can consciously act, change, reinterpret and disobey 
19 A. Gurevich, Historical Anthropology..., p. 48.
20 Ibidem, p. 4.
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the social order. Gurevich seizes this deterministic approach, proposing 
a definition of the subject as an active interpreter and free moderator 
proposing either his recognition or change of the world picture. 
Quite a different (although not so methodologically precise) perspective 
remains in the works of Clifford Geertz, whose conceptions were used by 
his colleague, Robert Darnton. The Geertzian description comprises of 
two parts – thick and thin. The second one touches a strict phenomenal 
description of the actions or gestures which were undertaken by the agent. 
On the other hand, the first one concentrates on the cultural interpretation 
of the action, treating it as a cultural sign, together with its symbolical 
superstructure requiring interpretation. Geertz provides us with an exam-
ple of winking at somebody. The physical aspect is quite simple, because 
somebody just closes an eyelid, but if one is aware of cultural symoblisms 
he knows that the amount of social senses connected with it (from social 
conspiracy, to joke) changes the action radically.
In Darnton’s adaptation, the anthropological assumptions of the Ameri-
can investigator find place in the moment of encountering strange and un-
explainable social phenomena. This basic amazement remains a rudimental 
amalgam of cultural difference often based on applying different values to 
the same situation. Such investigations are usually started with a physical 
description, and later on are followed by the values connected with them.
In Geertz’s case such a description found realization in cock fights on 
Bali, which were a manifest of typical men’s qualities like aggression and 
bustle. In Darnton example, the most interesting analysis regards histor-
ically related (hence: different) ways of traders and middle man work, the 
social functioning of distributors, etc. Another interesting work of his 
remains his ironic (in the understanding of Hayden White’s Metahistory) 
interpretation of the film Danton directed by the Polish director Andrzej 
Wajda, which shows the genealogy and critiques both of totalitarian and 
democratic political systems. The most famous works of Darnton21 ori-
21 Amongst them one should mention R. Chartier, The cultural origins of the French 
Revolution, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C. 1991; idem, Forms and meanings texts, 
performances, and audiences from codex to computer, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia 1995; R. Chartier, L. G. Cochrane, Cultural history: between practices and 
representations, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1988; R. Darnton, The kiss of Lamo-
urette: reflections in cultural history, Norton, New York 1990; idem, The great cat massacre 
and other episodes in French cultural history, Basic Books, New York 2009; N. Z. Davis, 
Fiction in the archives: pardon tales and their tellers in sixteenth-century France, Stanford 
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ented him towards investigating case studies, especially when they were in 
some way connected with the French Revolution. He presents us with the 
problems of transmitting information in the time of the Jacobean terror, 
and acquaints us with the problems of perceiving the revolution both from 
today’s and the 18th century perspectives and shows us the backstage scene 
of the brothers Grimm fairytale workshop.
3. Socio-cognitive conception of culture22
As I mentioned earlier in the part dedicated to methodological aspects of 
the current article, I find the historical anthropology the best theoretical 
strategy for creating the history of mentalities. It is also important to 
underline that this term results in innuendo demanding explanation of 
either the anthropological or historical elements. The concept of historical 
anthropology defines such an examination of past events, which relies 
on a culturalistic approach towards the diachronic analysis of the social 
constitutions of world views and their transformations. In this part of the 
text I would like to undertake the examination of the concept of culture, 
which would help to bring a more precise scope towards the scientific 
examination and present the socio-cognitive element of this endeavour.
The first important information regarding the socio-cognitive concep-
tion of culture is the fact that it relates to thought instruments, which are 
implied in the reality of the individual together with the members of his 
culture. Such an idea was inspired by the anthropological conceptions of 
Ward Goodenough, who defines culture as follows:
University Press, Stanford 1987; J. Delumeau, History of paradise: the Garden of Eden in 
myth and tradition, University of Illinois Press, Urbana 2000; J. Delumeau, J. Moiser, Ca-
tholicism between Luther and Voltaire: a new view of the Counter-Reformation, Burns and 
Oates, Westminster Press, London – Philadelphia 1977; P. Nora, L. D. Kritzman, Realms of 
memory: Rethinking the French past, Columbia University Press, New York 1996; P. Nora, 
L. D. Kritzman, Realms of Memory: Conflicts and divisions, Columbia University Press, 
New York 1996.
22 The below chapter is based on the following works of J. Kmita, G. Banaszak, Spo- 
łeczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury, Instytut Kultury Warsaw 1994; J. Kmita, Kultura 
i poznanie, PWN, Warsaw 1985; idem, Problems in historical epistemology, D. Reidel Pub. 
Co.; Wyd. Naukowe PWN, Distributors for the U.S.A. and Canada, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Dordrecht – Boston – Warsaw – Norwell, Mass., 1988.
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The term culture [refers to] what is learned, [...] the things one needs to know in order 
to meet the standards of others. 
And further:
Therefore, if culture is learned, its ultimate locus must lie in individuals rather than 
in groups. If we accept this, then cultural theory must explain in what sense we can 
speak of culture as being shared or as the property of groups at all, and it must explain 
what the processes are by which “sharing” arises.23 
Culture in its totality relates to the mind, the mental and ideal order 
which, later, when implied in reality, allows to experience and interpret 
it. Such a statement perfectly fits the propositions brought about by 
mentality investigators, which when approaching the historical agent (or 
collectiveness), they relate to its cognitive forms, knowledge or thoughts. 
Furthermore, Kmita’s theory is a multilevel concept allowing to examine 
social reality from the scope of social practices.
J. Kmita defines culture as a number of functionally determined forms 
of social consciousness which regulate different types of social practices 
engaged in the given objective conditions24. The number of social practices 
is equal to the number of forms of social practices.
The social practice depends on the objective conditions that are repro-
duced in a simple or extended way. In this way each social practice can 
be defined as a two level diachronic functional structure. The first level 
proposes that each social practice renders its objective conditions in such 
a way that the practice itself can maintain its original, global shape. The 
second – each social practice not only is determined by its global shape, 
but also functionally determined by its forms of social consciousness, the 
subjective behaviours of people, by providing them with judgements defin-
ing values (aims) and directives (means). Each cultural subject acquainted 
with those means and aims determines them in a subjective-rational way.
Although this definition seems very mysterious, its quite easy to under-
stand when explained through an example. Nearly every man that is born 
in a society is being brought up by his parents, but also by its social context 
(like school or the work place, for instant). The process of education and 
socializing provides us with a system of judgements (called norms and 
23 W. Goodenough, Cultural anthropology and linguistics, in D. Hymes (ed.), Lan-
guage in culture and societ: a reader in linguistics and anthropology, Harper & Row, New 
York 1964, pp. 19–20.
24 The system of production forces and class-differentiated relations of production.
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directives) that guides us in different social situations. In this way when 
we want to express our gratitude (a norm), we know that we must smile 
and shake hands with somebody (a directive), and when a man wants to 
show his sympathy to a woman (norm) he brings, say, flowers (directive). 
As easy as it is to understand this, we must also remember that usually 
we pass those judgements on to the next generations when telling our 
children how they should behave and participate in society. This is the 
moment when the first level of determination reaches its borders – each 
culture reproduces its global state.
Of course, not everyone is a perfect gentlemen, and even if we behave 
properly, we may somehow influence the execution of a directive or poorly 
understand the norm (in reference to the above examples, if we shake the 
hand too roughly or hand the flower turned upside-down). This is why we 
say that not only people of a given culture are determined functionally by 
that culture, but also that they determine it in a subjective-rational way 
(the second level), because they may understood something badly, and 
invent a new value or directive instead of the older one. This is also why 
we say that the culture is reproduced in a simple (when exercising the 
previous state and copying it) or in an extended way (when we change or 
invent something new).
It is important (here) to mention a few things. 
First and foremost. All the subjects are treated as rational. This term 
comes from Max Weber, and it informs us that each person knowing its 
means and aims will execute them in the best known way, dictated by 
its cultural hierarchy, but always understanding its social situation and 
determination.
The second thing is that when talking about social practices (forms 
of social consciousness expressed in the judgements called norms and 
directives), we must remember that they are comprised only of those 
judgements that are common to everyone who participates in the culture. 
This means that the social consciousness is much broader than it is as-
sumed in the definition of culture, and includes elements of everyday and 
common experience. The best way to show this situation is by referring 
to an example.
When one is seeing his neighbour each day he usually greets him by 
saying “Hello” or by a firm handshake. This simple gesture defines a good 
behaviour and a respect which one shows to other people. To this moment 
the norms and directives are obvious and communicative. But if we change 
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something i.e. when evading the neighbour or by mumbling, we can show 
something exactly opposite.
Such a way of understanding the culture has very significant conse-
quences. The first one is that the culture stops being understood as a group 
of physical objects. As Goodenough says:
A society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to 
operate in a manner acceptable to its members. Culture is not a material phenomenon; 
it does not consist of things, behavior, or emotions. It is rather an organization of these 
things. It is the form of things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, 
relating, and otherwise interpreting them.25 
Culture is more like a mental system of organizing the world and its 
elements than any physical feature that can be perceived or noticed in the 
object. In this way when an investigator approaches the problem, he is 
dealing with peoples values, judgements, convictions and prejudices – that 
possess a cultural subject and not a social phenomenon. When engaging 
a scientific enquiry, we reconstruct a composition of judgements about 
a world, and not a physical reality. In this way the outcome picture of 
a society has all the qualities of an idealistic model – a reconstruction 
of norms and directives distilled form the social behaviour. In such an 
understanding the created model is an ideal type of action, which can be 
attributed as the best, and most perfect example of the presented kind. 
Weber describes it in the following words:
For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, 
affectually determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a conceptually 
pure type of rational action. For example a panic on the stock exchange can be most 
conveniently analysed by attempting to determine first what the course of action 
would have been if it had not been influenced by irrational affects; it is then possible 
to introduce the irrational components as accounting for the observed deviations from 
this hypothetical course...Only in this way is it possible to assess the causal significance 
of irrational factors as accounting for the deviation of this type. The construction of 
a purely rational course of action in such cases serves the sociologist as a type (ideal 
type) which has the merit of clear understandability and lack of ambiguity. By compar-
ison with this, it is possible to understand the ways in which actual action is influenced 
by irrational factors of all sorts, such as affects and errors, in that they account for the 
deviation from the line of conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis that 
the action were purely rational.26
25 W. Goodenough, Cultural anthropology..., p. 167.
26 M. Weber, Basic sociological terms, in Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpre-
tive Sociology, University of California Press, California 1978, p. 6.
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Of course, a cultural subject does not always reflect on his patterns of 
behaviour. The best example is the usage of language. When somebody 
wants to speak, he “just” speaks and does not reflect about all the rules, 
adjectives and tenses. In addition, most people would have big problems 
or even find it impossible to reconstruct the rules of the language they 
are speaking.
Hence comes two ways of defining the subjects action. If we are acting 
like in the language example mentioned above, we are respecting the rules 
by following them unconsciously, and that’s why we call it respecting them. 
When a subject would do it on purpose, consciously recalling the rules 
and pattern, we may rather call it accepting. 
Such a theory of culture in its general structure has been divided by 
Kmita into two parts. The first one is called the technical-useful culture 
and comprises of three processes (exchange, production, consumption), 
which for their effectiveness do not require an understanding of the aims. 
This means that they have only a directival dimension which is necessary 
for technical functioning (i.e. one does not need to be an electrician and 
understand the electrical circuits to turn on a lamp). The second type of 
culture distinguished by Kmita is the symbolical one, which is based on 
the process of understanding and interpretation of the norms, and also 
requires knowledge about directives (i.e. painting, religion, etc.). Without 
such a distinction, it would be impossible to understand the fact of using 
different technical devices without having the knowledge of, say, the en-
gineer or artist, etc. On the other hand, there is no point in praying if we 
do not believe, and hence we do not respect the norms (values). Elements 
of symbolical culture are necessary if we want to discuss the problems of 
people’s worldviews and those elements of culture that are not palpable 
practically (i.e. magic, god and other elements that provide the semantics 
for communication).
There is no point in summarizing all the elements of Kmita’s writings, 
and as ambitious as this article is, one must also remember about the 
sketchy character of the work of his presented below, so without further 
delay I would like to stress some important facts implemented in Kmita’s 
theory that I find useful in discussing the topic of mentality.
The first one is the fact that the theory deals with one of the basic 
problems of mentality. The term mentality is usually depicted with a few 
simple sentences describing the phenomena, which later on is used for 
empirical applications. From the perspective of Kmita’s theory, such de-
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scription does not have a scientific status and has only a status of behavioral 
description. This means that till the theoretical breakthrough there is just 
a visible depiction of a given situation. When one uses the socio-pragmatic 
theory for their analysis, one usually uses the process of ideation, which 
reverses the investigating process. When starting the investigation, the 
scientist should start from the end, thus from the very behaviour of the 
cultural subject. After identification and describing, when one wants to 
explain the social phenomena one has to describe the situation and later 
find the elements that preceded it, and hence constituted it. The direction 
is reversed and helps to provide the analysis from the outcome backwards 
towards the causes of the situation and to hence find the motivation of 
the cultural subject. Such a method is called reproductive and ideistic. 
When the scientist is able to reconstruct the above mentioned judge-
ments, he has to assume that even when they seem illogical, or their moti-
vations and justifications are not communicative, in the alien culture they 
may be not only reasonable but shared, and to construct the complex vision 
of the world. The element that combines the individual convictions with 
that vision is the assumption about the rationalism of the unit undertak-
ing the action, which is really an output theory helping us to understand 
the analysed behaviour and to treat it as comprehensive (this means, that 
every alien to our own cultural behaviour will be treated as a consequent 
realization of the culture related vision of the world).
This assumption allows us to examine the world together with the 
possibility of a vision of the world existing that is different to our own 
and to explain actions different to our own. This means that each culture 
segregates, orders and furnishes the world in its own, separate way – cre-
ating its own social reality. Consequently, this means that the effect of the 
examination provided by the scientist is his own evidence of the world. 
Kmita used to call this the cultural imputation, which informs us about the 
necessary cultural minimum which is always transmitted into the outcome 
of the investigation.27 This is also the place which displays some ambiguities. 
During my talks with Krzysztof Moraczewski, I heard from him that, in 
27 “First and foremost – there is the external logic of culture, which in our case means 
at least: zero order logic as a fundament of language. Second, surely temporality and 
spatiality, which are implemented in the sense areas inscribed in the researched reality. 
Furthermore, especially important for us, elements that are connected with them – his-
toriographical metaphors, ideas, categories, symbolical paradigms or – if one likes it – 
stereotypes of historical thinking.” W. Wrzosek, Historia – kultura – metafora: powstanie 
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his opinion, the minimal amount of categories brought into the exami-
nation is probably the category of perceiving the subject and the relation 
between the members of society, for always does the subject have some 
kind of self-awareness and ways of establishing relations between himself 
and others members of society (in every other case one could not speak 
about culture, mentality, a group or any other form of human existence).
4. What is mentality?
When speaking about the scientific term “mentality” I think about culture 
oriented historical analysis aiming at describing a part of the human men-
tal everyday functioning (thought), which is bordered by the particular 
historical timing and whereabouts.
The first obligation that the investigator needs to fulfil is to determine 
and express what are the historical, political, geographical and timing 
limitations of his enterprise. It is impossible to describe mentality “in gen-
eral,” as even the peasants of Languedoc changed their attitudes towards 
life between the VII and XI centuries, not to mention other members of 
the social strata. The historians foreword should also mention the exact 
historical data he is going to address, as he may draw different conclusions 
from various historical sources.
The gathered historical material provides us with all sorts of informa-
tion regarding human behaviour, life and thinking. Therefore, one may 
treat the historical set of sources not only as a sign informing us exactly 
and strictly about its function, but also as a signum of other tendencies 
the subject involuntarily communicates. When a Viking buries his treas-
ures, he places them in the soil not for protection or safekeeping but for 
enriching his soul (in another case, why did the Norman warriors burry 
their gold in the most forsaken places, never to take them out again?) The 
explanation is derived from the Scandinavian sagas, in which the reader 
is informed how important it was to take care about the grounds one 
owned. Therefore, the physical state of the ground reflected the owners 
soul – if he was good, the soil would be fertile; if he was a bad person – the 
ground would turn in to a wasteland. In this context, buried gold would 
nieklasycznej historiografii, Wyd. Leopoldinum Fundacji dla Uniwersytetu Wrocławskie-
go, Wroclaw 1995, p. 20 (my own translation).
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be treated as a donation or kind of “fertilizer” one could use to promote 
one’s ground, and therefore the warrior’s own, status.
The signum character of the historical source informs us also about 
the theory of cultural imputation, which informs us about the impossibil-
ity of there being acts free of cultural determination. As Kantian theory 
informs us about the impossibility of perceiving the noumenon and only 
recognizing the phenomena determined by the strengths and weaknesses 
of our senses, the imputation takes this thought a step forward, claiming 
that all of our theories, behaviours and acts are culturally determined. In 
this way we can recognize the social influence on the perception of the 
reality, and hence have the possibility of examining it.28
We must also remember that when we talk about historical or social 
phenomena, the content we reflect on is usually noticed by the scientist 
because of its oddness. Why did some crazy monk, who threw stones at 
a local church, become recognized as wise, saintly and respectful, while 
others who only threw harsh language in the same direction were accused 
of blasphemy, trialled and sentenced? It took investigators quite a lot of 
time to understand the difference between foolishness for Christ (so called 
юродивый) and simply the irrational behaviour of the excluded or elim-
inated. This situation is clear and distinct, easy to notice, and intrigues 
today’s investigators. Nowadays, no one would understand the justifications 
of such behaviour and would simply equate it with insanity. This basic dif-
ference, or moreover – a feeling of total strangeness and alienation of the 
social practice of “saintly fools” – fascinates and draws scientific attention, 
being recognized as an archaic element of society. In modern29 times and 
epochs, when we tend to think that there is little difference between us and 
surrounding nations or – closer – generations, “the grasp of attention may 
occur,” when we try to understand people, who act in the same way as us, 
yet justify their means and motivations in a totally different manner (i.e. 
we may raise a dog and provide him with all their comforts because we 
like pets; the Eskimo may raise dogs treating them as part of his survival, 
necessary for transportation and hunting; we cry when a member of our 
family dies and we remain in mourning; the Inuit also cries, but the place 
28 E. Leach, Culture & communication: the logic by which symbols are connected: an 
introduction to the use of structuralist analysis in social anthropology, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 1986.
29 C. Wodziński, Św. Idiota: projekt antropologii apofatycznej, słowo/obraz terytoria, 
Gdansk 2009.
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of the dead man is exchanged immediately by somebody else who can pick 
up the empty place in the family and continue his role).
Usually the hardest venture is to find such a situation, that “little” cul-
tural detail, which we may grasp, examine, and which will bring us the 
necessary deepness connected with the cultural heart of the examined 
society. Usually the historian is presented with a behavioural outcome 
being introduced with how somebody acted, having the hard evidence 
without motivation and explanation, which he must find. All social facts 
are implicite determined by the worldview and also the epistemological 
assumptions which the subject had been previously equipped with by his 
culture. He always perceives the time, space, human relations within a par-
ticular scope and addresses them. This mental equipment (or mentality as 
historians like to put it) is unconsciously executed by the individual, who 
does not realize the influence of all the above mentioned factors, treating 
them as an objective state of the world (i.e. we do not think about the lan-
guage’s grammar – we just speak; what is more – merely a few people can 
explain the grammar rules they use every day). The investigator witnesses 
testimonies of the historical subject, trying to discover his intentions, or 
more likely – his way of thinking. This is not an easy situation, especially 
when nobody is able neither to confirm or falsify the full truth of the out-
come of their investigations. That’s why we say that the researcher usually 
tends to ask the dead on behalf of the living, trying to guess or point out 
the hypothesis which provides the proper explanation for his enquiries.
This is also the moment when the socio-cognitive conception of culture 
can be used, as it focuses not on fact stating but searching for values or 
norms that the subject obeyed when executing their action. Furthermore, 
in this endeavour its important not only to find out the norm (aim) and 
directive (means) but also to find statements that would explain the 
motivation standing behind the norm. There is a big difference between 
people who partake in a holy mass believing in salvation and those who 
do it because it is considered a duty by them to their community. Kmita’s 
theory likes to limit culture to norms and directives excluding the field 
of societies common (or everyday) experience. In my opinion30 widening 
Kmita’s scope could bring a lot of lucrative information and explanations 
regarding the motivations of the everyday man. This is the very moment in 
which the investigator can match or exchange elements between idealistic 
30 And also after a large number of consultations with dr hab. Krzysztof Moraczewski.
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conceptions of culture and the history of mentalities, as the latter provides 
methodological order to material brought by the former.
In this perspective the history of mentalities would be nothing more 
than the total amount of judgements (a chain of: justifications – norms – 
directives or simply: motivations – aims – means) which the researcher can 
justify by the given historical and cultural context. Such a collection has, 
obviously, a methodological status of a hypothesis whose trustworthiness 
(or simply intersubjectivity) is provided by the amount of information 
connecting the hypothesis with existing knowledge about the context 
and surrounding fields of the interrogated issue or category (as Gurevich 
liked to express it). In this way all the judgements should be divided into 
social categories of existence reflecting the way a given historical man 
perceived the cultural categories that helped him to interpret the sensual 
data, rationalise it and form a comprehensive world picture.
In such a situation, knowing the status and the procedure, one must 
still recall and present in detail the exact subject of his endeavour.
When speaking about the individual there is always a problem stating 
whether that individual was a genius, a madman or simply an every-
day-man? When Febvre treated about Rabelais or Luther, it was clear 
that he was speaking of great people, whose strength changed eras in the 
historical development of European culture. If we want to avoid glorying 
them, we could say that historical change had its scope placed inside 
their works and activities, through which they remain recognizable even 
after five hundred years’ time. One could say that they were larger than 
the times in which they lived, hence comes their greatness; but when we 
compare them with every other simple or regular man of their times, they 
probably would have nothing in common.
Exactly the opposite example is recognizable in the figure of Menochio31 
or Campanella,32 whose politics, behaviour and large mouth place them 
under the category of mad men, whose activity remains everything but 
comprehensible even in the context of their times. But can their actions 
be still useful for mentalities reconstructions? In my opinion – yes, they 
can...but in a negative understanding. The sin of the nonconformist can 
only be forgiven if history has remembered the individual and followed 
31 C. Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1992.
32 J. Delumeau, Campanella, “Znak” march 2010, http://www.miesiecznik.znak.com.
pl/3557/calosc/campanella [18.12.2013]. 
70 Chapter II
his footsteps and Menochio and Campanella provide examples of how 
a  historical man of their time should not behave. Their individuality 
marks the place of societies exclusion, negation in the exact way as it was 
presented in the case of Karl Rudolph’s Gnoza33 who used the teachings 
of St. Paul to reconstruct the gnostic worldview.
On the other hand, when one would like to examine the mentality of 
collectiveness, one needs either to identify individuals social background 
(i.e. treat Menochio’s testimonies as irrelevant and research the witnesses, 
the holy inquisition and everyone who opposed him) or to present large 
series of evidence exactly like Vovelle did. One must remember that the 
sphere of culture remains communicable to most members of society not 
only because they recognize the norms and directives (which, by the way, 
may not remain understandable between the popular and elite stratas of 
society) but because all the members are immersed in a common experi-
ence. This is why the “big artefacts” of history, even if they are produced 
by the elite, provide us with some information about the “normal” people. 
The best example is the art presented in different churches and cathedrals. 
Whilst nearly all of them were created by the elite, it was the everyday 
common man that understood them. If we read the books of Beda the 
Venerable,34 we also have some clues of how to translate difficult theolog-
ical sentences and issues to popular preaching.
High art and elite works are the best sources, because most of them 
have been preserved from destruction in museums, or galleries, which 
combined with comments (dialogues, programmes, discussions, mani-
festos) tend to shed more light on the situation of historical collectivities. 
Yet, as rich and as numerous as they have survived, it is always uncertain 
what investigator can deduct from them.
Summary
My proposition regarding implementing a socio-cognitive conception of 
culture should be understood as an entry point to a discussion regarding 
the future of “mentality.” As “solid” as the term remains, one must remem-
ber that the theory should always correspond with the exact situation of 
33 K. Rudolph, Gnoza, transl. G. Sowiński, Nomos, Cracow 2003.
34 A. Gurevich, Jednostka w dziejach Europy, transl. Z. Dobrzyniecki, Marabut – Vol-
umen, Gdansk – Warsaw 2002.
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the historian and his work. In my opinion, the most common mistake 
is made when one fits a general theory to extremely diverse material, to 
which the historian is bound to investigate. I write here “bound” because 
usually the historian has to work with the things he has found and not 
the sources he probably would like to possess in order to get-to-know the 
things he would like to know.
In this context, the conception of culture provides only some theo-
retical background which should be always correlated with the historical 
sources. The theory itself is not perfect, but it does give a glimpse of how 
a scientist can investigate the societies mental (idealistic) background, and 
how to reflect about it in the proper terminology provided by a strong 
methodology and logic.
The problem which have I presented in the text above is nothing more 
than a culture orientated reflection regarding historical (anthropological) 
work. One should also remember that such an undertaking should also 
be backed up with proper philosophical arguments presenting the con-
stitution of the historical facts and the proper intuitions regarding the 
construction of the world.

Chapter III
Durée as reproduction.  
Cultural-historical analysis
1. An object and a tool
The recent and the more or less distant past thus combine 
in the amalgam of the present. Recent history races towards 
us at high speed: earlier history accompanies us at a slower, 
stealthier pace.1 
F. Braudel, The History of Civilizations, trans. 
R. Mayne, A. Lane, The Penguin Press, New 
York 1994, p. xxxvi.
Uses of the Literacy by Richard Hoggart (1957),2 Culture and Society by 
Raymond Williams (1958),3 and the further elaboration of its themes 
in The Long Revolution (1961),4 as well as Edward Palmer Thompson’s, 
Making of the English Working Class (1963)5 – these are the works that 
have been commonly treated as the founding curriculum for the cultural 
1 F. Braudel, The History of Civilizations, trans. R. Mayne, A. Lane, The Penguin Press, 
New York 1994, p. xxxvi. 
2 R. Hoggart, Uses of Literacy. Aspects of Working Class Life with Special Reference to 
Publications and Entertainment, Chatto & Windus, London 1957. 
3 R. Williams, Culture and Society 1780–1950, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Compa-
ny, Garden City, New York 1960. 
4 R. Williams, The Long Revolution, Chatto & Windus, London 1961. 
5 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Vintage Books, New York 
1966. 
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studies.6 They have all grown out of a historical reflection, providing the 
new arena for the cultural-historical analysis. These writings, crucial for 
the establishing of a new Centre for Cultural Studies, as Stuart Hall has 
indicated, were the sign, and, at the same time, the answer for a “decisive 
historical conjuncture.”7 They have inscribed themselves into the logics 
of challenge and response, and not only registered the social, cultural and 
economical changes that have been crucial for the British society, but they 
were also events of a historical break, shift, discontinuity and intervention. 
They were crucial for the establishment of the outlines of the cultural anal-
ysis, which cannot consider itself differently than, as Fernand Braudel has 
suggested, in the same breath, a historical analysis. “History is the study 
of society, of the whole of society, and thus of the past, and thus equally 
of the present; past and present being inseparable.”8 Their socio-cultural 
historical tools have been turned into the problem of the cultural change 
of the post-war British society: the social and political transformations, 
the changes in the capitalist production, the new settlements of the welfare 
state. Yet, as Stuart Hall has pointed out, what was decisive for them was 
“a qualitative break with the past”: the shifts in the class relationships, 
changes in the process of class formation, the economic conditions of 
labour, and, resulting from these, the new cultural tendencies.9 
The spirit of the modern historiography has been recognized by 
Michel de Certeau, and after him by Gabrielle M. Spiegel, as “the decisive 
differentiation between the present and the past,”10 the cartographic act 
(the historian has to draw the line, to write a history within a space of lan-
6 See S. Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems, in 
Culture, Media, Language. Working Papers in Cultural Studies 1972–79, Routledge & Tay-
lor & Francis, London – New York 2005.
 7 Ibidem, p. 4. 
 8 F. Braudel, History and Sociology, in idem, On History, trans. S. Matthews, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1969, p. 69. This statement of Braudel is the trans-
position of, on the one hand, the famous sentence of Lucien Febvre’s (History, science of 
the past, science of the present), and on the other, of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ (For everything 
is history, what was said yesterday is history, what was said a minute ago is history). See 
C. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. C. Jacobson, B. Grundfest Schoepf, Basic 
Books, New York 1963 p. 12. 
 9 S. Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre... 
10 M. de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. T. Conley, Columbia University Press, 
New York 1988, p. 5, quoted in G. M. Spiegel, The Task of the Historian, “The American 
Historical Review” 114 (1)/2009, p. 3. 
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guage11) of the delineation between life (the present) and death (the past). 
For Raymond Williams in his Culture and Society a similar cartographic 
decision has been made: the task was to discern the moment of the Indus-
trial Revolution, from which the idea of modern culture came to life. This 
was indeed a historical analysis undertaken in the mode of the logics of 
the challenge and the response – for Williams the modern British culture 
could not be understood without a comprehension of the “responses in 
thought and feeling”12 to the eighteenth century changes. Yet, at the same 
time, the theoretical enterprise of Culture and Society has been pointed 
out as an elaboration of a new general theory of culture, and what is the 
most important, the theory considering the meaning of culture not yet 
seen in the anthropological terms: as a whole way of life, but as a theory 
of the relations existing between the elements of the whole way of life. For 
sure, the early understandings of Williams of the concept of culture have 
laid an emphasis on its quality being seen as a process of a historical kind, 
a constant transformation in time, and simultaneously, as a historically 
conditioned order of given relations. From the very beginning, the dia-
lectics of culture as a process and culture as a product has been present in 
culturalism’s proposition.13 And from the very beginning the necessity of 
an elaboration of the history of culture has been supplemented with the 
programme of an elaboration of the historical cultural analysis.
The foundational conceptions for the British cultural studies have 
been developed in the trajectories, full of breaks, shifts, disruptions, and 
regroupings, situated around a new “set of premises and themes.”14 Re-
searchers from the Birmingham Centre simultaneously chronicled the 
cultural changes and were a part of its particular logics. They were a part 
of a cultural order and its mechanisms of dealing with change. They put 
in motion the mechanisms through which cultural, traditional meanings 
do not proceed as the regulators of an established order, but as the tools 
of its reformulation. In the case of such authors as Raymond Williams, the 
theoretical developments were, as Stuart Hall has reminded, the result of 
11 Ibidem.
12 R. Williams, Culture and Society..., p. v. 
13 On the dialectics process-product see D. Hebdige, Subculture. The Meafning of 
Style, Routledge, London – New York 2002, p. 6 (first published in 1979 by Methuen & 
Co.).
14 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, “Media, Culture and Society 2,” Academic 
Press, London 1980, p. 57. 
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the awareness of “the manner in which real historical developments and 
transformations are appropriated in thought, and provide Thought, not 
with its guarantee of ‘correctness’ but with its fundamental orientations, 
its conditions of existence. It is because of this complex articulation be-
tween thinking and historical reality, reflected in the social categories of 
thought, and the continuous dialectic between ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’ 
[...].”15 As a consequence, within the cultural studies the implicit pro-
gramme of the sociology of knowledge has been developed, and within 
its boundaries – also the new theory of the historical cultural analysis. 
Thus, the indispensable mutual relations between the programme of the 
history of culture and the historical cultural analysis resulted from this 
metatheoretical awareness of the conditions of the rise of modern culture 
and, at the same time, the theory of modern culture. According to Hall, 
it was also an awareness of the new direction for the theory of culture. 
This new course in Raymond Williams’ analysis took the direction of the 
unitary theory of “culture-and-society.”16
The historical analysis of the modern relation of culture-and-society 
in Williams’ Culture and Society resulted from the fourth stage, as already 
discerned by him, of the development of the meaning of culture – seen 
as: “a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual.”17 Its historical 
analysis has been considered as interrelated with the changes that take 
place in democracy, industry, class, and art. What was indeed the subject of 
this historical analysis were not, however, only the changes of the material 
conditions of life in the spheres of democracy, class, industry and art, but 
most of all – their meanings in their linguistic, historically conditioned 
use. Williams was inquiring about “a general pattern of change in these 
words,” and delineating “a special kind of map by which it is possible to 
look again at those wider changes in life and thought to which the changes 
in language evidently refer.”18 According to Williams, the changing mean-
ings of culture can be understood, on the one hand, as a set of reactions 
to the changes in the economic and political life, but on the other, as 
“a special kind of map by means of which the nature of the changes can 
be explored.”19 Thus, a culture reveals itself as a structure of meanings, but 
15 Ibidem, p. 57. 
16 Ibidem. See also S. Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre...
17 R. Williams, Culture and Society..., p. xiv.
18 Ibidem, p. xi. 
19 Ibidem, p. xv. 
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the structure which is lived, understood, used, and can be reconstructed 
in the “general movement in thought and feeling.”20 Primary is the system 
of meaning witnessing the trajectories of the economic, social, political 
and artistic changes. All of them have to be considered as necessarily 
interrelated, for Williams was opposed to the simplistic versions of the 
materialist determinism (“culture was not a response to the new methods 
of production, the new Industry, alone”21). The structure of meaning and 
its historically interrelated patterns were thus analyzed as a response to 
the historical changes, and simultaneously, as their witness; as the object 
and the tool. Both were translated into the structures of feeling and living 
in the historical trajectories of the whole ways of lives. The analysis of the 
latter, at least in the time of Williams’ Culture and Society, yet had to wait 
for its methodological elaboration. 
2. Culturalism and history
The writings of Williams, Hoggart, and Thompson have all worked toward 
the progress of one of the general paradigms of cultural studies: the cul-
turalist paradigm.22 Interpreted in terms of their historical analysis, these 
literary works have broken with the dichotomy of the high and low culture, 
with its technological evolutionism, reductive economism, and organiza-
tional determinism. Hoggart’s Uses of Literacy has inscribed itself into the 
tradition of Leavis’ “cultural debate” and continued the consideration of the 
political, social and cultural changes. As Stuart Hall has reported, Hoggart’s 
method has still been presented in the form of “practical criticism,” thus 
the tendency “to ‘read’ working class culture for its values and meanings 
as embodied in its patterns and arrangements – as if it presented certain 
kinds of ‘texts.’ ”23 Yet, this attitude has found its finer appreciation in the 
course of the historical reinterpretations of the cultural studies. In his “Rich-
ard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy and the Cultural Turn,” Hall described 
Hoggart’s conceptualization of the category of culture as an indispensable, 
revolutionary break, similar and parallel to Williams’ elaborations, since in 
Uses of Literacy the meaning of culture as marking practices “making sense” 
20 Ibidem, p. xi. 
21 Ibidem, p. xvi. 
22 See S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms. 
23 Ibidem, p. 57. 
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was introduced. Consequently, in the course of the socio-cultural inquiry, 
culture could be analyzed as the ways in which the “working-class people 
spoke and thought, what language and common assumptions about life 
they shared, in speech and action, what social attitudes informed their daily 
practice, what moral categories they deployed, even if only aphoristically, to 
make judgments about their own behavior and that of others – including, 
of course, how they brought all this to bear on what they read, saw and 
sang.”24 Indeed, the parallels with Raymond Williams’ proposition were 
striking. Again, in Hall’s reinterpretations, culture as a sphere of commu-
nally shared meanings (in Williams and Thompson interpretations) has 
been an indispensable element of the historical analysis. Cultural meanings 
interwoven into social practices, conventions, and institutions are strongly 
built into the order of everyday life: “the meanings that are valued by the 
community are shared and made active, then there is no way in which 
this process can be hived off or distinguished or set apart from the other 
practices of the historical process.”25 
In the history of the culturalist paradigm one of the most important 
shifts refers to Raymond Williams’ elaboration of the concept of culture 
between his Culture and Society (1958) and The Long Revolution (1961). 
This move has been usually analyzed also in relation to the publication of 
E. P. Thompson’s Making of the English Working Class (1963). Williams was 
inspired by the polemics around Culture and Society and delineated the 
programme of The Long Revolution comprehensively, not excluding from 
it the matters of historical analysis. He has developed the “questions in the 
theory of culture, [the] historical analysis of certain cultural institutions 
and forms, and problems of meaning and action in our contemporary 
cultural situation.”26 Thompson, continuing his cultural analysis in the 
field of English Marxist historiography and economic and labour history,27 
has interpreted the “making” of the working class as a historical, “active 
process, which owes as much to agency as to conditioning.”28 Both of these 
propositions, Williams’ and Thompson’s, were crucial for the possibility of 
an evocation of the most important theoretical problems in the cultural 
studies field, especially in its culturalist version. 
24 S. Hall, Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy and the Cultural Turn, in S. Owen (ed.), 
Richard Hoggart and Cultural Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2008, pp. 24–25. 
25 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 59.
26 R. Williams, The Long Revolution, p. 9.
27 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 58. 
28 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 9. 
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Within the culturalist paradigm, two formative, analytically discerned, 
theoretical moments consolidate the concept of culture. The first one, 
(1) ideative, pays attention to the meaning of culture as “the sum of the 
available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect 
their common experiences.”29 According to the commentaries of Stuart 
Hall, this understanding does not refer to the sphere of ideas understood 
as the “best that has been thought and said,” but to the commonly and 
democratically shared order of ideas and meanings. The last mentioned, 
described also as “descriptions,” can be understood as shared justifica-
tions: giving sense to the common practices and making them reflective. 
The sphere of ideas and descriptions is understood not only as com-
monly shared, but also as “giving and taking meanings,” thus, it cannot 
be considered separately from the practices of communication: “since 
our way of seeing things is literally our way of living, [and] the process 
of communication is in fact the process of community: the sharing [of] 
common meanings, and thence common activities and purposes; the 
offering, reception and comparison of new meanings, leading to tensions 
and achievements of growth and change.”30 
The second conceptual moment in the British culturalist tradition – (2) 
anthropological – pays attention to the ordinariness of culture as a sphere 
of all “human activities” and “human energy.” It introduces a more doc-
umentary, ethnographic model of the cultural analysis, describing and 
inquiring into the variety of social practices. It was this moment in which 
the accent was laid on the wholeness of the lived and shared culture – 
culture as the whole way of life. 
In this early culturalist conception of culture, meanings have not yet 
been considered as a possible tools of the social distinction, inequality 
or subordination. According to Hall, the general tone of Williams’ The 
Long Revolution directed itself against vulgar materialism and economic 
determinism, and thus resigned from the distinction of the base and the 
superstructure on behalf of a “radical interactionism” – of the “inter-
action of all practices in and with one another, skirting the problem of 
determinacy.”31 It paid attention rather to the democratization of culture 
than to its internally competitive dynamics of conflict. What was also 
diminished in Williams’ perspective was the problem of the conditions 
29 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 59. 
30 R. Williams, The Long Revolution, p. 55.
31 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 60. 
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of the ways of life and their changes in the historical course. Differently 
to E. P. Thompson, Williams has not kept the distinction between what 
is culture and what is not culture, and as Stuart Hall has denounced, he 
“totally absorbed ‘definitions of experience’ into our ‘ways of living.’ ”32 
E. P. Thompson, on the other hand, constructed his cultural-historical 
analysis as based on human agency on the one hand, and its condition-
ing on the other. His analysis is openly anti-structuralist. He replaces the 
synchrony of a possible structuralist analysis of class (its “fluency evades 
analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and anatomise 
its structure”33) with a “notion of [a] historical relationship,”34 based on 
the dialectics of class experience and class-consciousness. If the class is 
considered as a (historically changing) mode of a social relationship, its 
experience is determined and conditioned by the already existing “giveness” 
of structural conditions. Class-consciousness consists of non-determined 
(and not ahistorically presupposed) ways of dealing with the class experi-
ences, yet in cultural terms: “embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas, 
and institutional forms.”35 Thompson has actually understood the cultural 
process as an inherently historical one. Considering the experience of the 
social subjects as half way between the structural conditions of living and 
a social consciousness, he enhanced the logics of the historical analysis in 
the terms of challenge and response, and ultimately helped to determine 
the culturalist concept of culture. Stuart Hall defines this as “as both the 
meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and 
classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions and relationships, 
through which they ‘handle’ and respond to the conditions of existence; and 
as the lived traditions and practices through which those ‘understandings’ 
are expressed and in which they are embodied.”36 As a consequence, the 
pair culture-consciousness is the most formative in the culturalist paradigm, 
and the category of a creative and historical agency is introduced. 
As Stuart Hall yet concludes, this conception is rather humanistic than 
anthropological. From its two moments, ideative and anthropological, the 
first mentioned is crucial – it underlies the meaning of the concept of cul-
ture as a historically conditioned order of relationships between elements 
32 Ibidem, p. 63.
33 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 9. 
34 Ibidem. 
35 Ibidem. 
36 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 63. 
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in the whole ways of life: “Culture is not a practice; nor is it simply the 
descriptive sum of the ‘mores and folkways’ of societes – as it tended to 
become in certain kinds of anthropology.”37 It is rather an ideative moment 
of the conception of culture that gives sense to the anthropological one; 
it accents the relational order of culture: “culture cannot be reduced to 
the sphere of social practice, it is threaded through all social practices, 
and is the sum of their inter-relationship,”38 it consists of the patterns of 
organization which can be the subjects of historical shifts and distortions, 
“discontinuities of an unexpected kind.” 
The problem of the history of cultural change has been undertaken by 
Raymond Williams in his Culture and Society. He has explicitly derived 
the problem of cultural change from the assumptions of Marxism.39 Later, 
at the time of Marxism and Literature, he has diminished the role of his 
earlier divagations and the quality of “impoverished Marxist tradition” 
commonly known and accessible for British scholars in the 1950s from 
which he took his inspirations for his early interpretations. Between Cul-
ture and Society (1958) and Marxism and Literature (1977) the “alternative 
Marxist tradition” vividly discussed within the New Left circles became 
a new possibility for Williams to rework the problem of cultural change.40 
In Culture and Society Williams has already rejected the simplistic un-
derstanding of the historical process in terms of the base-superstructure 
determination. He has paid attention to the highly complex character of 
a superstructure and its always historical character. Yet “historical” meant 
for Williams a process which includes “continuities from the past as well 
as reactions to the present.”41 Reworking Engels’ commentaries to Marks 
from Engels letter to J. Bloch, Williams has paid attention to the complexity 
of relations between the economic, social, political and cultural elements 
37 Ibidem, p. 60.
38 Ibidem.
39 See R. Williams, Marxism and Culture, in idem, Culture and Society. 
40 Raymond Williams had been recalling: “I found also, and crucially, Marxist think-
ing which was different. in some respects radically different, from what I and most people 
in Britain knew as Marxism. There was contact with older work that had not previously 
come our way – that of Lukacs and of Brecht, for example. There was new contemporary 
work in Poland, in France, and in Britain itself. And while some of this work was explor-
ing new ground, much of it, just as interestingly, was seeing Marxism as itself a historical 
development, with highly variable and even alternative positions.” R. Williams, Marxism 
and Literature, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 1977, p. 3. For the impov-
erished and alternative Marxist traditions see S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms. 
41 R. Williams, Marxism and Culture, p. 284.
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within the wholeness of society, and on the possible superstructural in-
fluences and determinations of the economic order in the course of the 
historical transformation of society.42 He regarded relations between the 
elements of society in the context of Time, but turning the theory of culture 
not in the direction of a cultural change problem, but rather entering the 
field of a cultural reproduction: of a mechanism of a constant production 
and reproduction of the real life. “We arrive at a different model, in which 
reality is seen as a very complex field of movement, within which the 
economic forces finally reveal themselves as the organizing element.”43 As 
a constructive element of the cultural reproduction Williams has regarded 
the problem of interaction.
As it was mentioned before, in Stuart Hall’s interpretation of the cultur-
alist paradigm, Williams’ early conception of culture has been understood 
as a “radical interactionism.” Williams indeed has followed the Plekhanov’ 
commentaries about the social interaction searching for the possibility of 
going beyond the base-superstructure dialectics: 
Interaction exists [...] nevertheless, by itself it explains nothing. In order to under-
stand interaction, one must ascertain the attributes of the interacting forces and these 
attributes cannot find their ultimate explanation in the fact of interaction, however 
much they may change thanks to that fact. The qualities of the interacting forces, the 
attributes of the social organisms influencing one another, are explained in the long 
run by the cause we already know: the economic structure of these organisms, which 
is determined by the state of their productive forces.44 
As Stuart Hall has reported, the insistence within the culturalist tradi-
tion on the problem of interaction has coincided with the developments of 
42 F. Engels, Letter to J. Bloch, 21 September 1890, in Selected Correspondence, p. 475, 
quoted in ibidem, pp. 286–287: “According to the materialist conception of history, the 
determining element in history is ultimately the production and reproduction in real life. 
More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. If therefore somebody twists this 
into the statement that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms 
it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, 
but the various elements of the superstructure political forms of the class struggle and its 
consequences, constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, 
etc. forms of law and then even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the 
combatants: political, legal, and philosophical theories, religious ideas and their further 
development into systems of dogma also exercise their influence upon the course of the 
historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form.” 
43 R. Williams, Marxism and Culture, p. 286. 
44 G. V. Plekhanov, The Development of the Monist View of History, trans. A. Rotnstein, 
London 1947, p. 207; quoted in ibidem, p. 286. 
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the social interactionism, especially of the very influential work of How-
ard Becker and subcultural theories.45 With this area, an interest in the 
ethnographic methods became the important source of data and opened 
access to the lived meanings and values, to the qualities of everyday life.46 
With these also the concept of the “definition of the situation” became 
important and evaluated, also in the historical mode of research. 
If at this point the course of the cultural-historical analysis can be un-
derstood as an “attempt to discover the nature of the organization which 
is the complex of these relationships”47 in time, it can be compared to the 
relational analysis of the historical patterning, yet in this model also the 
anthropological moment becomes visible: what is indeed patterned is the 
structure of feeling. Orders and relationships between cultural patterns has 
to be analytically delineated, but with regard to the question of how these 
patterns are experienced, lived and understood. The “structure of feeling” is 
the category derived from Lucien Goldman’s genetic structuralism, of study-
ing the social conditioning of the facts of literature, and homologies between 
literature and the structures of the empirical consciousness of given social 
groups. Williams has reworked these categories under the influence of E. P. 
Thompson’s critique in “The Base and Superstructure” and Marxism and 
Literature. He has not excluded literature from the other forms of social 
practice, he has argued “against the structuralist emphasis on the specifics 
and autonomy of practices, and their analytic separation of societes into 
their discrete instances,”48 reworked the problem of determination and 
hegemony, and maintained the dialectics of a  variety of social practices 
(ethnographically documented) and the totality of sensuous human practice. 
According to Stuart Hall, the tension between ethnographic-experi-
ental accounts and structural and the historical determinations “has been 
a pivotal site of Centre theorizing and debate since then.”49 It opened up 
cultural studies, on the one hand, in the social anthropology, and on the 
other, in the “history from below” – the new social history. 
45 See H. Becker, Outsiders, The Free Press, Glencoe 1963.
46 In this area especially important were the works of Paul Willis, see P. Willis, Pro-
fane Culture, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1978; idem, Learning to Labour, Saxon 
House, Farnborough 1977; also works gathered in T. Jefferson (ed.), Resistance through 
Rituals, Hutchinson with CCCS, London 1976. 
47 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 63. 
48 Ibidem, p. 61. 
49 S. Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre..., p. 11.
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3. Anthropology and history
The thesis of Frederic W. Maitland: 
[...] by and by anthropology will have the choice between being history and being 
nothing,” has been elaborated on during the XXth century in many sinuous and rough 
ways. The reconstruction of the most important of them should be held in a plural 
modality. There is no one anthropology, and there is no one history: “we have a va-
riety of anthropologies appropriating a variety of histories, making any one-sentence 
invocation of the intersection of anthropology and history simplistic and naïve.50 
One of the most criticized trends in anthropology with regard to its 
historiographic assumptions was that started by the evolutionist and 
neo-evolutionist school. They assumed the Western type of historical 
consciousness, determining a linear and teleological course of the evolu-
tion of societies, from the most primitive ones to the most advanced. At 
the core of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ criticism of the evolutionist school was 
the arbitrary character of its assumptions. According to these “Western 
civilization thus appears to be the most advanced expression of the evo-
lution of societies, while primitive groups are ‘survivals’ of earlier stages, 
whose logical classification reflects their order of appearance in time.”51 The 
logic of the evolutionist interpretation is thus based on the assumption of 
a dual organization of a given stage of the social development, and on the 
discerning of a simple, observable form as a manifestation or survival of 
its historical predecessor. According to Lévi-Strauss, this type of selection 
is necessarily arbitrary “and makes of this type the model from which one 
attempts, through speculation, to derive all the others.”52 A similar objec-
tion has been formulated for the diffusionism – its mode of selection53 and 
50 W. Roseberry, Anthropologies and Histories. Essays in Culture, History, and Political 
Economy, Rutgers University Press, New York 1994, p. 5. 
51 C. Lévi-Strauss, Introduction: History and Anthropology, in idem, Structural An-
thropology, trans. C. Jacobson, B. Grundfest Schoepf, Basic Books, New York 1963, p. 3.
52 Ibidem, p. 10. The polemics of Franz Boas with evolutionism in F. Boas, History and 
science in anthropology: a reply, “American Anthropologist” vol. 38, 1936.
53 C. Lévi-Strauss describes the diffusionist mode of selection as a choice of the “ob-
served types, usually the most developed and complex, as representing the archaic form 
of the institution and would attribute its origin to that region of the world where it is best 
documented, all other forms being considered the product of migrations and borrowings 
from the common cradle.” Ibidem, p. 10.
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deduction of diffusionist trajectories is no less arbitrary and speculative. 
Yet, according to Lévi-Strauss, some results of the diffusionist analysis can 
be acknowledged as valuable, especially on the level of micro-history, if 
the inquiry refers to the, usually two, populations under consideration 
with a documented contact between them.54 
The functionalist school analyzed the wholeness of the societal sys-
tem and its inherent functional patterns. The functionalist research has 
been focused rather on social roles than on the motives and intentions 
of human actions. Yet, the functionalism of Bronisław Malinowski, as it 
has been turned against “evolutionist and pseudo-historical diffusionist 
reconstructions”55 (especially the postulates of G. Elliot-Smith), reserved 
much more interest in peoples’ and societies own conceptions of time and 
history, focusing the analysis on the elements of their oral traditions.56 
The reinterpretations of this analytical tendency, before the relativist turn, 
have introduced the distinction of the “ideological” and “objective” histo-
ry. Ideological history, as Ariane Deluz-Chiva has referred to it, was “the 
expression of a fraction of society (a particular social group, for instance) 
or a sign of the nascent historical consciousness in a changing society. 
But it will be only an ideological history, objective from the standpoint of 
that society alone. In considering the relationship between anthropology 
and history, we are thus faced with a dilemma: objective history accord-
ing to our civilization, but exterior to the society studied, or ideological 
history based on the internal logic of that society, but non-objective by 
our standards.”57
For a long time historians have perceived one/the object of anthro-
pological analysis as dealing with the “problems of social change in 
54 See A. Deluz-Chiva, Anthropology, history and historiography, “History and Social 
Science. International Social Science Journal” vol. XVII, 4/1965.
55 Ibidem, p. 573.
56 A. Deluz-Chiva has inscribed some of the functionalist attitudes to the French tra-
dition of historians, referring their research to the diffusionist and evolutionist schools, yet 
conveying the historical analysis of the unwritten languages: Ch. Monteil, Les empires du 
Mali, Larose, Paris 1930; M. Delafosse, Haut-Sénégal-Niger, Larose, Paris 1912; L. Tauxier, 
Histoire des Bombara, Geuthner, Paris 1942. The documents left by them strengthen an 
interest in the research of a “subjective history” in Sudanese Africa see ibidem. See also 
B. Malinowski, Myth in primitive psychology, W.W. Norton and Co., New York 1926.
57 A. Deluz-Chiva, Anthropology, history..., p. 576. The distinction of the ideological 
and objective history has been introduced by S. F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1942.
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underdeveloped countries,”58 and later as also turning its attention to 
the study of “advanced societies.” Societies under research have been 
often qualified as in the state of a structural equilibrium. These have 
been interpreted in the field of social anthropology as “healthy societies” 
and opposed to those societies internally conflicted and in the state of 
anomaly.59 The dominant categories here were those of the social struc-
ture, social organization and social equilibrium. The course of the social 
change has been often considered as a deviation from the norm and as 
an idiosyncrasy, unless it has became organized in a new kind of pattern. 
Many socio-anthropological writings “were concerned with the functions 
and interrelationships of institutions, not with the problems of social 
change.”60 The terrains of history and anthropology seemed to be opposed 
to each other to a vast extent. The study of so called “primitive societies” 
demanded a synchronic analysis as “the only scientifically valid method 
which could be used in the study of societies with no written records.”61 
Also the tools of anthropological study in terms of the analysis of myths 
and traditions seemed not to have any real access to the historical past. 
“Myths and traditions ma y have some factual basis, but in the absence 
of contemporary evidence it is impossible to determine what that basis 
was.”62 According to Crozier, a great impulse for the analysis of cultural 
change has resulted from colonialism and cultural contact and this gave 
an impulse for the development of the social and historical anthropology.
For Alfred Radcliffe-Brown in his Method in Social Anthropology, the 
most important aim of the anthropological method is the capacity of its 
scientific generalization.63 Thus he has insisted on the necessity of there 
being a distinction between the historical and comparative methods, when 
only the latter are able to offer “the general propositions.” His project of 
social anthropology, inspired by the comparative sociology, has been thus 
clearly distinguished from the – especially conjectural – historical method. 
58 D. Crozier, History and Anthropology, in History and Social Science, “International 
Social Science Journal” vol. XVII, 4/1965, p. 561. 
59 See W. E. Washburn, Against the Anthropological Grain, Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick, NJ,1998. 
60 D. Crozier, History and Anthropology, pp. 562–563. 
61 Ibidem, p. 562. 
62 Ibidem. 
63 A. Radcliffe-Brown, Method in Social Anthropology, ed. M. N. Srinivas, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago 1958.
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Defining, at its best, history as a discipline of “an authentic account of the 
succession of events in the particular region over the particular period of 
time”64 can still only lead to satisfactory outcomes when combined with 
the comparative potential of the social anthropology.
According to Ariane Deluz-Chiva, the first visible moment of the re-
habilitation of historical analysis among the British anthropologists has 
followed between 1950–1961, especially in the field of African studies. 
This critical decade has been undoubtedly opened by Edward E. Ev-
ans-Pritchard’s Marett Lecture on Anthropology, Past and Present (1950).65 
Assumptions about the anthropology belonging rather to the field of 
history than to the natural sciences were elaborated upon in 1961 in his 
Anthropology and history.66 Evans-Pritchard refused Radcliffe-Brown’s 
distinction of the historical and comparative methods with the generali-
zation abilities of the latter: “the functionalist critics and diffusionists [...] 
dropped the history and kept the pursuit of the laws, which was often pre-
cisely what made the history bad [...] and rejected historical explanations 
of any kind. They justified this by a methodological distinction between 
generalizing sciences [...] and particularizing sciences like history. This 
would be legitimate were history merely a record of a succession of unique 
events and social anthropology a set of general propositions; but in practice 
social anthropologists today generalize little more than historians do.”67 
Evans-Pritchard saw the anthropology and history as having the same aim: 
going beyond the passages of a narrative history (“history is not a suc-
cession of events, it is the links between them”68) and abstractions of the 
philosophy of history. The common aim for anthropology and history was 
thus the pursuit of an analysis able to grasp intelligible wholes: “organisms, 
patterns, complexes, networks, relations.”69 This is the sociological history 
of “regularities, tendencies, types, and typical sequences; and always within 
a restricted historical and cultural context.”70 It was Evans-Pritchard who 
64 Ibidem, p. 128. The concept of an “authentic history” has been opposed to the 
“pseudo-history” as arbitrary generalizations about the unknown past.
65 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social anthropology, past and present, “Man” vol. 198/1950.
66 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Anthropology and history, Manchester University Press, Man-
chester 1961. 
67 Ibidem, p. 2. 




with this statement made the strict connection between anthropology 
and the historical work of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre in the Annales 
School, and who not only confirmed the role of the sociological history, 
but also silently announced the coming of the historical anthropology. 
One of the most resonant ideas, as much so in the field of anthro-
pology as in the field of history, evoking the possibility of cooperation 
between these two, was the concept of structural anthropology of Claude 
Lévi-Strauss. The important point of departure for Lévi-Strauss was an 
explicit articulation of a paradox of ethnology, coming from the writings 
of Franz Boas. Ethnology for Boas was a science dealing with the relation 
between the “objective” world and “subjective” world of man. Demanding 
a scrupulous method of research of the “subjective world,” Boas reveals 
at the same time the variety of historical processes, which hardly can be 
reduced to a common denominator. “Boas introduces the standards of 
the physicist in tracing the history of societies for which we possess only 
documents that would discourage the historian. When Boas is successful, 
his reconstructions amount to true history – but this is a history of the 
fleeting moment, the only kind of history that can be captured immediately 
– in other words, a microhistory, which can no more be related to the past 
than can the macrohistory of evolutionism and diffusionism.”71 Lévi-Strauss 
poses the problem of there being a divergence between anthropology and 
history differently: rather as a matter of their mutual relationships than 
the difference of their subject, their goal, or their methods. These are the 
same for both disciplines, and can be subsumed as the joint trial of a better 
understanding of man. The difference then is in their (complementary) 
perspectives: “History organizes its data in relation to conscious expres-
sions of social life, while anthropology proceeds by examining its uncon-
scious foundations.”72 The subject of an anthropological analysis is then 
common for anthropology and history: “The anthropologist goes forward, 
seeking to attain, through the conscious, of which he is always aware, 
more and more of the unconscious; whereas the historian advances, so to 
speak, backward, keeping his eyes fixed on concrete and specific activities 
from which he withdraws only to consider them from a more complete 
and richer perspective. A true two-faced Janus, it is the solidarity of the 
two disciplines that makes it possible to keep the whole road in sight.”73 
71 C. Lévi-Strauss, Introduction: History and Anthropology, p. 8. 
72 Ibidem, p. 18. 
73 Ibidem, p. 24.
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In the 1970s historical anthropology entered a new field under the 
influence of the semiotic conception of culture of Clifford Geertz. For 
William Roseberry “in the most restricted understanding,” there was no 
relationship between history and anthropology until Geertz’s publication 
of The Interpretation of Cultures (1971).74 Despite the incautious negli-
gence of even Franz Boas’ historicism tradition, an opinion quoted by 
Roseberry points out the critical role of Geertz’s writings. These works, 
continuing the anti-universalist spirit of Boas’ conceptions, and at the 
same time distancing themselves from the completeness of Boas’ method 
of induction, have conceptualized anthropology as neo-Kantian historical 
science, and equipped the anthropologist with the tools of the critique of 
positivism. Cultural analysis in anthropology after the interpretative turn 
has connoted the historical process with a process culturally situated,75 and 
had introduced the semiotic conception of culture into the anthropology 
through the hermeneutic door. It inspired the historical writing of Robert 
Darnton,76 and Natalie Zemon Davis.77 
Robert Darnton summarizing the enormous career of the French 
history of mentalities rigorously points out the probable reasons for its 
decrease. He sees in it “an overcommitment to the quantification of culture 
and an undervaluation of the symbolic element in social intercourse.”78 He 
also engages himself in the polemics dealing with the “French formula” of 
sometimes simplified versions of Marxism, rhetorically asking: “How many 
of our books begin by sketching the social background of the subject and 
by filling in the culture?”79 An answer followed ironically, uncovering “an 
unspoken assumption that if we can get the social setting right, the cultural 
content will somehow follow.”80 With these arguments Darnton situates his 
analysis rather not in the area of the French history of Mentalities, but of 
the American cultural anthropology. Distancing himself from the newer 
inspirations of Jacques Le Goff, Jean-Claude Schmitt, Roger Chattier found 
74 W. Roseberry, Anthropologies and Histories..., p. 5. 
75 Ibidem, p. 6. 
76 R. Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History, 
Basic Books, Philadelphia 1984. 
77 N. Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge 1983.
78 R. Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre..., p. 258. 
79 Ibidem.
80 Ibidem, p. 259. 
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in the field of anthropology (according to Darnton “restricted within the 
structuralist system of Claude Lévi-Strauss or the functionalism derived 
from Émile Durkheim”81), he derives his inspirations from the Weberian 
strain followed by Clifford Geertz. “While Americans tend to ignore 
systems of relations, the French generally neglect systems of meaning.”82 
Yet, the arguments of Robert Darnton are of the double-edged kind, 
and have been used with the same obstinacy against Clifford Geertz’s 
cultural analysis. Aletta Biersack has pointed out that time in Geertz’s 
Negara “is merely another mode of displacement, a further estrangement. 
Meaning is described, never derived. [...] The webs, not the spinning; the 
culture, not the history; the text, not the process of textualizing – these 
attract Geertz’s attention.”83 In consequence, “Geertz’s cultural analysis is 
as static as any structuralism,”84 and in spite of its attention to the sym-
bolical communicative surface, it goes too far by saying nothing about the 
“historical and institutional settings.” For the possible interlink between 
the history and anthropology, considered (as for Biersack) in the light 
of a subtle analysis of Michel Foucault and its “ubiquity of the political 
function,” at the time of a “Marxism softened with new culturalism,” it 
would be hard to point to Geertz’s writings as providing the crucial tools 
plotting the nodes of anthropology, history and cultural studies into the 
one multidisciplinary analysis. 
According to Nicolas Dirks, it was Marshall Sahlins who had carried 
out one of “the most dramatic interventions” in the field of anthropology. 
He had introduced the vivid reinterpretation of the French structuralism, 
thus making a place in the field for the semiotic conceptions of culture 
(he “had locked himself into a far more formal cultural semiotics than 
the fluid Weberianism of Clifford Geertz”85), and implemented it into 
the context of the historicity of cultural forms, structures and events. For 
William Roseberry, Marshall Sahlins was one of the three most important 
81 Ibidem, p. 282. 
82 Ibidem. 
83 A. Biersack, Local Knowledge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond, in L. Hunt (ed.), 
The New Cultural History, University of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1989, 
p. 80. 
84 Ibidem. 
85 N. Dirks, Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthropologies and Anthropological Histories, 
Transformations. Comparative study of social transformations, CSST Working Papers, The 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1990, p. 4. 
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anthropologists (next to Clifford Geertz and Eric Wolf) who had taken the 
trial of introducing the mode of historical inquiry into the field of anthro-
pological analysis.86 Yet, the most important accomplishment of Sahlins, 
according to Alletta Biersack, was his choice “to employ Braudel’s term long 
durée to mean Lévi Strauss’ ‘structure,’ ”87 when he considered Braudel’s 
long “run” rather in categorical terms than as an example of geographical 
or geohistorical structures. “Braudel rebaptized his geohistory ‘structural 
history’ to affiliate himself with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss. Mean-
while, Sahlins, many years later, cites Braudel to ground anthropology in 
history as a prelude to refashioning structuralism in historical terms.”88 
Thanks to these decisions, Sahlins undertakes the task of the structural 
anthropology in a moment, whilst Claude Lévi-Strauss left it to further 
elaborations when he was explaining: “It is unnecessary to refer here to 
the problem of diachronic structures, for which historical knowledge is 
naturally indispensable. Certain developments of social life no doubt re-
quire a diachronic structure.”89 For Biersack, Sahlins intervention brings 
about the shift from the structural anthropology (through the elaboration 
of historical structuralism) to the historical anthropology, taking its in-
spiration from the social history of Fernand Braudel. 
4. The longue durée
Thinking about history as a field interrelated with many other disciplines, 
Fernand Braudel has introduced its possible categorization with regard 
(1) to method, or (2) to time. The categorization with regard to method 
discerned, for example, the “traditional history,” and the history of events 
with its “dramatic, breathless rush of narrative.”90 Braudel’s proposition 
of thinking about historical analysis first in terms of time, and then in 
86 See W. Roseberry, Anthropologies and Histories... The strong position of Marshall 
Sahlins among the anthropologists dealing with the historical analysis is unquestionable 
even for scholars, who evidently reject any trials of implementation of the neo-Marxist 
conceptions into the field of anthropology, and disregard the work so valued by William 
Roseberry of Eric Wolf. 
87 A. Biersack, Local Knowledge, Local History..., p. 72. 
88 Ibidem, p. 73. 
89 C. Lévi-Strauss, Introduction: History and Anthropology, p. 21. 
90 F. Braudel, History and the Social Sciences. The Longue Durée, in idem, On History, 
trans. S. Matthews, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1980, p. 27. 
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the terms of method, pointed out at least three various time-space plans 
of historical sight: the short time span (“proportionate to individuals, to 
daily life, to our illusions, to our nasty awareness”91); the cyclical time 
spans characteristic of new economic and social history (the time of 
conjunctures); and the long time span (the time of long lasting patterns 
of organization, “coherent and fairly fixed series of relationships between 
realities and social masses”92). In the Preface to The Mediterranean and 
the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Braudel delineated the 
architecture of his historical analysis. The three kinds of time-method 
categorization have been treated as complementary levels of the one 
monumental narrative: from the “history of man in relation to his sur-
roundings,” existing almost “out of time” (long span); through the history 
of the “gentle rhythms,” “groups and groupings,” “states, societies and civ-
ilizations” (cyclical span); to the traditional history of events (short span). 
The history of events in the perspective of Fernand Braudel was yet 
not unproblematic, or needless in historical analysis (“we do not seek to 
deny the reality of events”93). Just the opposite, he was fully aware of the 
necessity and subtlety of the changing time-method perspective when 
one analytically travels between long and short spans of history. “To put 
things more clearly, let us say that instead of a history of events, we would 
speak of a short time span.”94 
According to Braudel, events belong to a complex, intermeshed social 
reality, which cannot be reduced to, or flattened by, the one dominant 
factor: “neither the conflict between races, [...] nor powerful economic 
rhythms, [...] nor constant social tensions.”95 Yet, Braudel seemed to think 
about the category of event from two different perspectives: (1) as about 
an element of the complex reality of daily life, “social facts” of the “real” 
time,96 (2) as about, made by the historian, the historical analytical cate-
gorization of a fluid reality. As the first mentioned, events as facts are of 
91 Ibidem, p. 28. 
92 Ibidem, p. 31. 
93 F. Braudel, The Situation of History in 1950, in idem, On History, trans. S. Mat-
thews, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1980, p. 10. 
94 F. Braudel, History and the Social Sciences..., p. 29. 
95 F. Braudel, The Situation of History..., p. 10. 
96 S. Kinser admits Braudel’s tendency over an assimilation of the historical event to 
fact and not fully understanding the constructed character of events. He also points out 
that the opposition between structural and event history is false and leads to simplifica-
tion. “An event is a site of change, a construction developed by historians because they seek 
to understand structures and conjunctures, not despite their larger goals.” See S. Kinser, 
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an “explosive” nature, they are “the matter of the moment” and exist as 
a vast mass of diverse facts, which yet do “not make up all of reality” and, 
in consequence, create “almost a horror of the event” for the social scienc-
es.97 As the second mentioned, events/an event as a tool of the historian’s 
categorization has often created “a mere abstraction,”98 unable to touch 
the plasticity and rhythm of the time in the history. Events are the dust 
of the history. Braudel has not rejected the short span perspective in the 
historical analysis, reversely, he has appreciated its problematic potential: 
“the short span is the most capricious and the most delusive of all.”99 If 
the short time span is the domain of events, the longue durée is the mat-
ter of structures. This dialectics of structure and events will return in an 
anthropologically elaborated way in the conception of Marshall Sahlins. 
Braudel has seen the possibility for the great historical social science 
as encompassing many social disciplines (sociology, ethnography, eth-
nology, anthropology, communication science, geography, economics, 
political science, etc.) for all the three time spans. Its task had been 
thought of as depicting the “social realities” taking the forms of “collec-
tive life, economies, institutions, social structures, in short and above all, 
civilizations.”100 All the elements of these social realities are of a different 
and constantly changing pace and duration, thus the most fundamental 
explanatory force, according to Braudel, should be directed toward their 
underlying principles, “a slow-paced history of civilizations, a history of 
their depths, of the characteristics of their structure and layout.”101 This 
was not a proclamation of a reductive principle in the historical analy-
sis to the level of the structures of the longue durée, but rather a trial of 
maintaining a constant, explanatory dialectics between the structure and 
the event. Braudel’s stress on the necessity of this dialectics is the most 
visible in his trial of the reconciliation of Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Marxist’s 
perspectives without the gesture of a reduction the one into another. His 
attitude has been rather solidly embedded into the constant move “from 
event to structure, and then from structure and model back to the event.”102 
Annaliste Paradigm? The Geohistorical Structuralism of Fernand Braudel, “American His-
torical Review” 86/1981, p. 96. 
 97 F. Braudel, History and the Social Sciences..., p. 28. 
 98 F. Braudel, The Situation of History..., p. 10.
 99 F. Braudel, History and the Social Sciences..., p. 28.
100 F. Braudel, The Situation of History..., p. 11.
101 Ibidem, p. 12. 
102 F. Braudel, History and the Social Sciences..., p. 50.
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The dialectical analytical rule from structure to event and back to 
the structure was yet expressed in slightly different terms in Braudel’s 
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. 
Samuel Kinser analyzing the changing concept of Braudel’s structure had 
shown that it hardly could be explained in the terms of the one, struc-
tural paradigm.103 In The Mediterranean the structural history regarded 
as a geohistory had carried a great ambition of restoring everything. This 
early version of Braudel’s geohistorical historiography placed itself be-
tween the Scilla of Marc Bloch’s patterns of agricultural production and 
the Charybdis of Lucien Febvre’s mental patterns of cultural activity.104 
The only two principles that the geostructures of Baudel shared were the 
spirit of Annales analysis: considering the structure as a given form of 
order, and the methodological interdisciplinary openness for the struc-
tural analysis. In The Mediterranean the geohistorical structure is built of 
a countless number of “structural facts,” organized in a way of, as Kinser 
defines, organic coding, working out the shape assumed by Braudel of an 
organismic structure of a unitary historical everything.
Yet, the final outcome of Braudel’s structural analysis and the actual 
course of his analytical procedure were finally not closed into the shape of 
the one, united and closed structure. It rather took a form of “the display 
of spatial patterns whose parts act and react to each other in ways that 
cannot be totalized, because new associations – subparts and superior 
parts – constantly form and dissolve.”105 From the two heuristic proce-
dures undertaken by Braudel in his analysis, the first one referred to the 
interwoven “concrete reality” of “how one kind of activity led to another 
in ways that were quite beyond the consciousness of any particular group 
[...]”106, and the second, of orchestrated various tendencies occurring in 
the different time and space as running parallely. 
In consequence, Braudel’s structure has preserved a basic resemblance 
to Gaston Roupnel’s conception of structure in its “descriptive concreteness 
above systematicity and abstract rigor.”107 But, what is the most impor-
tant, and what Samuel Kinser has revealed, in the course of the historical 
analysis resulting from the two heuristic procedures, in The Mediterranean 
the two contradictory meanings of structure have glimmered: the first 
103 S. Kinser, Annaliste Paradigm? The Geohistorical Structuralism... 
104 Ibidem. 
105 Ibidem, p. 80. 
106 Ibidem, p. 78. 
107 Ibidem, p. 73. 
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as an apparent framework referring to the actual, sensorial and physical 
entity; and the second one, as the generating law. If before the 1950s the 
first meaning was dominant: of the structure as a pattern in the sensorially 
perceived reality, after this period the anthropological-structural meaning 
of Lévi-Strauss came onto the scene. The term “social structure” referred 
not to the social reality itself, but to the model implied over it; and in the 
terms of Lévi-Strauss and his structural anthropology expressed in the 
context of the diachronic methods of analysis, to the “logical framework 
for historical developments,”108 or as Phillip Rousseau called it, to the 
“changing patterns of a kaleidoscope.”109
In Braudel’s elaboration of the structuralism, these two appeared as the 
mechanical and statistical models for the social realities or as a (1) “senso-
rially referential sense” of (2) a structure as a model of social relations,110 
without (after the reservation of Lévi-Strauss) the possibility of a reduction 
of the one to the other, yet with the possibility expressed by Braudel of 
the control, verification and comparision one through the other.111 From 
these two meanings of structure, the first one referred to the operation 
of discerning the visible and documentable patterns of social action, the 
second to the conceptual model – a structure – implied by the variety of 
orchestrated patterns. 
Following Kinser’s analysis of Braudel’s historical structuralism one has 
to discern the methodological writings of Braudel from his actual histor-
ical analysis. According to Kinser, what Braudel has actually achieved in 
his The Mediterranean is not a structural analysis itself, but a mere “pat-
terning.” If Braudel repeats after Lévi-Strauss the postulate of discovery 
of the general structural laws on the microsociological level of analysis, 
at the same time he inclines toward the sensorially referential sense of 
a structure, thus toward a patterning. Combating a social-scientific struc-
turalism, Braudel treats the dichotomy between pattern and structure as 
108 C. Lévi-Strauss, Introduction: History and Anthropology, p. 24. 
109 P. Rousseau, Structure and Event in Anthropology and History, “New Zeeland Jour-
nal of History” 9/1975, p. 34.
110 See F. Braudel, History and the Social Sciences..., p. 40. 
111 “The procedure of this research is clear: to get past superficial observation in or-
der to reach the zone of unconscious or barely conscious elements, and then to reduce 
that reality to tiny elements, minute identical sections, whose relations can be precisely 
analyzed [...]. It seems to me that research is a question of endlessly proceeding from the 
social reality to the model, and then back again, and so on, in a series of readjustments 
and patiently renewed trips.” Ibidem, pp. 44–45. 
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between the material life (and its concrete history) and the ideal life (and 
its abstract and vague analysis). As a consequence, as Kinser summarizes, 
“from the point of view of twientieth-century structuralism, Braudel’s 
structures are long-enduring patterns, associated groups of activities that 
change their mutual relations but slowly.”112 The processes reconstructed 
by his geohistorical structure have been also elaborated on rather in the 
paradigm of exchange than production. Braudel was focused mostly on 
the forms of the commercial exchanges of long-distanced trade and the 
strategic role of the cities, and as Samuel Kinser has pointed out left aside 
the questions of production, distribution and consumption.113 
Nothing shows better the ambiguity of the term structure in Braudel’s 
writing than his edition of The Mediterranean. Braudel’s turn to the structur-
al analysis inspired changes in its second edition. Yet, as Kinser paradoxically 
admits, no one from the indeed structuralist moments in The Mediterranean 
is really labelled as structuralist in the same way as the geohistorical analysis 
from the first edition, which was indeed nothing more than a practice of 
patterning.114 The theoretically elaborated meaning of structure and pattern 
in the course of historical analysis “is implicit, but unexplored.”115
Kinser admits that the opposition between structural and event 
history is false and leads to simplification. “An event is a site of change, 
a construction developed by historians because they seek to understand 
structures and conjunctures, not despite their larger goals.”116 He suggests 
to consider the historical analysis as starting not from the collection of 
events or facts, but from the conceptually discerned situations, and later, 
the derived from them hypotheses of patterns and conjunctures. On this 
basis the structural (in the systemic paradigm), conjunctural and event-
ful analysis (in the chronological paradigm) can be undertaken with the 
necessary reference to each other.117
112 S. Kinser, Annaliste Paradigm? The Geohistorical Structuralism..., p. 83. 
113 Kinser writes about Braudel’s exchangism inspired mostly by the economic histo-
ry of Henri Pirenne. See ibidem, p. 75. 
114 Ibidem, p. 88. 
115 Ibidem, p. 85. 
116 Ibidem, p. 96. 
117 “Historians can discover when a pattern changes by reference to the concerted 
flow of conjunctural curves, long and short, which measure shifts in the relation of one 
kind of human activity to others. And they can discover why and how a pattern changes 
by analyzing the systems in play (the other patterns associated with the pattern in ques-
tion and the structures implied in them) at the moment when conjunctural curves change 
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In this light Braudel’s fallacy has consisted in the treatment of events 
as mere “atoms,” or “dust.” In consequence Braudel has considered them 
in terms of their autonomy and not as factors possibly breaking patterns 
and thus setting in motion the dynamics of historical change. The theo-
retically elaborated dialectics between the structure and event has thus 
been flattened and disrupted in the course of actual analysis. As Kinser 
concludes: “just as there can be no adequate patterning without structural 
analysis, there can be no adequate conjunctural analysis without theorizing 
about ‘breakpoints’ or ‘events.’ ”118 
5. Structuralism and history
One of the more poignant aspects of the current postmodernist 
mood is the way it seems to lobotomize some of our best grad-
uate students, to stifle their creativity for fear of making some 
interesting structural connection, some relationship between 
cultural practices, or a comparative generalization.The only 
safe essentialism left to them is that there is no order to culture.
M. Sahlins, Waiting for Foucault…Still, Prickly Paradigm 
Press, Chicago 2002, p. 48.
The analysis of the social systems “in play,” the cultural patterns in the 
course of their change, as Kinser has suggested, meant in the field of 
cultural studies, as of cultural anthropology, to go back to the Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’ statement that: “we must work on meanings.”119 Gabrielle 
M. Spiegel has named this moment as a “semiotic challenge” posed “to 
the practice of historiography by the rise of structural linguistics.”120 
Under this sign, the new impulse appeared for the development of the 
anthropological history. In the field of British cultural studies, the so far 
their course – that is, at the moment when ‘productivity’ of one form of human activity or 
another, insofar as such activity is quantifiable, grows or declines massively. Finally, ana-
lyzing particular times and places allows historians to construct the ‘events’ – the breaks 
in routines, customs, ideas, technologies – that disrupt patterns, sometimes massively 
enough to indicate that a structure has been displaced from its dominant position or has 
disappeared completely.” Ibidem, p. 97. 
118 Ibidem.
119 C. Lévi-Strauss, The Scope of Anthropology, trans. S. Ortner, P. and R. A. Paul, Jon-
athan Cape, London 1967, p. 23.
120 G. M. Spiegel, The Task of the Historian, p. 2.
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posed questions and proposed resolutions regarding the cultural-historical 
analysis have found themselves in the trap of the structural-functionalist 
theories; as Stuart Hall has denounced – cultural-historical analysis has 
been “evading the dialectic between agency and conditions: its thought 
‘structures’ as uncontradictory, integrative, functionalist in an evolution-
ary and adaptive sense.”121 The rescue from this trap, the “decisive second 
break” in cultural studies came with the “alterative” Marxism tradition 
and with the structuralism.122 For Marshall Sahlins in the field of cultural 
anthropology, the elaboration of structuralism enabled him to move to 
the terrain of historical anthropology.
Sahlins in his reinterpretation of structuralism goes far beyond the 
“giveness” of the social and cultural realities, reinforcing the (1) structur-
alist privilege of the system over the event, and (2) an exclusion from the 
structural analysis of the agency of individual action. For him the appli-
cations posited so far of the structuralism into the field of anthropology 
have left its basic theoretical assumptions intact. The most important of 
them were not those referring to the diachrony of the cultural and social 
process, to the history and cultural change, but to the human practice, 
“human action in the world.”123 In the structural linguistics, according to 
Sahlins, “action entered into account only as it represented the working 
out of an established order, the ‘stereotypic reproduction’ (Godelier’s 
phrase) of existing cultural categories.”124 The dialectics between structure 
and event elaborated earlier by Braudel in his project of structural his-
tory reappears in Sahlins’ interpretation first in his Culture and Practical 
Reason.125 For Sahlins, anthropological theory and practice is the most 
privileged site of elaboration of “practical reason,” and goes far beyond the 
old dichotomies of materialism-idealism, mind-matter, and subject-object. 
He treats these dualisms as a bad symptom of the modernity: “the contest 
between the practical and the meaningful is the fateful issue of modern 
121 S. Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre..., p. 12.
122 Hall enumerates within the second break the works of G. Lukács,’ L. Goldmann’s 
Hidden God, W. Benjamin’s, the early texts of the ‘Frankfurt School’, and J.-P. Sartre’s Ques-
tion of Method. Ibidem. 
123 M. Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, The University of Michi-
gan Press, Michigan 1995.
124 Ibidem, p. 6. 
125 M. Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason, The University of Chicago Press, Chica-
go – London 1976.
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social thought.”126 At the same time, these dichotomies have reappeared in 
the structuralism-Marxism historical relations, and according to Sahlins, 
touched the heart of the anthropological conception of culture. 
One of the most sharp critical arguments of Marshall Sahlins’ cul-
tural anthropology points out the lack of a well elaborated conception 
of culture. Nicolas Dirks has no illusions that Sahlins hasn’t managed to 
develop a  comprehension of the semiotic conception of culture in the 
field of anthropology. As he nastily points out, “Sahlins may be correct 
to assert that we should attempt, ‘to explode the concept of history by 
the anthropological experience of culture’, but by leaving his concept of 
culture unexploded by history he has merely reproduced the tendency for 
interdisciplinary formulations to swing only in one direction. If history 
should be explored by culture, then culture should likewise be explored 
by history.”127 This argument has been repeated after... Roseberry, for 
whom the Sahlins’ definition of culture almost completely overlaps with 
the conception of structure. The problem thus recognized regards Sahlins’ 
objects of symbolic structures: they belong as much to the realm of the 
social determination, as to the orders of ideas, signs, meanings, and beliefs. 
Thus, what strikes one in this conception is the vagueness of the difference 
between structure and culture. Translated into the terms of the historical 
analysis, so formulated a problem as the unclearly delineated dialectics 
between structure and event has reappeared. Dirks points out that in 
Sahlins’ interpretation events take the form of a disruptive force, and thus, 
on the one hand, they are challenging “structuralist assumptions about 
reproduction,”128 and on the other, they are problematic for historians. As 
we have already seen, even in Braudel’s structural history, events are the 
mere dust of the history (or as Nicholas Dirks followed Braudel: “for his-
torians events are everywhere”), and the meaning of events in the context 
of a long time span have been not elaborated as disruptive for patterns 
and as factors of the cultural change. Dirks’ reservations regard basically 
the anthropological and historical understanding of the processes of the 
cultural and social reproduction: Sahlins’ events are merely a “periodic, 
if occasional check on the steady reproduction of cultural systems,” and 
cultural systems of meaning are formulated prior to and autonomously 
126 Ibidem, p. ix. 
127 N. Dirks, Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthropologies..., p. 5. 
128 Ibidem, p. 5. 
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from the moment of risk or determination.”129 The mechanisms of cultural 
reproduction yet remained untouched. 
The reason for this may lay in the structuralist interpretation of the 
dialectics of event and structure. As Philip Rousseau has written: “it is 
not, in any case, events that are determined. Only structures are neces-
sary: events are contingent. Moreover, although there may be an overall 
system, that does not rule out a ‘local’ logic, existing in its own right, 
governing particular links, for example, in a chain of social adaptation.”130 
Yet, the disparity between the structure and event posed a much more 
general problem touching very deeply the concept of culture. Claude 
Lévi-Strauss has expressed it as a task, one could even say, a “task of the 
historian”: “We shall have the hope of overcoming the opposition between 
the collective nature of culture and its manifestations in the individual, 
since the so-called ‘collective consciousness’ would, in the final analysis, 
be no more than the expression, on the level of individual thought and 
behavior, of certain time [and space] modalities of the universal laws 
which make up the unconscious activity of the mind.”131 In other terms, 
one of the most important simplifications coming from the structuralist 
paradigm is the assumption that the structure is the matter of being and 
continuity, and the change is the matter of rupture and event. As Philip 
Rousseau has admitted, “Structural anthropology seems to have been able 
to reconcile, with less anxiety, continuity of structure and the reality of 
change.”132 It was the effort of this reconciliation that bothered as the field 
of British cultural studies, as Marshall Sahlins’ historical anthropology, in 
their elaboration of the method of the historical-cultural analysis. 
In the field of cultural studies the postulate expressed in such a way 
moved the concept of culture from “a set of texts and artifacts” (cultural 
objects), from the “ideal order” (of what the best have been ever said and 
written) to the anthropological moment in the theory of culture – to the 
understanding of culture as cultural practices, or speaking more specif-
ically, to the questions about the processes of ordering culture, of how 
these orderings are produced and sustained, and how they are the result 
of given practices and relations. These issues, which according to Stuart 
Hall are thanks to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism “offered a promise 
129 Ibidem, p. 4. 
130 P. Rousseau, Structure and Event..., p. 34. 
131 C. Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, p. 65. 
132 P. Rousseau, Structure and Event..., p. 34. 
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to the human sciences of culture a paradigm capable of rendering them 
scientific and rigorous in a thoroughly new way.”133 And thanks to Louis 
Althusser’s work, the promise expressed in such a way could be realized 
with the Marxist spirit and within the linguistic paradigm (posed as a 
possibility to “read” the modes of production as they were expressed 
in language134). The list of concrete analytical questions arising in such 
a described area Hall described as problems of “the circumstances and 
conditions of cultural reproduction,” and he enumerated them in the 
following questions: (1)  “what were the processes by means of which 
a dominant cultural order came to be ‘preferred’? (2) “who preferred this 
order rather than that?” (3) “what were the effects of a particular order-
ing of the cultures of a social formation on the other hierarchized social 
arrangements?” (4) “how did the preferred cultural order help to sustain 
‘definite forms of life’ in particular social formations?” (5) “how and why 
did societies come to be culturally ‘structured in dominance’?”135 In the 
perspective of the historical-cultural analysis, these questions interrogate 
a “universality of the anthropological meaning,” posing it in the context of 
“social formation, cultural power, domination and regulation, resistance 
and struggle.”136 They also enable to treat cultural texts and objects as 
documents and evidence of the cultural reproduction and change. 
What has been considered by Stuart Hall as the most important dif-
ference between the proposition of Lévi-Strauss’ and Althusser’s, was that 
Lévi-Strauss “gave up the question of the relation between signifying and 
non-signifying practices – between ‘culture’ and ‘not culture,’ to use other 
words – for the sake of concentrating on the internal relations within 
signifying practices by means of which the categories of meaning were 
produced.”137 In consequence, he “left the question of determinacy, of 
totality, largely in abeyance.”138 He left the historical logics of determina-
cy for the sake of the structuralist causality (“of the articulation of parts 
within a structure”139). 
133 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 64.
134 Ibidem.
135 S. Hall, Cultural Studies and the Centre..., p. 15. 
136 Ibidem.




In Althusser’s reinterpretation of structuralism, the unconscious ide-
ologies replace the unconscious structures. In consequence, differently 
than in the culturalist paradigm, the cultural subject does not create their 
lives through their ground “experience,” but their experience is an effect 
of “the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture.”140 As 
ultimately Stuart Hall has admitted, “experience was conceived, not as an 
authenticating source but as an effect: not as a reflection of the real, but 
as an ‘imaginary relation.’ ”141 
If for the cultural studies turning to the structuralist and Marxist par-
adigms was the matter of, as it was said before, “the questions about the 
processes of ordering culture, of how these orderings are produced and 
sustained, and how they are the result of given practices and relations;” 
Sahlins from his Culture and Practical Reason, took a very similar direc-
tion. He was looking for the relation “between practice and concept as 
an occasion to reflect on the adequacy of material praxis to account for 
the cultural order.”142 For Stuart Hall and his colleagues, as for Marhall 
Sahlins, the divergences between Marxism and structuralism were not 
impossible to reconcile. They rather problematized the concept of cul-
ture, its reproduction in time, the cultural change and its longue durée. 
As Sahlins has commented in 1976, “the love-hate affair raging between 
structuralists and Marxists,” and “still, the usual modes by which the two 
are opposed, the synchrony of structuralism to the diachrony of Marx-
ism, the idealism of the former to the materialism of the latter,” “make it 
difficult to understand why they should even contemplate a synthesis [...]. 
What structuralism seems to offer, even beyond a conception of the con-
tinuity in history that Marx recognized for certain precapitalist societies, 
is an explicit statement of the culture in the praxis, the symbolic order in 
the material activity.”143 What he considered then as a common ground 
between these two paradigms was the relation between the “productive 
action in the world and the symbolic organization of experience.” The 
point of departure, as much for Sahlins as for the cultural studies, can be 
thus seen as a structuralist assumption about the priority of the structure 
over the event. (“Privileging the determinations of the preexisting state, 
140 Ibidem.
141 Ibidem.
142 M. Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason, The University of Chicago Press, Chi-
cago 1976, p. 17. 
143 Ibidem.
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rather than the modifications ensuing from practice, structuralism invokes 
the action of the past where Marxism demands only the presence of the 
action.”144) If for the structuralism the synchrony is the first principle, 
the diachronic character of structures is thus thought of as a variation of 
the synchronic order. As Sahlins admits, “in truth structuralism is not so 
much a theory of simple reproduction as it has been a theory of structures 
that so reproduce.”145 
The mutual dialogue between cultural studies and anthropology has 
resulted in the deepening of the conceptualization of the category of cul-
ture in the field of anthropology and ethnography, but also in regarding 
the anthropological conception of culture as one of the most important 
elements of cultural studies. For many American cultural anthropologists, 
it was Raymond Williams’ adaptation of the anthropological conception 
of culture that ultimately defined the field of British cultural studies, and 
his position in the field is no less important than Clifford Geertz’s in 
the anthropological writing.146 Cultural studies has also supported the 
anthropological recognition of the political dimension of cultural order, 
and prepared the comprehensive recognition of poststructuralism. The 
last mentioned, with the consequences of the crisis of representation, 
according to Dwight Conquergood enabled the critical rethinking of the 
key issues for ethnography: the Body, the Boundaries and Borderlands, 
The Performance, the Rhetorical Reflexivity.147 
Yet, in the course of the development of cultural studies, the possibil-
ities suggested by Stuart Hall of the reconciliation of the culturalist’s and 
structuralist’s strengths and weaknesses into the one programme of elab-
oration of historical-cultural analysis, appeared to be extremely difficult 
in its realization. Hall did not believe in the simple synthesis of these two 
theoretical propositions, yet, at the same time he insisted that neither of 
them could function as completely autonomous. 
According to Hall, one of the most important achievements of a variety 
of structuralist propositions in the field of historical-cultural analysis has 
been (1) the thesis of determinate conditions of the historical development, 
breaking with the naïve conviction that “men and women make their his-
144 Ibidem, p. 21.
145 Ibidem.
146 N. Dirks, Is Vice Versa? Historical Anthropologies... 
147 D. Conquergood, Rethinking Ethnography: Towards a Critical Cultural Politics, 
“Communication Monographs” 58/1991.
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tory alone.” The human subject of history has been replaced here by a his-
torical agent, already politically and economically placed and conditioned. 
The awareness of these historically contextualized conditions is considered 
as an indispensable premise of any political action. Another important 
premise of structuralisms (2) broke with the “radical interactionism,” and 
placed the human relationships in the centre of the historical processes. 
Thus (3) a constant development of the theory is required, necessarily 
oscillating between different levels of abstraction in the analysis of var-
ious historical processes. (4) Structuralism’s advantage over culturalism 
lays also in its insistence on the complexity of the unity of the structure, 
which cannot be simply reduced to particular practices. Hall has expressed 
this conviction as a belief “that there is always a mediator between praxis 
and practices, namely, the conceptual scheme by the operation of which 
matter and form, neither with any independent existence, are realized as 
structures, that is as entities which are both empirical and intelligible.”148 
He also warned against thinking of the cultural and social unity radically 
in terms of “difference,” which loses the concept of the structure, and 
suggested the direction “towards the problematic [area] of relative au-
tonomy and ‘over-determination’, and the study of articulation.”149 (5) The 
structuralist elaboration of the concept of ideology in relation to the ex-
perience led to the further problematization of the cultural reproduction 
over time. (6) The structuralist premises should be elaborated according 
to the culturalist restoration “between the unconsciousness of cultural 
categories and the moment of conscious organization. (7) An alterna-
tive proposition of the development of cultural studies could be derived 
from the discourse theories by placing not a unified but the decentred 
and contradictory subject in the centre of diachronic structures, (8) and 
as adeeper elaboration and return to the “political economy of culture.” 
Above all these possible elaborations, Hall has insisted on the exercising of 
the “concrete” historical analysis “of particular ideological and discursive 
formations” in the mode of Foucault and Gramsci.150 
Regarding the cultural longue durée as variety of the processes of 
the structural reproduction of cultural values and meanings within the 
complexity of human praxis has been also the core of Marshall Sahlins’ 
programme of historical anthropology. Sahlins, similarly to Hall, neglects 
148 S. Hall, Cultural Studies. Two Paradigms, p. 65.
149 Ibidem, p. 69.
150 Ibidem.
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the post-structuralist developments and an analytical domination of the 
processes of the discursive signification over the materiality of human 
practices. His aim is to reconcile the symbolic and pragmatic conceptions 
of culture in the context of the historical analysis. Yet, he is also far away 
from the utilitarian and simplistic political-economical interpretations 
of culture. In his Waiting for Foucault, he writes: “The current Foucault-
ian-Gramscian-Nietzschean obsession with power is the latest incarnation 
of Anthropology’s incurable functionalism.151 
The vivid rise of the performative studies in the 1990s has reopened, 
as much for anthropology as for the cultural studies, a hope of a return 
to the question of the material conditioning of the cultural reproduction 
rather in the terms of performativity than of the processes of significa-
tion. Marshall Sahlins passes this field with the old and since his Culture 
and Practical Reason well known dichotomy between the logics of social 
“structure and practice, system and event, state and process, norm and 
behavior.”152 His hope for the reconciliation of these is based on an old 
trouble: “We find it difficult to imagine that at the level of meaning, which 
is to say of culture, being and action are interchangeable.”153 He operates 
with the concept of the symbolic production, yet discerns its two types: 
prescriptive structures and performative structures, “continuously making 
relationships out of practice,”154 treated as reciprocal modes of the symbolic 
production. Performative structures understood similarly to the habitus, 
or to “structuring structures” involve the sphere of values as reflected or 
unreflected premises of human action: “being and doing or relationships 
and conducts, as meanings inhabit the same universe of discourse and 
are subject to common conceptual operations [...] By a common logic 
which is virtual to both, action and relation may thus function alternately 
as signifier and signified to the other.”155 The historical logic of perform-
ative structures reveals itself only if their processes became reworked in 
the moment of signification: the interplay of the structure and praxis. Its 
course does not occur ad hoc, but often post factum. Within the logics of 
performative structures the old sentence of Marc Bloch finds its sense: “al-
151 M. Sahlins, Waiting for Foucault..., p. 20.




155 Ibidem, p. 30.
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though men were not fully aware of the change, the old names which were 
still on everyone’s lips had slowly acquired connotations far removed from 
their original meaning.”156 Marshall Sahlins’ proposition, and the actually 
unrealized programme of the possible reconciliation of culturalist and 
structuralist paradigms in the field of cultural studies, could be inscribed 
ascribed to the historical anthropology’s and anthropological history’s 
searching for the great synthesizing explanations – abandoned after the 
latest developments in the field. Interestingly, the entrance of the Annales 
School into the vast field of humanistics came at a time, when “the old 
interpretations, the political interpretation, the economic interpretation of 
history, the ‘great man’ theory, have all in turn been successfully challenged 
and discarded, but nothing has been put in their place to give coherence 
to the study of culture. In consequence, the relevance of a knowledge of 
history to the understanding of the way in which human society works 
is becoming increasingly difficult to defend.”157 In consequence, Fernand 
Braudel’s understanding of the history of man and the structural order 
regulating the cultural, institutional, political and social long lasting 
orchestrations has rather introduced the “humanistic-naturalistic” ide-
as, derived from the Enlightenment naturalism, of Space (of ecological 
systems), Time (of variety of rhythms) and Man (as the intersection of 
the two).158 The human subject of historical analysis took the form of an 
abstract unity. What could serve as a trace of Braudel’s cultural analysis 
is trapped in the fallacy of universalism. The cultural and social realities: 
science, religion, war, etc., are not reconstructed but treated as already and 
universally given: “to Broudel these categories are already articulated and 
ordered; the historian’s duty is merely to find them.”159 
This view could not cope sufficiently with the subtlety and variety 
of social and cultural differentiations, and even less with the quality of 
everyday life. Yet, its further elaborations came back to the core of the 
historicity of the concept of culture. 
156 M. Bloch, French rural history, trans. J. Sondheimer, University of California Press, 
Berkeley 1966, p. 90, quoted in ibidem, p. 31.
157 D. Crozier, History and Anthropology, pp. 563–564. 
158 S. Kinser, Annaliste Paradigm? The Geohistorical Structuralism..., p. 67. 
159 Ibidem, p. 101. 
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